432. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near
Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Allen) to the Secretary of
State1
Washington, July 9,
1956.
SUBJECT
- Suggested United States Policy on Israel–Arab Relations
I concur with the attached memorandum with the following exception and
comment:
I am not certain that the danger of an Arab–Israeli outbreak during the
next six months will stem principally from the Israel Government. Hasty
or ill–considered action such as the recent movement of Jordan troops
towards the frontier may result in hostilities by accident, even though
the Arab Governments may not intend or even desire such an outbreak.
Inter–Arab quarrels over dividing up Jordan might also precipitate
hostilities with Israel, possibly through a dash across the Negev by
Egyptian forces. It seems to me the danger of trouble is about even from
the Arabs and Israelis.
As regards F–86’s, I believe we should inform the Canadians that we would
be willing to consider allowing Italy to sell a few such planes (six or
perhaps twelve) if such action would satisfy Canada’s desire that we
share some part of the responsibility for Canadian sales. I would not
favor a direct sale by the US at this moment. The position we have taken
of refusing such direct sales is a useful one and should not be lost
unless no other alternative can be found.
As regards suggested steps towards settlement of the Israel–Arab issues,
I would add to Mr. Russell’s
suggestions the thought that we consider returning to the 1947 UNGA Resolution insofar as it calls for
the creation of separate Arab and Jewish states in Palestine, linked
through close economic ties. The Israelis may feel that they are now
strong enough economically to achieve gradual economic domination of the
Arab state, and Ben Gurion might
conceivably be brought to make some territorial concessions to the new
Arab state, as long as it was separated from Jordan and could serve as a
buffer.
[Page 787]
[Attachment]
Memorandum From the Secretary of State’s Special Assistant
(Russell) to the
Secretary of State2
Washington, July 6,
1956.
SUBJECT
- Suggested U.S. Policy on Israel–Arab Relations
- 1.
- Short Term Problem: Israel Activism.
The danger of an outbreak between the Israelis and the Arabs
during the next six months will stem principally from the Israel
Government. It is unlikely that the responsible Arab leaders
will feel during that period that they have achieved a military
position which will justify them in initiating hostilities. The
Israel Government, on the other hand, will feel that it is a
critical time. The debate in Israel circles between forcing the
issue on the one hand and moderation on the other will come to a
head. The proponents of the first have recently forged ahead.
This is indicated by the dismissal of Sharett and such actions by the Israel
Government as the construction of fortifications in the
demilitarized zone at Banat Yaacov, the building of kibbitzim at
El Auja, the effort to ship Israel cement through the Suez Canal
and Ben Gurion’s recent
talks with General Burns. Ambassador Eban recently asked for a meeting with you,
saying that he was not asking for a general discussion but only
for an answer on Israel’s requests for arms and for a $75
million Export–Import Bank loan.3 The
nature of your response to Eban will undoubtedly have some effect on early
decisions by the IG. It is
suggested that in your meeting with Eban you state that:
- a.
- We are following most closely the changes in Arab
effective military strength as a result of Soviet arms
shipments; that it is still our conclusion that Israel’s
total effective military strength is superior to that of
the Arabs and that the Arabs do not intend to launch an
attack in the near future; that there are indications
that the Soviet Union may not wish to support the Arabs
to the point of an attack on Israel and may, in fact,
use their influence within limitations to deter them;
that as long as Israel maintains a position of military
superiority, we believe it would lessen these deterrents
if the United States were to change its position on the
shipment of heavy arms at the present time.
- b.
- The reports from Ottawa are not encouraging with
respect to the likelihood of Canadian shipment of F–86’s
to Israel, although we
[Page 788]
are waiting for Pearson’s return
from his present trip to Europe for a final answer; at
that time we intend to explore other possibilities on
the basis of the Canadian decision. (Although it would
probably be better not to be too specific with Eban, the French have
recently filed with NEACC statements indicating their desire to
ship substantial additional quantities of arms to Israel
and it is not impossible, despite their recent
statements to us, that they would be willing to provide
another 24 Mysteres. There is good reason to believe
also that the Italians, if we gave them our approval,
would be willing to sell F–86’s to Israel.)
- c.
- The Export–Import Bank has not finished its study of
the IG application for
the $75 million loan and we are, therefore, not in a
position to make a final decision on this. If the
Export–Import Bank should find that the loan is
economically feasible, in whole or in part, we assume
that the Israel Government would be prepared to forego
construction in the demilitarized zone at Banat Yaacov
during the period of time that the construction on the
coastal plain which was financed by the Export–Import
Bank loan was in process.
- d.
- Our ability to pursue the policies set forth in the
preceding paragraphs will, of course, depend upon the
pursuance by Israel of policies that are conducive to
peace in the area and especially upon Israel’s
cooperation with Hammarskjold and UNTSO.
- 2.
- Longer–Term Problem: Increasing Arab
Sentiment for Showdown with Israel. The longer term
problem with respect to peace in the Middle East lies in the
increasing Arab sentiment for a showdown with Israel as a result
of the confidence stemming from the receipt of Soviet arms. It
is difficult to formulate now the steps which will be most
effective in dealing with this development. It will probably not
come to a head until next year. In general, the most effective
deterrent will be to work toward a situation in which the armed
forces of Israel and the Arab states will be in a mutually
stand–off position, with neither side finding it practical to
initiate hostilities. We should continue to support Hammarskjold in his attention to
the Middle East problem and to support action by the Security
Council whenever indicated. We should also continue to follow
closely and, where possible, probe the extent of the apparent
Soviet policy of stopping short in their support of the Arabs at
the point of Arab launching of military action against Israel.
From time to time, as circumstances indicated, we might find it
desirable to reiterate our continued adherence to the principles
of the Tripartite Declaration.
- 3.
- Steps Toward Settlement of Israel–Arab
Issues. Although the likelihood of a general settlement
of the Israel–Arab dispute is not bright, there may be a
possibility of progress from time to time on particular issues.
Instances of this would be the Lahoud approach on the Jordan
River,4 i.e., parallel construction
on the Israel and Arab sides which could later be coordinated in
something similar to the Johnston
[Page 789]
Plan; the transfer of
administration of refugee funds from UNRWA to the Arab Governments in such a way as to
promote absorption of the refugees into the Arab communities;
and a proposal for repatriation of substantial numbers of Arab
refugees in the Galilee section of Israel territory that would
have gone to the Arabs under the 1947 resolution.
