As you know, Mr. MacArthur has
been in touch with Captain Wagner on this matter, I would be most
grateful if the necessary list of actions could be developed by the
Department of Defense as a matter of urgency so that we can see clearly
what must be done.
[Attachment]6
MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT
- Preparations for implementing the President’s April 9
Statement (relating to the Arab-Israel situation)7 to the Effect that the United
States is Determined to Support and Assist any Nation in the
Middle East Which might be Subjected to Aggression
Background
In connection with the tense Middle East situation, the President on
April 9 announced that “… the United States is likewise determined
to support and assist any nation which might be subjected to such
aggression …”8 It is, of course, essential that the United States
Government now take such steps as may be required to be in a
position to implement the President’s statement should this become
necessary.
It is proposed that if the state of tension in the Middle East should
reach a point where it appeared that either Israel or the Arab
States were likely to initiate hostilities, the United States would
announce that it had military equipment and weapons in the
Mediterranean area which it was prepared to make rapidly available
to the victim of aggression. The announcement would be intended to
serve the political purpose of creating an additional deterrent to
aggression. However, should aggression occur, the United States, on
the basis of the plan set forth below, would be in a position to
[Page 630]
render assistance (in the
form of military equipment rather than use of our armed forces) to
the victim of aggression.
Implementation (Operation “Stockpile”)
A. Israel the victim of
aggression:
If Israel were the victim of aggression, the concept is that we would
turn over to Israeli authorities at Cyprus twenty-four F–86’s which
would be taken from U.S. operational units in Europe and flown via
Brindisi and Athens to Cyprus, where they would be turned over to
Israeli pilots for onward flight to Israel. Secretary Dulles discussed this proposal on a
most secret basis with British Foreign Secretary Lloyd in Paris9 during the recent
NATO meeting, and obtained Mr.
Lloyd’s tentative
approval with the understanding that we would explain the operation
in detail to Ambassador Makins in Washington10 with a view
of obtaining definite United Kingdom concurrence.
In addition, a stockpile of spare parts and ammunition for these
F–86’s should be constituted in Italy, possibly at Leghorn or
Naples. On the President’s instruction, Secretary Dulles discussed this matter with
General Gruenther during the
recent NATO meeting in Paris.11 General Gruenther expressed the view that
the plan was feasible, but cautioned most strongly that the
instructions to him (on the basis of which the necessary secret
contingent planning would be undertaken) should be handled on a most
secret basis to avoid any chance of leaks. Similar precaution would
have to be taken with respect to constituting a stockpile of F–86
spare parts and ammunition in Italy. Such a stockpile should
nominally be considered as reserves for U.S. forces operating in
Europe and the Mediterranean.
During the course of the NATO
meeting, the Secretary also discussed this possibility in general
terms with Mr. Pearson,12 the Canadian Secretary for External Affairs.
The Secretary explained that if Israel were the victim of
aggression, we would consider turning over to Israel some F–86
aircraft. If in the meantime the Canadian Government would permit
Israel to purchase perhaps twelve F–86’s which would enable the
Israelis to train pilots and ground crews, the problem of Israel
being able to use U.S. planes in the event of aggression would be
greatly facilitated. Mr. Pearson undertook to
endeavor to obtain Canadian Government approval of the sale of
possibly twelve F–86’s to Israel for training purposes. If Canada
does authorize this sale, the problem of training Israeli pilots so
that they
[Page 631]
will be in a
position to accept U.S. planes in Cyprus would be greatly simplified
since the Israeli pilots could presumably undertake their training
in Canada (or if this were not feasible, in Italy.)
B. Egypt or an Arab State the
victim of aggression:
If Egypt or an Arab State were the victim of Israeli aggression, we
would have an AKA (attack cargo
vessel) in the Mediterranean as a unit of the 6th Fleet, on which
would be loaded the following military supplies and equipment:
- 36 AAA weapons 75 mm (Skysweeper),
- 280 105 mm Recoilless Rifles mounted on 1/4 ton trucks,
- 1000 3.5 inch Rocket Launchers,
- 35,000 cubic feet anti-tank mines,
- 10,000 cubic feet of miscellaneous ammunition.
In the event of aggression by Israel, the AKA could, if it were deemed necessary, deliver the
arms stored on it to an Arab port, possibly Alexandria. If, in the
light of the circumstances obtaining, it did not seem feasible for
U.S. Naval personnel to deliver the vessel to Alexandria,
consideration might be given to turning it over on a loan basis to
Egypt so that an Egyptian crew could man the vessel at some
intermediate point such as Sicily or Benghazi, to proceed to
Alexandria.
Action Required
In order to be in a position for the President to make an
announcement that we have arms in the Mediterranean area that could
be rapidly delivered to the victim of aggression, certain immediate
steps are required, including the following:
- 1.
- Most secret instructions to General Gruenther to make the
necessary plans for twenty-four F–86’s to be delivered from
U.S. operational units in Europe to Cyprus. The instructions
would make clear that this was contingent planning and that
the proposal would only be activated if the President so
directed.
- 2.
- The constitution of a stockpile of spare parts and
ammunition for the F–86’s, presumably in Italy.
- 3.
- The assignment now of an AKA as an additional unit to the 6th Fleet, to
be dispatched to the Mediterranean when it had taken on the
cargo of arms and munitions set forth above.
- 4.
- The transfer from U.S. war reserves or other U.S. military
stocks of the arms and weapons for the Arab part of the
stockpile, and their early shipment to an embarkation port
where they could be loaded on the AKA. Ostensibly, the AKA and its cargo would simply be an additional
unit and equipment for U.S. forces operating in the
Mediterranean, and strict secrecy would be maintained as to
its possible ultimate destination.
- 5.
- Final agreement with the British regarding the use of
Cyprus as a point of delivery for the F–86’s to Israeli
pilots.
- 6.
- In the event of aggression against Israel, concurrence of
the Italian and Greek Governments would have to be obtained
for transit rights for the F–86’s en route from Europe to
Cyprus. To avoid leaks, however, this would not be broached
to the Italian or Greek authorities prior to the time when
the decision was taken. Similarly, the French should be
informed after we have taken the decision, but before
announcement.
- 7.
- If, contrary to present expectations, the Canadians do not
permit the sale of some F–86’s to Israel, we might encourage
the Italian Government to grant the request made by the
Israeli Government last March that Israeli pilots be given
F–86 training in Italy. The Italians did not grant the
Israeli request largely because the U.S. expressed the view
that this would interfere with training of NATO pilots and the Italian
air program.
Note: There may well be other necessary steps
in connection with the above program which the Department of Defense
may deem necessary.
