357. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State1
2304. Have reviewed Embassy cables make certain we have accurately predicted our feeling that Nasser capable of almost any conceivable act in order to insure Egypt and Arabs will have and be able to retain what they believe to be adequate military strength vis-à-vis Israel. We believe our past messages have made this clear.
It may not be entirely clear to Department why GOE (and we presume other Arab States) consider arming of Israel not only against their general interest, which of course logical conclusion, but actually hostile act directed at them. History of Israeli attitude and operation over past several years reveals systematic raids across borders in implementation deliberate policy of vigorous retaliation which Israelis hoped would force Arabs seek settlement. Arabs reason that Israel’s superiority in arms lead to her conclusion this safe tactic. Nasser at least feels this type of reckless activity bound to cease as Arab strength grows and that there would not be a repetition of Qibya, Nahhalin,2 Gaza etc. unless and until Israel decides on full scale war. He feels fact that there has been no such raid now that arms coming to Arabs is significant, and that last Israeli aggression one of shelling across border rather than using troops proves his theory.
Provision of arms to Israel, it is reasoned, is therefore to provide Israel with the means to continue her past tactics without substantial fear for her own security. As they have no doubt that this is what Israel would do, and as they feel we must honestly hold same view, they conclude such assistance as being aimed at themselves.
It seems to me that if we properly assess strength this Arab reaction we would conclude that in future all interests including United States, Arab [States] and Israel, would best be served if we discussed with Arabs beforehand—without seeking their prior approval any substantial shipment arms this area.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684.86/5–2156. Secret. Received at 8:30 a.m., May 22. Repeated to Amman, Beirut, Baghdad, Jidda, Damascus, Tel Aviv, Paris, and London.↩
- The Nahhalin incident occurred on March 28, 1954, when Israeli armed forces attacked the Jordanian village of Nahhalin, killing 9 persons and wounding 14 others. See also footnote 1 in Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. IX, Part 1, p. 1500.↩