Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1–July 26, 1956, Volume XV

346. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Egyptian Ambassador (Hussein) and the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, Department of State, Washington, May 14, 1956¹

Washington, May 14, 1956

SUBJECT

• Near Eastern Problems

PARTICIPANTS

• Dr. Ahmed Hussein, Egyptian Ambassador
• NEA—William M. Rountree
• NE—Fraser Wilkins

The Egyptian Ambassador said he had spoken with the Secretary on Saturday evening² at the Gridiron Dinner. They had agreed to postpone their talk scheduled for Monday, May 14, until Thursday, May 17,³ the day before the Ambassador’s return to Cairo for talks with Prime Minister Nasser. The Ambassador said that when he had seen Mr. Rountree last week⁴ he had done most of the talking; he hoped Mr. Rountree would be willing to speak today. Mr. Rountree agreed and thought it would be useful again to have a look at such matters as the Aswan Dam, arms for Israel and the Baghdad Pact.

1. Aswan Dam. Mr. Rountree said he had checked with his associates, as he had told the Ambassador he would do, regarding the suggestion that the U.S. deposit $55 million with the International Bank pending U.S.-Egyptian agreement. Mr. Rountree said there was no way of making such a deposit prior to agreement between the U.S. and Egypt. Because we were approaching the end of F.Y. 1956, those funds which had previously been earmarked to cover U.S. Grant Aid for the first stage of the construction on the Aswan Dam would be diverted to other purposes. New funds for use on the High Aswan Dam would, however, be available in F.Y. 1957. The Ambassador inquired whether the Department could write a letter to the IBRD saying the U.S. planned, when agreement was reached, to assist in financing the Aswan Dam. Mr. Rountree regretted the Department could not write such a letter prior to agreement between the U.S. and Egypt.

Mr. Rountree asked the Ambassador whether the Government of Egypt had gone into all the legal aspects regarding utilization of Nile waters, including claims which other countries such as the Sudan and Ethiopia might advance. The Ambassador said that, as we knew, Egypt and the Sudan had begun talks. He had spoken with Prime Minister Nasser by telephone on this subject. The Prime Minister had told him the talks were going well. The Ambassador did not know whether any legal study had been prepared with respect to Ethiopian claims. He did know Ethiopia was endeavoring to make trouble by raising this question with the Government of Sudan. He did not know why they were taking this action because Ethiopia had plenty of rain and water and could not possibly in the foreseeable future need any water from the upper regions of the Nile. He thought that perhaps Ethiopian claims were now being injected for the purpose of Ethiopian advantage.

Mr. Rountree pointed out Ethiopian claims might have some basis in that once the Aswan Dam is built and had been in operation for a number of years, Ethiopian action to dam or withdraw water might be represented as unwarranted. In that sense the Ethiopians might now claim their rights might be impaired.

2. Arms for Israel. Mr. Rountree said that according to recent reports from the Near East, the U.S. was strongly being attacked in the press and on the radio regarding shipments of planes from France and other Western countries to Israel. He said this criticism did not seem justified since the U.S. had not adopted an official position of bringing pressure on other countries to make shipments to Israel. He added that, in any event, shipments from the U.S. were routine and mainly replacement such as spares for civilian aircraft and that other items from European countries were small and relatively unimportant. Altogether, none of them loomed very large in comparison with armaments which Egypt and other Arab countries were receiving from the Soviet bloc. Shipments from the West which were being criticized in the Near East were greatly misrepresented. Furthermore, Mr. Rountree noted that in addition to large quantities of arms going to the Arab states from the Soviet bloc, Egypt was serving as a channel for arms for Syria, Yemen and possibly other Arab states.

The Ambassador said that if the U.S. was not bringing pressure on France and also on Canada, he would think that we might issue an official denial. Mr. Rountree said the Secretary and press officers of the Department had continued to make clear the impartial policy of the U.S. We had not brought pressure on France and even now we had no information that Canada had taken action. The Ambassador inquired whether the U.S. itself planned to ship arms. Mr. Rountree said it was not likely that the U.S. would supply a significant quantity of arms to Israel.

3. Baghdad Pad. Mr. Rountree again confirmed the continued strong support of the U.S. for the Baghdad Pact, although it itself did not plan to adhere at this time. It was not U.S. policy to urge other states of the Near East to adhere. Each state should make this decision in the light of its own interest.

[Here follows a brief discussion of British colonial policy in the Persian Gulf; the situation in Algeria; and the Palestine question.]

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.00/5–1456. Secret. Drafted on May 15 by Wilkins.
2. May 12.
3. See Document 353.
4. During this meeting, Ambassador Hussein explained that he intended to return to Egypt for consultation and wished to “obtain a clear understanding of the U.S. position which he might communicate to Nasser”. (Memorandum of conversation by Burdett, May 10; Department of State, Central Files, 611.74/5–1056)