327. Telegram From the Delegation at the North Atlantic Council Ministerial Meeting to the Department of State1
Secto 11. Subject: Bilateral talk with British. Middle East situation discussed by Secretary at lunch May 3 with Lloyd.2 Others present were Jebb, Caccia and Shuckburgh of U.K., Merchant, Bowie and Rountree. Other subjects discussed bilaterally with British reported separately.
Lloyd reviewed discussions with Soviets on Middle East and expressed view that while Soviets wished make as much mischief as possible for West in area, they anxious avoid war or risk of war. They appeared impressed by British frank statement re importance which U.K. attached availability NE oil which of such degree would cause British go to any length protect it. Lloyd expressed view to Secretary that main immediate objective Soviets in area was to undermine and destroy Baghdad Pact. He said Russians attributed primary responsibility to British for creation pact, and said Nehru had told them Secretary remarked to him that U.S. had in fact opposed pact (Secretary of course set record straight this matter).
Secretary referred to message which he had sent to Eden and Lloyd while Russians in London suggesting possibility of Hammarskjold being asked undertake further Security Council mission, assuming present mission successful, to explore possibilities more permanent solution Arab-Israel problem.3 He said recent Soviet policy statements led us to believe that if they at all sincere in expressing desire achieve peace in area, it might be wise undertake further action along these lines soon as possible. Factor in present situation was that not only might Soviets be less obstructionist but Arabs might be more amenable to peace efforts if they no longer had feeling they could attack Israel with Soviet support or could look to Soviets for complete backing in any course which they might decide pursue.
Lloyd responded that he favorably disposed toward Secretary’s suggestion and agreed fully that we should not let matter drop with cease-fire agreement. Felt decision should depend in large measure upon actual success of Hammerskjold present mission, but if that [Page 605] showed good results he thought second mission should be undertaken.
Shuckburgh observed that Hammarskjold had previously expressed view it not now possible achieve overall settlement. Secretary responded while this may be case perhaps progress can be made in certain specific areas such as refugee problem. Matter was left that decision upon next step would be withheld until we learned what Hammerskjold thought might be possible.
In further discussion U.S.–U.K. policies in area, Secretary outlined U.S. position regarding Baghdad Pact. Lloyd expressed appreciation for Henderson’s mission to Tehran4 and for U.S. decisions announced by him there.5 He thought position regarding pact had been considerably improved thereby.
In reply Lloyd’s query what should be done about Aswan Dam, Secretary said we considering in conjunction U.K. officials Washington position which should be taken upon Nasser’s suggestions for amendment U.S.–U.K. aide-mémoire. He observed there had been growing opposition members Congress to U.S. financing Aswan Dam and did not exclude possibility effort would be made attach to mutual security legislation rider prohibiting use mutual security funds for this purpose. However, we did not rule out proceeding with Dam and felt neither U.S. nor U.K. should indicate to Egyptians that we had changed our minds. If queried by Nasser we would reply matter still under active study.
Turning to Saudi Arabia, Lloyd reviewed progress Dodds-Parker mission6 and expressed gratification that first objective of bringing British Ambassador7 back and commencing talks on relatively friendly basis had been achieved. He thought next phase would be continuation of talks by Ambassador in Jidda and Riyadh. He was also considering inviting Azzam Pasha to visit him in London to discuss matter. He thought such conversations with Azzam would be particularly desirable in view Azzam’s influence upon King and Lloyd’s belief Azzam perhaps more intelligent and objective than other Saudi Arabian reps who might be dealing with matter. He felt he should himself avoid meeting Feisal until later stages of negotiations.
[Page 606]Lloyd was not optimistic regarding actual settlement of Buraimi issue and placed main hope in possibility protracted negotiations which would keep matter “on ice” for some time during which other elements U.K.-Saudi relations might be improved.
Lloyd inquired whether we felt Saudis were disposed turn away from Egypt. Secretary replied real progress this connection would depend upon success in other directions. Saudis main concern was their disputes with British, with Hashemites and with Israeli. It will require continuous efforts by all of us to bring about situation in which Saudi-Egyptian ties will be less appealing to them. If progress can be made in British-Saudi rapprochement, in an improvement in Iraq-Saudi relations, and in the direction of a solution to Israeli problem, Secretary felt situation in Saudi-Arabia could be much improved. Meanwhile, we were greatly encouraged by fact that Saudis continued refuse Soviet arms and technicians and professed, we believe sincerely, that they desired full cooperation with us. Secretary referred to forthcoming negotiations on Dhahran airfield and said he thought it would be necessary for us to agree to sell some arms to Saudis. Lloyd’s only reaction to latter comment was jokingly to ask whether the purpose of arms would be to attack Buraimi.
Lloyd inquired whether U.S. had made representations to SAG re recent anti-British activities. He was told we had issued instructions U.S. Chargé8 to express our concern re reports provision of arms to tribes in Aden, expulsion British members FAO anti-locust mission, and harsh anti-British propaganda on Saudi radio and in Saudi papers. Lloyd expressed appreciation.
Referring to Jordan, Lloyd said present situation far from clear. While British endeavoring to do all possible maintain stable situation, he not confident this will be possible. U.K. had agreed permit British officers remain in legion, but they would serve in advisory positions since it felt that if they left in commanding positions additional frictions would be created. While King at first displeased this decision, he now appeared agree it was best. Lloyd took some encouragement from report by Kirkbride, British Ambassador Amman,9 that feeling Jordan against Egypt had grown. Kirkbride felt that order of unpopularity other countries in Jordan was Iraq, Egypt, Britain. We expressed surprise this development and inquired whether Kirkbride’s analysis based upon evaluation attitudes Jordanians as a whole or only ruling classes from East Bank. Lloyd and [Page 607] his colleagues somewhat uncertain, but thought that to some extent at least attitudes West Bank Jordanians taken into account. We observed our own reports had not confirmed this development.
Shuckburgh commented that continuation subsidy to Jordan had created problem in British Government. In past this paid by Defense Ministry as military expenditure, but in present situation Defense refused bear cost and responsibility had had to be assumed by Foreign Office as political operation.10
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–PA/5–456. Top Secret. Received at 8:15 a.m. Drafted by Rountree and approved by Merchant. Repeated to London.↩
- The memorandum of this conversation is not printed. (Ibid., Conference Files: Lot 62 D 181, CF 705:↩
- See Document 292.↩
- Loy Henderson headed the U.S. Delegation observing the Baghdad Pact Council meeting in Tehran April 16–20.↩
- For texts of Henderson’s statements, see Department of State Bulletin, May 7, 1956, pp. 753–754.↩
- A.D. Dodds-Parker, Parliamentary Under Secretary of State in the British Foreign Office, arrived in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, on April 27 for the purpose of discussing the Buraimi Oasis dispute as well as other boundary questions with Saudi officials in Riyadh on April 29.↩
- Roderick Wallis Parkes.↩
- Alfred leS. Jenkins.↩
- Sir Alec Kirkbride was British Ambassador in Jordan from June 17, 1946, until he was appointed Ambassador in Libya on December 24, 1951. As of May 4, 1956, Charles Beresford Duke was British Ambassador in Jordan.↩
- Dulles informed Eisenhower of this conversation with Lloyd. (Dulte 3 from Paris, May 3; Department of State, Central Files, 110.11–DU/5–356)↩