336. Telegram From the Delegation at the North Atlantic Council Ministerial Meeting to the Department of State1
Secto 29. Subject, Tripartite Talks: Middle East. Pineau opened discussion by saying he did not think it was up to three powers try resolve all ME problems, particularly delicate Arab-Israel problem; nor should they consider these questions from too general a viewpoint. While their interests not basically in conflict there may be differences between them as to solutions. UK had to protect its oil interests. Because of North African situation French Government had to be extremely cautious in its dealings with Arab countries. He suggested ministers consider two problems: (1) adoption of common [Page 616] stand regarding Arab-Israel problem in SC, and (2) supply of arms to Israel. On first point, he said Secretary General’s report not yet received.2 However, he thought ministers could direct their representatives in SC to adopt common stand and propose joint solutions. He asked for views of Secretary and Lloyd.
Secretary responded he thought we should always seek common position in SC. Assumed on this occasion matter would come up in two stages: (a) approval Hammerskjold’s report (which he thought probably certain) and, (b) decision on further steps to be taken by SC.
In response Pineau’s comment that we could not decide on further measures until we had report, Secretary agreed steps would depend in large measure upon what Hammerskjold himself thought. He hoped in any such steps USSR participation would be accepted only within context its membership SC and not as part any four power or other international committee. Three powers should pursue policies which would not permit USSR assume any special role in ME.
Pineau concurred.
Lloyd also agreed common policy essential and that USSR participation in further measures should be related their SC membership. He thought it best, however, if tripartite powers did not present in SC too obviously coordinated position; he saw advantage in fact that past action creating Hammerskjold mission was by virtue resolution sponsored by US alone.3 We should have understanding among ourselves, but publically should not act as “trio”.
Pineau said much more difficult and urgent question was that of arms to Israel. Because of difficult French position in North Africa and fact certain Arab States, especially Saudi Arabia and Egypt, were exploiting deliveries French arms to Israel and undermining French position North Africa, he felt it imperative proceed with caution. Tensions had been created by fact French had in recent months supplied most spectacular items going to Israel. He agreed Israel should have additional arms, but thought Western powers should distribute efforts this field and that other countries, such as Canada, might make sales in order draw less attention to French.
Secretary said he understood Pineau’s position. He recalled that he had talked with Pineau May 34 and again at NATO Council meeting May 55 expressing concern he had regarding US beginning sales which might place US in position backing Israel with USSR [Page 617] backing Egypt. Emotions would become aroused, which would undermine our efforts find peace in area. He referred to active question now being considered re delivery 12 additional Mysteres to Israel and said he had informed Pineau US prepared to go further now than before in indicating US concurrence in sale. He read draft statement which he would be prepared make this regard and asked for Pineau’s comments. Pineau said he felt it important show solidarity re question arms to Israel but thought it possible statement might give rise greater publicity than would otherwise be case. He would prefer if possible to keep matter secret. Secretary responded US would of course prefer no publicity and had suggested statement only on basis his understanding French had wished more open support regarding sale of first 12 Mysteres. If Pineau now thought there should be no publicity he would be willing to communicate statement in private and leave it up to Pineau to decide whether he wished to release it in a few days so that it would not be associated with present meeting. He asked that Pineau inform him in advance if document was to be released. Pineau agreed and, after consideration certain suggestions made by French re text, following was accepted by Secretary and Pineau:
“Government US has indicated its concurrence in French proposal that US agree to a delay in deliveries under its off-shore procurement contract in order enable French Government promptly to complete sale and delivery of final 12 Mystere IV aircraft ordered by Israel.”6
Pineau said that on basis this conversation French Government prepared make delivery of 12 additional Mystere IV but that this would be last Mystere IV sale to Israel.7
Secretary stated he discussed with Pearson8 possible Canadian sales F86s to Israel and he was not without hope Canada would [Page 618] agree, although matter was left that Pearson would discuss subject with Cabinet following his return Ottawa. One advantage such sale would be that this was US type plane and if Israel had some for training purposes it would render it possible, if US should later decide provide same type, avoid great loss of time required for training. Secretary inquired whether Lloyd had talked with Pearson on this subject.
Lloyd confirmed that he had, and that his impression same as Secretary’s. He confident that 12 F86s would be supplied since Pearson seemed feel very strongly on subject. He commented that difficulty in Canada was that government must announce each sale in House of Commons.
