Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1–July 26, 1956, Volume XV

349. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, May 16, 1956, 4:34 p.m.¹

Washington, May 16, 1956, 4:34 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Operation Stockpile

PARTICIPANTS

• The Secretary
• Mr. Gordon Gray
• Admiral Radford
• Mr. MacArthur

Mr. Gray said that he and Admiral Radford had called on the Secretary to discuss certain aspects of Operation Stockpile. Admiral Radford said that following receipt of the Secretary’s letter of May 10,² with attached memorandum, he had discussed this project with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Secretary Wilson and the President.³ The JCS doubted that the aircraft would be effective if they were only delivered after aggression had taken place since the Egyptians could be expected to bomb the Israeli airfields from the outset, thus making Israeli air operations most difficult. The President, however, had told Admiral Radford that he thought it was a good idea. Admiral Radford then made the following comments:

1. In his informal consultation with the JCS on Operation Stockpile, they had expressed the view that it might be difficult to keep some information on this project from becoming public knowledge. With respect to the F–86 aircraft there would have to be a limited number of people in Europe informed (including both General Gruenther and General Tunner), since operational plans would have to be drawn up. However, the operational planning could doubtless be handled in a way where information would not leak out and he was not too concerned about any leak on the F–86 planning project. Similarly, he was not concerned about information getting out about the stockpile in Italy of aircraft spare parts and ammunition. …

With respect to the use of Cyprus as a point of turn-over to the Israelis, Admiral Radford commented that the present airfield facilities there were not very good. The present airfield was crowded and the additional field under construction would probably not be completed for another eighteen months. He inquired whether we might also wish to consider turning the planes over to the Israeli pilots at Athens. There was some discussion and it was agreed that Admiral Radford would find out whether the planes had the capacity to make the flight non-stop from Athens to Israel.⁴ If they did, we could also keep this possibility in mind, although for planning purposes we would try to firm up with the British on Cyprus.

2. With respect to Arab arms stockpile which is to be loaded on the AKA, Admiral Radford said that since this was Army equipment when it was loaded on the AKA and sent to the Sixth Fleet, there might be some speculation as to its purpose. He was thinking of having the loading take place in the Naval docks at Yorktown, Virginia, but even there civilian employees would have some knowledge of the matter. However, they would not of course know what the destination and purpose of the shipment was, although because of its unusual character and the fact that it was Army equipment going to the Sixth Fleet, there might be some speculation. We might, therefore, have to consider making an announcement if there were press speculation.

Admiral Radford said he understood that it was agreeable to the Secretary to change somewhat the composition of the Arab stockpile and the Secretary confirmed that it was agreeable. In particular, the Defense Department thought that Skysweepers were inappropriate (as it would take over a year to train people to use them) and it would like to substitute other items. The Secretary looked at the revised list of items, which Admiral Radford had with him, and said that the list was acceptable.

3. Admiral Radford said the furnishing of an AKA as an additional unit of the Sixth Fleet was feasible. The Navy had at one moment considered that a civilian-manned vessel might be better but had given this idea up since the cost was $2,000 a day and the security would not be as good. However, since the equipment on board the AKA was Army equipment, there would have to be about 20 Army technicians to care for it as it would deteriorate if it sat for a long period in the ship without proper care. The Navy was a bit concerned that crew members of the AKA in letters home or otherwise might talk about the nature of the cargo. While presumably only the Captain of the ship and perhaps one or two officers would know what the ultimate possible destination might be, information as to the cargo, if it became public, might lead to speculation as to the purpose of the arms. The Secretary said it was important to do all we possibly could to prevent information from leaking out prematurely. However, at some stage we might wish to make a public announcement that we had arms ready and available in the Mediterranean area to supply to a victim of aggression. In such event, it was particularly important that the exact nature of the arms not be known and, therefore, it was important that information as to the character of all the items of equipment in the AKA not get out since, if we made a very general announcement and if the public knew what was on the AKA, people could put two and two together and come up with an answer as to what we would furnish. It was better to have an air of mystery as to what we might do rather than to have it known in advance. It was agreed that every effort would be made to prevent information from becoming public as to the exact character and detail of the equipment and arms in the AKA.

4. Admiral Radford inquired who would speak to the British to firm up the arrangement regarding the use of Cyprus as a turnover point. Mr. MacArthur said that he would speak to Ambassador Makins about this matter and inquired whether it was all right to go ahead and do so now. Both Admiral Radford and Mr. Gray concurred that Mr. MacArthur could now call in Ambassador Makins and try to button up the Cyprus aspect.⁵

Mr. Gordon Gray said that paragraph 7 of the action required in the memorandum which the Secretary had sent over under cover of his letter of May 10⁶ was not strictly accurate. He gave Mr. MacArthur the following re-formulation of paragraph 7 which Mr. MacArthur said he would use to amend the memorandum:

“7. If, contrary to present expectations, the Canadians do not permit the sale of some F–86’s to Israel, we might encourage the Italian Government to grant the request made by the Israeli Government last March that Israeli pilots be given F–86 training in Italy. The Italians did not grant the Israeli request probably because the U.S. asked the Italians to consider whether such training would have an adverse effect upon IAF training capability and also to consult NATO authorities as to possible conflicts with Italian training responsibilities to NATO.”⁷

1. Source: Department of State, S/S–NEA Files: Lot 61 D 417, Omega #5. Top Secret; Omega. Drafted by MacArthur. The time of the meeting is from Dulles’ Appointment Book. (Princeton University Library, Dulles Papers) MacArthur recorded another portion of the conversation in the memorandum infra.
2. Document 342.
3. See Document 347.
4. According to MacArthur’s memorandum for the record. May 21, Admiral Hedding telephoned him that day to say that the F–86 aircraft “could fly from Athens to Israel without stopping at Cyprus.” (Department of State, S/S–NEA Files: Lot 61 D 417, Omega #5)
5. See Document 358.
6. Document 342.
7. MacArthur notified Radford and Gray by letter on May 17 that he had amended, in conformity with Gray’s suggestion, paragraph 7, page 4, of the memorandum enclosed in the Secretary’s letter of May 10 to each of them. (Department of State, S/S–NEA Files: Lot 61 D 417, Omega #5)