433. Memorandum From the Secretary of State’s Special Assistant
(Russell) to the
Secretary of State1
Washington, July 9,
1956.
SUBJECT
- Fawzi Approach to British
Ambassador on Israel–Arab Settlement
Mr. Bailey of the British Embassy
has just left with me the attached telegrams. One of them, from
Trevelyan to the Foreign
Office, reports a new approach by Fawzi, authorized by Nasser, to an Israel–Arab settlement. It would be based
upon initial conversations by Hammarskjold with both sides, to be followed by final
recommendations on the terms of the settlement by a group of outside
powers. The second telegram gives the initial reaction of the Foreign
Office.
The Foreign Office intends to cable Trevelyan asking him to express to Fawzi the tentative U.K. views before
Nasser leaves for Brioni
on July 12. The Foreign Office would like our comments before cabling
Trevelyan.2
[Page 790]
[Attachment
1]3
Washington, July 9,
1956.
PALESTINE
The following information was telegraphed to Foreign Office by Her
Majesty’s Ambassador, Cairo, on July 5:—
Egyptian Minister for Foreign Affairs today raised the Palestine
question with me. After urging that everything should be done to
prevent the Israelis taking aggressive action against Jordan
following the information given by Burns,4 he outlined his
ideas on progress towards a settlement of the whole Palestine
question.
- 2.
- The first step to be taken was to ascertain what the gap was
between Cairo and Tel Aviv and to narrow it as far as possible.
This might be done secretly through Hammarskjold or through other means, and the
process might begin as soon as the present tension between
Israel and Jordan was removed.
- 3.
- He then contemplated a second stage, which he thought could
only take place after the American elections. There would
undoubtedly be a gap remaining between the Arab and Israeli
ideas. At this stage certain outside Powers could come into the
picture and should try, in consultation with Cairo and Tel Aviv,
to produce a scheme for a settlement. During this process, Egypt
would consult the other Arab States and obtain an all–Arab view.
The terms proposed by the countries concerned could then be
given shape in a United
Nations resolution sponsored by as many States as possible and
United Nations authority could if necessary be used to insist
upon the acceptance of the settlement of Arabs and
Israelis.
- 4.
- In discussing this second stage, Dr. Fawzi said that there were three
possible means of proceeding:—
- (a)
- Through Hammarskjold. He believed, however, that
Hammarskjold
would not have sufficient authority to carry the affair
through.
- (b)
- Through the tripartite Powers. This the Egyptians
would oppose as having an appearance of foreign
influence in it.
- (c)
- Through a mixture of outside States. He first talked
about India, Indonesia, Burma and some Latin American
States, but subsequently discarded this idea and made a
precise proposal of the United States, the United
Kingdom, the Soviet Union, India and Pakistan. I asked
him about the French. He said that he had not put their
name in as he wanted to get away from the usual patter,
but he did not absolutely exclude them.
- 5.
- In answer to my question, Fawzi said that they had not discussed this with
the Soviet Government. At this stage they would only wish to
discuss it with the Americans and ourselves. However, it might
be discussed with Nehru
and Tito at Brioni, or subsequently with Nehru here, and they would also,
I gathered, be prepared to discuss it with Hammarskjold who wanted to come
here and whom they hoped to invite here shortly.5
- 6.
- In answer to another question, Fawzi confirmed that they intended that this
machinery should be limited to the question of Palestine and
should not be used to consider other Middle East problems. He
said that this was only “a chat” and in no way a formal
proposition. They wanted to be helpful and were therefore taking
this initiative. He would not want any formal reply, though he
would naturally be ready to have another informal talk in the
light of any ideas which I might receive from London. He agreed
with my presumption that the views which he expressed were in
accordance with the President’s6
ideas. I confined myself to saying that I was glad that he was
seriously contemplating resumption of efforts to solve the
Palestine question and was prepared to take an initiative in the
matter.
[Attachment
2]7
I welcome this Egyptian initiative and think we should encourage the
Egyptians to follow it up. My preliminary comments are as
follows.
- 2.
- The idea of proceeding in two stages is promising and we have
always had in mind that Egypt should lead for the Arabs as
regards a Palestine settlement. I agree that Hammarskjold is probably the
right person to handle the first stage. He is already in the
picture and plans to revisit the Middle East (paragraph 7 of New
York telegram No.8). On the
other hand the first stage may prove more complicated and
prolonged than Fawzi seems
to think, if the inevitable gap between Egyptian and Israel
views is to be substantially narrowed. This will require
confidential negotiation with the two Governments alternately,
and Hammarskjold may be
too public a figure and too occupied with other duties to
undertake it. We might then have to fall back on preliminary
negotiations through
[Page 792]
Anglo–American intermediaries, although ideally I should prefer
some neutral person.
- 3.
- Fawzi’s idea of the
second stage seems to be a conference attended by Egypt, who
would present the all–Arab view, Israel and a mediator or group
of mediators. I agree that neither Hammarskjold nor the Tripartite Powers as a
group would be suitable for this latter role. I should prefer a
group consisting of say India, Pakistan, Burma, a Latin–American
state (perhaps Uruguay) and perhaps Italy. None of these has
previously been involved in the Palestine dispute, their
sympathies would about balance: and there would be no great
Power. We ourselves would thus avoid the odium which has usually
come to us for “Great Power meddling” and of being cast
inevitably for the role of Israel’s supporters. We should have
an excuse for excluding the Russians. If the Egyptians insist,
however, on the Soviet Union as one of the group we and the
Americans clearly cannot stand aside; and the Israelis for their
part might well refuse to attend a conference if we and the
Americans were not there (Tel Aviv telegram No.9). Furthermore since we and the Americans
have already stated our willingness to help financially with
regard to the refugees we shall clearly have to become
associated with the conference even if only at a further
stage.
- 4.
- I agree that it would be a good idea to formulate the terms of
a settlement in a United Nations resolution which would then
formally supersede those of 1947 and 1948. But it is essential
that the settlement should first be accepted by both Israel and
the Arab States. I hope the Egyptians do not intend to try and
force through a United Nations resolution which is not
acceptable to all concerned.
- 5.
- Please discuss these ideas with the State Department and
telegraph their views. I should like to authorize Her Majesty’s
Ambassador in Cairo to tell Fawzi before July 12 at least that:
- (a)
- We welcome his initiative which we think is
constructive;
- (b)
- We agree with his proposed first stage and suggest
that his idea should be put to Hammarskjold on the
latter’s next visit to Cairo; and
- (c)
- We are considering further his ideas on the second
stage which will necessarily depend in part on the
success of the first.
