Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1–July 26, 1956, Volume XV

437. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Allen) to the Secretary of State¹

Washington, July 10, 1956.

SUBJECT

• Egyptian Suggestions Regarding Arab–Israel Settlement Discussion:

Egyptian Foreign Minister Fawzi has broached to the British Ambassador in Cairo the possibility of moving toward an Arab–Israel settlement and suggested this be done in two stages: First, through Hammarskjold and then by an international conference. (Tab B²) Ambassador Byroade is seeing Fawzi this week and may receive the same suggestions. The British Foreign Office welcomes the initiative and has instructed the British Embassy to discuss the matter with the Department. (Tab C³)

In considering the matter we think that the following factors should be kept in mind:

1. The many instances in the past in which Egypt has talked of a willingness to move towards a settlement.

2. The possibility that this is another Egyptian maneuver to retain Western support, despite acts of collaboration with the Soviet Union.

3. The extreme position, particularly with respect to the Negev, taken during the talks with Robert Anderson in January and March.

4. The likelihood, despite Fawzi’s disclaimers, that this particular program was discussed and perhaps worked out with the USSR.

5. Implicit in the suggestion is support for Egyptian leadership in the Arab world which would run completely counter to our present policies.

6. Recent indications the Soviet Union does desire a détente in the Middle East. Ambassador Bohlen has reported that Hammarskjold is convinced the USSR does not want an outbreak of hostilities and is willing to cooperate in working toward a settlement.⁴ Shepilov’s refusal to support the Arabs publicly against Israel during his recent visit lends credence to this thesis.

7. Hammarskjold’s apparent desire to work alone on the Arab–Israel problem, without interference from the major powers.

8. The dangers of being maneuvered into a position of supporting Israel while the USSR supports the Arab states, either at an international conference or in the UN.

9. The need to maintain, at least publicly, a position of support for any moves which could lead to a settlement. Your speech of August 26, 1955 gives a firm position upon which to stand.

Recommendations:

In view of the above factors, it is recommended that you:

1. Reply to the British along the lines of the attached talking paper. (Tab A)

2. That we do not permit this gambit to divert us from proceeding with the other measures we are taking within the area, designed to reduce Egyptian influence.

3. That, despite considerable initial skepticism, we await the results of Hammarskjold’s further talks with the Egyptians before determining definitely what position to take.⁵

[Tab A]

TALKING PAPER⁶

As the British are aware from the Alpha operation, we are prepared to make large contributions to secure an Arab–Israel peace and had thought that Egypt was the key to any such arrangement. Our position on the general nature of such a settlement remains as set forth by the Secretary on August 26, 1955.

However, we cannot fail to regard the present Egyptian move with considerable skepticism in view of the attitude taken by Nasser during the talks in January and March and the likelihood that this particular plan may have been worked out with the Soviet Union. It has been a favorite Egyptian maneuver to try and retain Western support by talking about peace with Israel, while building up Egypt’s own strength in the area and collaborating in acts with the Soviets.

Nevertheless, we do not think we should avoid exploring the present opening to see whether any real possibilities exist. We accordingly are in accord with the proposed British reply to Fawzi and are prepared to instruct our Ambassador in Cairo to take a similar line if he is approached by Fawzi. We would suggest in addition emphasizing to Fawzi the need for concrete steps indicative of a real intent to proceed, such as cooperation with Hammarskjold on his suggestions regarding the border and abandonment of the Suez Canal blockade. Also, we would avoid showing an undue interest in the proposal and would not imply to Fawzi support for any particular procedure in the second phase.

We believe that both of us should study carefully all the implications, but refrain from any definite determination regarding further steps pending the results of Hammarskjold’s next visit to the area.

1. Source: Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Omega—Egyptian Suggestions Re Arab–Israel Settlement. 1956. Top Secret; Omega. Drafted on July 9 by Burdett.
2. Tab B is attachment 1 to Document 433.
3. Tab C is attachment 2, ibid.
4. Ambassador Bohlen on July 7 informed the Department in telegram 46 from Moscow that he had learned that Hammarskjöld was convinced the Soviets did not want war in the Middle East; that the Soviets hoped to contribute to creating an atmosphere in which the parties could negotiate; that the Soviets were not committed to the U.N. resolutions of 1947 as a point of departure in any Arab–Israeli negotiations; and that Shepilov had informed Hammarskjöld that it was his impression that Nasser was concentrating on Egypt’s internal political and developmental situation. (Department of State, Central Files, 315/7–756)

   Hammarskjöld was visiting the Soviet Union as part of his first Eastern European tour as Secretary–General of the United Nations. He visited the Soviet Union on July 2–5.

5. Dulles initialed his approval on the source text.
6. Top Secret. Drafted by Burdett on July 9.