Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1–July 26, 1956, Volume XV

326. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State¹

Tel Aviv, May 3, 1956—2 p.m.

1164. Reference: Embtels 1122 and 1136.² GOI official who was present at meetings has given me following summary Hammarskjold talks May 1 and 2 with Ben Gurion and Sharett (have requested Consul General Jerusalem to obtain General Burns’ appraisal when possible).

1. Israel-Egyptian GAA. GOI discussed at length recent incidents Gaza strip and said that unless they were stopped they would “jeopardize the pledge of reciprocity” which Israel had made to conform to Article 2 paragraph 2. Hammarskjold reportedly said he was convinced Nasser had issued orders to his military groups to conform to said article but that some gap might exist in implementation. Upon his return to Cairo May 3 he would endeavor to get a commitment to private crossings by civilians. Regarding previous discussions Articles 7 and 8, Hammarskjold said he had some hope of getting Nasser informally and unobtrusively to lift (de facto) Suez and Tiran blockades. After discussion and pursuance of this effort, Israel has given SYG a written declaration that as soon as Egypt gives evidence it has lifted the blockade Israel will “implement its compliance with Articles 7 and 8.”

2. Syrian-Israel GAA. Hammarskjold reported on his discussions in Damascus and said that GOS had remained adamant on unconditional undertaking compliance Article 3 paragraph 2, maintaining its insistence on statement that compliance would be non-operation in case Israel resumption work DZ. Hammarskjold requested Israelis to give him an intimation that wisdom would prevail and that GOI would not be resuming work in DZ. Such an intimation would enable him to return to Damascus and persuade the Syrians to abandon their attempt to link cease-fire with Banat Yaacov, telling them that they did not have to worry about work resumption. Ben Gurion replied that Israelis were entitled to resume work; that they could if they so desired begin work “when we leave this room;” and that he could not therefore give SYG any pledge. (Source said that Israelis made no reference to discussions water problem now going on in Washington.) After going to Damascus yesterday afternoon for a final effort to persuade Syrians, Hammarskjold is holding another meeting this morning with GOI before proceeding Cairo.

3. Jordan-Israel GAA. Hammarskjold reported that he had obtained letter of cease-fire compliance from HKJ; that while letter contained strong statement re Israel resumption work Banat Yaacov, this did not constitute a condition to acceptance. SYG reported he had made no progress on question of compliance Article 8 GAA (Mt. Scopus),³ whereupon Israeli delegates requested him to record that fact in his report to Security Council. Hammarskjold indicated he was reluctant to do this because he did not want to evoke any discussions about past performance but rather to concentrate on making practical proposals for progress in future.

In discussion with SYG on local commanders agreements, Ben Gurion made concessions, which he had previously refused to make to General Burns, including agreement for UN observer at meetings whenever higher party so desired. Source said these concessions should now make it possible to go ahead with local commanders’ agreements covering critical border areas similar to program already in effect for Jerusalem.

White

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 674A.84A/5–356. Secret. Received at 7:32 a.m., May 5. Repeated to Cairo, Beirut, London, Paris, Damascus, and Jerusalem.
2. Documents 298 and 306.
3. Article 8 of the Israel–Jordan General Armistice Agreement of April 3, 1949, established a Special Committee composed of two representatives of each party whose responsibility would be to formulate agreed plans and arrangements designed to enlarge the scope of the General Armistice Agreement and to effect improvements in its application. (U.N. doc. S/1302 and Add. 1 and Corr. 1)