433. Memorandum From the Secretary of State’s Special Assistant (Russell) to the Secretary of State1

SUBJECT

  • Fawzi Approach to British Ambassador on Israel–Arab Settlement

Mr. Bailey of the British Embassy has just left with me the attached telegrams. One of them, from Trevelyan to the Foreign Office, reports a new approach by Fawzi, authorized by Nasser, to an Israel–Arab settlement. It would be based upon initial conversations by Hammarskjold with both sides, to be followed by final recommendations on the terms of the settlement by a group of outside powers. The second telegram gives the initial reaction of the Foreign Office.

The Foreign Office intends to cable Trevelyan asking him to express to Fawzi the tentative U.K. views before Nasser leaves for Brioni on July 12. The Foreign Office would like our comments before cabling Trevelyan.2

F.H.R.
[Page 790]

[Attachment 1]3

PALESTINE

The following information was telegraphed to Foreign Office by Her Majesty’s Ambassador, Cairo, on July 5:—

Egyptian Minister for Foreign Affairs today raised the Palestine question with me. After urging that everything should be done to prevent the Israelis taking aggressive action against Jordan following the information given by Burns,4 he outlined his ideas on progress towards a settlement of the whole Palestine question.

2.
The first step to be taken was to ascertain what the gap was between Cairo and Tel Aviv and to narrow it as far as possible. This might be done secretly through Hammarskjold or through other means, and the process might begin as soon as the present tension between Israel and Jordan was removed.
3.
He then contemplated a second stage, which he thought could only take place after the American elections. There would undoubtedly be a gap remaining between the Arab and Israeli ideas. At this stage certain outside Powers could come into the picture and should try, in consultation with Cairo and Tel Aviv, to produce a scheme for a settlement. During this process, Egypt would consult the other Arab States and obtain an all–Arab view. The terms proposed by the countries concerned could then be given shape in a United Nations resolution sponsored by as many States as possible and United Nations authority could if necessary be used to insist upon the acceptance of the settlement of Arabs and Israelis.
4.
In discussing this second stage, Dr. Fawzi said that there were three possible means of proceeding:—
(a)
Through Hammarskjold. He believed, however, that Hammarskjold would not have sufficient authority to carry the affair through.
(b)
Through the tripartite Powers. This the Egyptians would oppose as having an appearance of foreign influence in it.
(c)
Through a mixture of outside States. He first talked about India, Indonesia, Burma and some Latin American States, but subsequently discarded this idea and made a precise proposal of the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, India and Pakistan. I asked him about the French. He said that he had not put their name in as he wanted to get away from the usual patter, but he did not absolutely exclude them.
5.
In answer to my question, Fawzi said that they had not discussed this with the Soviet Government. At this stage they would only wish to discuss it with the Americans and ourselves. However, it might be discussed with Nehru and Tito at Brioni, or subsequently with Nehru here, and they would also, I gathered, be prepared to discuss it with Hammarskjold who wanted to come here and whom they hoped to invite here shortly.5
6.
In answer to another question, Fawzi confirmed that they intended that this machinery should be limited to the question of Palestine and should not be used to consider other Middle East problems. He said that this was only “a chat” and in no way a formal proposition. They wanted to be helpful and were therefore taking this initiative. He would not want any formal reply, though he would naturally be ready to have another informal talk in the light of any ideas which I might receive from London. He agreed with my presumption that the views which he expressed were in accordance with the President’s6 ideas. I confined myself to saying that I was glad that he was seriously contemplating resumption of efforts to solve the Palestine question and was prepared to take an initiative in the matter.

[Attachment 2]7

I welcome this Egyptian initiative and think we should encourage the Egyptians to follow it up. My preliminary comments are as follows.

2.
The idea of proceeding in two stages is promising and we have always had in mind that Egypt should lead for the Arabs as regards a Palestine settlement. I agree that Hammarskjold is probably the right person to handle the first stage. He is already in the picture and plans to revisit the Middle East (paragraph 7 of New York telegram No.8). On the other hand the first stage may prove more complicated and prolonged than Fawzi seems to think, if the inevitable gap between Egyptian and Israel views is to be substantially narrowed. This will require confidential negotiation with the two Governments alternately, and Hammarskjold may be too public a figure and too occupied with other duties to undertake it. We might then have to fall back on preliminary negotiations through [Page 792] Anglo–American intermediaries, although ideally I should prefer some neutral person.
3.
Fawzi’s idea of the second stage seems to be a conference attended by Egypt, who would present the all–Arab view, Israel and a mediator or group of mediators. I agree that neither Hammarskjold nor the Tripartite Powers as a group would be suitable for this latter role. I should prefer a group consisting of say India, Pakistan, Burma, a Latin–American state (perhaps Uruguay) and perhaps Italy. None of these has previously been involved in the Palestine dispute, their sympathies would about balance: and there would be no great Power. We ourselves would thus avoid the odium which has usually come to us for “Great Power meddling” and of being cast inevitably for the role of Israel’s supporters. We should have an excuse for excluding the Russians. If the Egyptians insist, however, on the Soviet Union as one of the group we and the Americans clearly cannot stand aside; and the Israelis for their part might well refuse to attend a conference if we and the Americans were not there (Tel Aviv telegram No.9). Furthermore since we and the Americans have already stated our willingness to help financially with regard to the refugees we shall clearly have to become associated with the conference even if only at a further stage.
4.
I agree that it would be a good idea to formulate the terms of a settlement in a United Nations resolution which would then formally supersede those of 1947 and 1948. But it is essential that the settlement should first be accepted by both Israel and the Arab States. I hope the Egyptians do not intend to try and force through a United Nations resolution which is not acceptable to all concerned.
5.
Please discuss these ideas with the State Department and telegraph their views. I should like to authorize Her Majesty’s Ambassador in Cairo to tell Fawzi before July 12 at least that:
(a)
We welcome his initiative which we think is constructive;
(b)
We agree with his proposed first stage and suggest that his idea should be put to Hammarskjold on the latter’s next visit to Cairo; and
(c)
We are considering further his ideas on the second stage which will necessarily depend in part on the success of the first.
  1. Source: Department of State, S/SNEA Files: Lot 61 D 417, Omega #8. Top Secret. Also addressed to Hoover.
  2. See Document 438.
  3. Secret.
  4. See Document 425.
  5. On July 10, U.N. Secretary–General Hammarskjöld announced his intention to visit Israel and Egypt July 19–22 as a followup to his previous peacekeeping mission.
  6. On June 23, Nasser was elected President of the Republic of Egypt.
  7. Top Secret.
  8. The telegram number was crossed out on the source text.
  9. The telegram number was crossed out on the source text.