684A.85/3–3154
No. 784
Memorandum of Conversation, by Robert L. Burns of the Office of
Near Eastern Affairs
Subject:
- Israel-Jordan Armistice Situation
Participants:
- Ambassador Rifa’i of Jordan
- NEA—Mr. Byroade
- NE—Mr. Burns
The Ambassador said he had intended to call on the Secretary but after further consideration and discussions with his Arab colleagues had decided to call on Mr. Byroade, perhaps seeing the Secretary at a later date.
The Ambassador referred to the recent call of the Arab Ambassadors on the Secretary and said the fears then expressed over possible aggression by Israel were borne out at Nahhalin.1 The Jordan Government considers the situation even more dangerous than heretofore, with tension at a peak. The Arab Legion could have but did not reciprocate the attack. However, Jordan expects the United States, as a signatory of the Tripartite Declaration, to do something about the matter. Jordan feels the United States responsible for the situation which has developed or at least for any future developments which may occur if some action is not taken. Jordan and its Arab friends are considering bringing the Nahhalin attack before the Security Council. Maybe other powers will bring the general armistice situation to the Council. Mr. Byroade said regardless of how discussion originated in the Council, it would be impossible to limit debate to one of the several aspects of the situation.
In response to Mr. Byroade’s query whether the Ambasador thought Council discussion might relieve the dangerous tension, the Ambassador said in the event of SC consideration the Arabs [Page 1501] would ask for Qibya-like sanctions against Israel for Nahhalin; Israel has withdrawn from the MAC and allowed its forces to commit further aggression. Mr. Byroade reiterated there was no way to isolate Nahhalin from several other questions: Article XII; the bus attack; individual infiltration; etc. We have been talking with the UK about the problem. Some act of diplomacy is needed to ease the situation.
Mr. Byroade did not share the Ambassador’s view that an effort by the U.S. or SC to “cool down” Israel would bring quiet to the area; lots of problems would be left unattended, especially the primary problem of the Near East today: public opinion. Prime Minister Sharett is trying to play a moderating role, and an attempt to limit SC discussion to Nahhalin and avoid Article XII, etc. would further excite the Israel people. One reason the Israel public is so excited is because of the U.S.; the Israelis think we have turned against them. Some background on this: the U.S. looks at its own security with an East-West point of view; it sees the lack of strength in the Middle East, contends that something must be done to stabilize the area and begins to take some action toward this end; this process started about three years ago, and it is a recognition of this evolution of American policy which has caused tension in Israel. There are people there who think we will do anything to gain Arab friendship. We hope that in a few years we will arrive at a situation wherein neither side will fear us. At this point the Israelis are really scared when they hear we may supply arms to some of the Arab states.
Mr. Byroade said the present Arab policy of maintaining a delicate balance between peace and war in the area is extremely dangerous; in time the world will say the Arabs’ refusal to talk and improve local conditions cannot be condoned. In the present instance it therefore does not seem in the long range interests of the Arabs to restrict SC discussion to the Nahhalin incident.
The Ambassador listed the withholding of U.S. aid to Israel over Banat Ya’qub, SC condemnation of Israel for Qibya, failure of the MAC to find Jordan guilty in the bus incident, and said the Arabs expect some action in the case of Nahhalin. All that is desired is tranquillity; the Arabs are not even asking for implementation of UN resolutions. Unless the West acts, the Arabs may feel compelled to take action which would force the West to rectify the unsatisfactory state of affairs. Will the three powers bring Nahhalin to the SC if the Arabs do not? Mr. Byroade said we were presently considering the matter. He believed the USSR’s vetoes in the Council are something more than friendly acts toward the Arabs; they are attempts to frustrate any move toward stability in the Near East. Some way should be found to bring Israel back to the MAC [Page 1502] and have Israel–Jordan talks on ways to make the UN machinery more effective.
The Ambassador said the Arabs feel Nahhalin must be brought to the Council but have not yet made a firm decision in the matter. If the Arabs do not bring it, will it be brought by others? Mr. Byroade said his guess was it would be.
(The Ambassador, in referring to Arab apprehensions that expanded discussions will result if Nahhalin is raised in the Security Council, mentioned the Arabs’ “new Russian friend”.)
- On Mar. 30, the Jordanian Foreign Minister charged in a cable to the U.N. Secretary-General that Israeli armed forces had on Mar. 28 attacked the village of Nahalin, killing 9 persons and wounding 14 civilians. (U.N. doc. S/3192) On Apr. 1, the Representatives of Lebanon requested on behalf of Jordan the inclusion of the item on the Security Council’s agenda for urgent consideration. (S/3195) On Apr. 5, Israel asked for urgent consideration of four complaints that Jordan had repudiated its obligations under the Israel–Jordan Armistice Agreement, particularly by staging an attack on a bus at Scorpion Pass on Mar. 17. (S/3196 and Add.1; S/3200) The subject was discussed at Security Council meetings 665 to 671, from Apr. 8 to May 12. (S/PV.665–671) On June 19, the Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization submitted to the Secretary-General two reports concerning the Nahalin and Scorpion Pass incidents. (S/3251 and S/3252)↩