Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1–July 26, 1956, Volume XV

298. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State¹

Tel Aviv, April 20, 1956—10 p.m.

1122. Rafael, Foreign Ministry advisor on UN affairs, who has been participating with Ben-Gurion and Sharett in talks with Hammarskjold past three days, gave me orally this afternoon following summary progress made these meetings (Department will want to analyze this report in light of UNTSO’s version which I assume Consulate General Jerusalem is obtaining).

(1) Implementation Article II, paragraph 2, GAA. Ben-Gurion agreed to following measures:

a. Israel patrols would not operate within several hundred meters Gaza border except in special cases where security required it. Example given of exception was case of actual infiltrator stealing within Israel territory.

b. Israel agrees to maintenance by UN observation posts along border.

c. Israel agrees to UN observer patrols operating along border as long as accompanied by IDF personnel. Rafael said that he understood Egypt has made similar undertakings and that Article II matters are virtually completed. He said that on all matters connected with his article, Ben-Gurion was most cooperative and made “surprising concessions” relative to his previous adamant position of “complete sovereignty”.

(2) Proposals under Article I. Israelis took position that in view of fact that SC resolution directed Hammarskjold to survey the GAA’s he had an obligation to obtain from Egypt commitments re implementation of Article I, including free passage Suez and Strait of Tiran, no massing of troops in Sinai, no propaganda or threats against Israel, discontinuance state of belligerency, and other warlike acts. Israelis indicated to Hammarskjold that they would be satisfied with de facto rather than de jure arrangements on Suez and Strait of Tiran. Hammarskjold maintained his position that these matters were outside his SC directive but that he was prepared to discuss them with Nasser in his capacity as SYG.

(3) Implementation of Article VIII.² Israel position was that they were prepared to trade withdrawal of troops from DZ against Article I but could not do so as long as Egypt was engaging in the “aggressive actions” prohibited by paragraph 2 Article I. When I asked Rafael whether GOI prepared comply Article VIII against Egyptian compliance Article VII³ and VIII, he replied that he was not prepared to comment on that question.

(4) Israel-Syria GAA.⁴ Rafael said this morning’s discussion centered on relationships with Syria and that GOI had agreed as follows:

a. Will undertake not to send police boats closer than 250 meters to shore, except when required to rescue Israel fishing vessel which may have grounded and would undertake such operation only after notification Syria.

b. Agreed to permit Syrian use Tiberias for water purposes.

c. Reiterated willingness permit Syrians to fish, but only under individual licenses granted by Israel authorities, a condition with which Rafael said Hammarskjold agreed.

d. Told Hammarskjold that he might inform Syrian Government that crew of Syrian vessel and vessel itself would be released from Haifa within next few days.⁵

e. In return requested Hammarskjold to investigate Israelis allegedly detained by Syria.

Rafael said that General Burns had affirmed that he already had undertaking from Syrians not to shoot at Israel fishing vessels any place on lake and not at Israel police vessels beyond the 250 meter line.

(5) Banat Yaacov. Israelis took attitude that Syrians were obligated under Article 1, Israel-Syria GAA,⁶ to refrain from firing across line, including any firing into DZ. Rafael quoted Hammarskjold as agreeing with this theory and as saying that he would request of Syrian Government reaffirmation of its compliance with Article 1.

Israelis then raised with SYG question “right of Israel to proceed with Banat Yaacov Canal”. Israelis argued that urgent period referred to in SC resolution had long since passed and that they were free to proceed with work. Sharett was quoted as making categorical statement that Israel would not permit this third work season to pass without completing the canal work. Hammarskjold took position that this was a matter outside his jurisdiction and was in first instance a decision for General Burns or, if it so desired, for SC.

(6) At close of this morning’s final regular session, Hammarskjold requested secret meeting this afternoon with Ben-Gurion and Sharett to explain “why he was so optimistic about Nasser”.⁷ Rafael said that he did not know what this meant. It is possible, however, that this conference may be related to a matter which Nahum Goldmann discussed with me briefly this morning. He said he had two-hour conversation with Hammarskjold yesterday afternoon. The latter said that he believed some prospects for settlement had grown out of his conversation with Nasser. Goldmann noted Hammarskjold as saying that much to his surprise Nasser did not appear to be primarily interested in any questions of territory, but felt that disposition of refugees was important problem. Hammarskjold reportedly said that he believed Nasser would be receptive to a formula under which principle would be established that refugees would have option of returning to Israel or being settled otherwise but Israel would be protected by condition in formula setting forth specified criteria for eligibility which would in fact limit the number of refugees which Israel would have to receive to a reasonable total.

White

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/4–2056. Secret; Priority. Received at 10:43 a.m., April 21. Repeated to Cairo, Beirut, London, Paris, Damascus, and Jerusalem.
2. Article 8 of the Egypt-Israel General Armistice Agreement provided for demilitarization of the area comprising the village of El Auja and vicinity. (U.N. doc. S/ 1264/Corr. 1 and Add. 1)
3. Article 7 empowered the U.N. Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization to define the areas comprising the western and eastern fronts in Palestine.
4. Israel and Syria signed a General Armistice Agreement on July 20, 1949. (U.N. doc. S/1353/Add. 1 and 2 and Corr. 1)
5. Israel seized the Syrian vessel Faysal and its crew of four on August 4, 1955. They were not released until May 7, 1956. (Despatch 380 from Damascus, May 15; Department of State, Central Files, 683.84A/5–1556)
6. Article 1 of the Israel-Syria General Armistice Agreement pledged both parties to observe the U.N. Security Council injunction to refrain from resorting to military force in the settlement of the Palestine question. (U.N. doc. S/1353/Add. 1 and 2 and Corr. 1)
7. See Document 306.