322. Telegram From the Delegation at the North Atlantic Council Ministerial Meeting to the Department of State1
Secto 2. Subject: Bilateral talk with French. The Secretary, accompanied by Dillon, Merchant, Bowie and Rountree called on Pineau May 2, who was assisted by Daridan and Marjolin. Pineau promptly got down to business by saying that he wished to talk about four subjects:
- A.
- Middle East.
- B.
- Far East.
- C.
- NATO.
- D.
- Disarmament.
Talk lasted nearly two hours and approximately half time was spent on Middle East. Conversations on other items being reported separately.
In opening discussion on Middle East Pineau said there seemed to have been some confusion in U.S. regarding French reasons for proposing three-power conference on Middle East. He said U.S. had seemed to believe French wished continue to handle Middle Eastern question within framework of 1950 tripartite declaration. Pineau said [Page 596] this was not at all the case and that all French wished was to develop common position with U.S. and U.K. for presentation in United Nations. He also said French intelligence had obtained advance information that Soviets intended to make dramatic move in Middle East and he had hoped that West could act first.
Pineau said second thing which French had wished accomplish by three-power meeting was agreement on problem of supply of arms to Israel. He stated the standing French position that peace could best be served by maintaining rough equilibrium in arms capacities of Israel and her Arab neighbors and that this would now require delivery of arms from West to Israel. Pineau pointed out that France was presently almost alone in making arms deliveries to Israel and that this situation was one which obviously could not continue. Pineau then said that a possible alternative to arms deliveries to Israel would be establishment of general arms embargo but that this would require agreement of Soviet Union. Pineau said that French had had no desire to get into basic questions involved in settlement of Arab-Israeli dispute in tripartite conference which they had proposed.
Pineau then commented that question was whether Western powers were ready to allow Israel to defend herself or were prepared sooner or later to sacrifice Israel to Arab States. If we were to save Israel we must do one of two things—either supply arms to Israel and Egypt in equal quantities or alternatively enforce an arms embargo which would require agreement of Soviet Union. Adoption of one of these policies, according to Pineau, was only way to avoid war in the area.
Responding to Pineau’s comments, Secretary said U.S. was not traditional supplier of arms to Israel, but that latter had in past looked primarily to European sources; that U.S. sale of arms to Israel in present circumstances would make it appear we were yielding to political pressure from Zionists and had turned away from position of neutrality, thus seriously impeding effectiveness of U.S. in seeking solution basic problem; and that if there should continue to be elements of arms race, it would be better not to create situation in which U.S. was engaged in competition with Soviet Union in supplying arms to area, thus openly engaging prestige of both countries in this issue. For these reasons he hoped Israel could get arms where it normally made purchases in past. We had made clear our encouragement of other countries to supply such arms and were glad to have agreed to technical arrangements necessary for delivery of French Mysteres. Secretary said he planned to speak tomorrow to Pearson2 re possibility sale by Canada of certain number F–86 jets, [Page 597] and expressed some optimism regarding possibility of Israeli purchases from Italy. He said we would, of course, support an agreement, if such were possible, that no further weapons would be sold to Israel or countries bordering upon Israel, after equalization of their arms. This was highly desirable from many points of view, including fact that Israel, in light its small population, could effectively absorb far fewer arms than forty million Arabs surrounding it. Possibility of Egypt remaining static in its arms position would be greater if any additional weapons acquired by Israel should come from sources other than U.S.
Secretary stated that our policy certainly was not one of abandoning Israel. We had made it clear that if aggression should occur, we would take action both within and outside U.N. to assist victim. He realized that this action might come too late to be of immediate assistance in initial assault, but one of our principal purposes in making intentions known had been to deter aggression. There was, of course, no assurance that it would be possible to give Israel adequate means of defending itself alone after an attack should occur. While he fully realized morale factor in increasing Israel’s military capability he thought future of Israel could not be preserved by arms alone. Far greater security lies in realization by Arabs that free nations would react in defense of Israel. This “reaction” need not be confined solely to arms; there are a number of economic measures which would have perhaps disastrous effect upon economies of aggressor nations.
Secretary emphasized important role which U.N. can and must play in preservation of State of Israel and was encouraged by effectiveness of measures now in process. He said recent Soviet statement re peace in area3 in large measure followed initiatives which we had taken. In proclaiming its desire cooperate with UN., Russians were following recent American lead and obviously were not embarking upon new program or proceeding alone.
Secretary observed many Israelis felt Israel could not exist within small area which it now held, and they believed expansion could be accomplished if there were war in which they had backing of great powers. Fortunately, this not prevailing view but it essential to maintain most careful watch over situation to avoid “being trapped.” In U.S. there is large articulate body of Zionists whose attitude toward administration’s NE policy might have considerable effect upon Presidential and Congressional elections. President’s position was, regardless of any such political considerations, that he would adhere strictly to policies for good of American people and Free World as a whole.
[Page 598]Reverting to comment by Pineau that French should not be alone in giving arms to Israel, he said that if other countries could not be prevailed upon to join France in such arms sales, we would review our own policy in this regard.
Pineau then commented that he understood U.S. position and was impressed by what the Secretary had said. He felt that Secretary’s remarks regarding the necessity of avoiding a prestige contest in the area between U.S. and USSR had explained better than any Frenchman could the basic reasons for French opposition to the Baghdad Pact. Baghdad Pact had created just what we were now trying to avoid, namely, prestige race between Anglo-Saxon powers on one side and Soviets on other.
Secretary said that Soviet suggestion for an embargo upon arms to NE apparently envisaged embargo upon all Baghdad Pact countries. We could not, of course, accept such an embargo, as it would involve Turkey, a member of NATO, Pakistan, a member of SEATO, and Iraq and Iran, who are closely allied with the Free World defense system. While, therefore, questions of embargo embracing members of the Baghdad Pact would be most difficult, that of curtailing shipments to Israel and bordering Arab States would be far less so. He stated U.S. was not author of Baghdad Pact, nor had we joined, although we had been under strong pressure to do so. He said that he had learned about Iraq–Turkey treaty only after it had been signed. Later we questioned desirability of Iran’s joining, thinking Iran’s adherence might be taken as provocation which would increase Iran’s dangers while there would not be enough strength in the pact itself to offset those dangers. Iran nevertheless adhered on its own initiative, and we felt that we must support that action. While it might be argued that it would be better if pact did not exist, its reality is a fact and its abandonment at this time would impose grave problems. Secretary noted his understanding that although French reservations about pact remained, French Government had instructed its Ambassadors in the area to avoid, for the sake of Western unity, any derogatory comments about the pact. He said we very much appreciated this position.
Pineau replied by saying that we seemed to understand each other fully but what is the solution to the problem whose existence we both recognize? The Secretary replied that the solution may rest in action by Canada to which Pineau nodded agreement. Discussion of Middle East then closed with understanding that there would be further opportunity to talk at tripartite meeting. Latter meeting set for 10:00 a.m., Sunday subject to Lloyd’s agreement.
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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/5–356. Secret. Received at 9:31 a.m. Drafted by Dillon and Rountree and approved by Merchant who signed for Dulles. Also sent to London.
According to Secretary Dulles’ Appointment Book, he left Washington on May 1 for the NAC Ministerial meetings held in Paris May 4–5. He returned to Washington on May 7. (Princeton University Library, Dulles Papers)
↩ - See Document 325.↩
- See Document 291.↩