Secretary observed that if situation should become really critical and there were evidence that preparations being made for Egyptian attack, US might reconsider its position since it of course had no desire to see Israel destroyed. Even if Israel had very substantial numbers of planes it would not mean, however, that Israeli cities would not be destroyed under an Egyptian onslaught. Situation was that Egyptian planes would have to fly over Israel territory for only few seconds in order bomb Tel Aviv and Jeruselum. Distances so short in Israel that little could be done about this. He observed parenthetically that even in US if Soviets should send planes over North Pole to attack we could probably not get sufficient planes in air in time altogether to prevent great damage. Value of supplying planes to Israel primarily psychological, so that they would not feel deserted and denuded and thus be tempted to embark upon preventive war. He observed that principle deterrent to Egyptian attack should be foreknowledge that other countries would react against them.
Pineau then referred to question of arms for Israeli ground forces. Israel had asked for huge quantities of such arms, including rockets, tanks, artillery, etc. Obviously France could not alone supply Israeli requirements.
Lloyd said UK also had substantial Israeli requests, including Centurion tanks. British in no position supply latter. Moreover, substantial difficulties involved British supply of significant quantities such arms to Israel, particularly in view reaction in Jordan. They were thinking of providing certain anti-aircraft, anti-tank and self-propelled guns and were sending a list to NEACC for consideration. If policy of “trickle” to be pursued, weapons this nature would appear UK to be most logical. He commented Israel also anxious obtain half-track vehicles and saw no reason not provide some.
Pineau stated problem was provide Israel means for defense without arming it to point where Israel tempted attack neighbors. Western powers should compare orders received and decide which to [Page 619] fill. Lloyd agreed and suggested matter be handled in NEACC. Pineau commented NEACC beset by many problems and should be provided more precise instructions regarding arms to Israel. Lloyd suggested Ambassadorial committee in Washington might review NEACC procedures. Pineau thought NEACC action not sufficiently prompt and its studies not accurate; committee failed to take into account all orders received from Israel. Lloyd again suggested matter be considered by Ambassadorial committee pointing out Italians would be offended if arms matter discussed further by tripartite powers in their absence. Pineau agreed that it inadvisable risk offending Italians and that question should be examined in Washington. Secretary said he thought NEACC machinery as good as could be devised but agreed with Pineau that intelligence on Israeli arms situation might not be accurate enough.
Pineau stated related matter was distribution among Western Powers of orders received from Israel. Lloyd pointed out none of Western Powers really wanted supply arms to Israel and did so mainly for psychological reasons. He hoped procedure of having Ambassadorial committee and NEACC review whole question would not hold up relatively small list now before NEACC. He felt such delays might impose danger that the Israelis would act in reckless manner.
Mr. Pineau said that he hoped everyone was agreed that all orders should be processed through NEACC. France intended to submit order for 12 Mystere IV’s to committee. Secretary and Lloyd agreed.
Pineau stated Israel order to French included request for 12 Mystere IIs. He thought this posed no difficulty since planes relatively outdated and useful primarily for training. Secretary said he saw no objection.9
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/5–656. Secret. Received at 5:44 p.m. Drafted by Rountree and Burdett and approved by Merchant. Repeated to London.↩
- See Document 348.↩
- See Document 206.↩
- See Document 322.↩
- No record of this conversation has been found in Department of State files.↩
- On May 11, the Department transmitted, in circular
telegram 784, the text of this proposed French statement to the
Embassies in Amman, Baghdad, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, Jidda, Tel
Aviv, London, and Paris, as well as to the Consulate at Jerusalem.
The Department also informed these missions that the French
Government planned to publish the statement on May 12 with U.S.
concurrence, and that the sale of these 12 Mystere IVs would bring
the total number of French sales of Mystere IVs to Israel to 24.
(Department of State, Central Files, 784A.56/5–1156)
The Embassy in Paris confirmed on May 11 that the French Government planned to issue the agreed statement late in the afternoon of May 12 for publication May 14. (Telegram 5310 from Paris; Ibid.)
On May 14, the Embassy in Paris transmitted the text of the French Foreign Ministry statement, which was to be published the following day in Le Monde, announcing the sale and impending delivery of an additional 12 Mystere IV aircraft to Israel. (Telegram 5355 from Paris; Ibid. 784A.56/5–1456)
↩ - Maillard of the French Foreign Ministry confirmed in a conversation with an Embassy official that France would not ship any more aircraft to Israel. (Telegram 5436 from Paris, May 17; Ibid., 7 S A.56/5–1756)↩
- See Document 325.↩
- A summary of Secto 29 was sent to the Embassy in Tel Aviv as Polto 1, May 6. (Department of State, Central Files, 784A.86/5–656) Secretary Dulles informed President Eisenhower of the result of this discussion in Dulte 12 from Paris, May 6. (Ibid.)↩