Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1–July 26, 1956, Volume XV

303. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Director General of the Israeli Prime Minister’s Office (Kollek) and Robert B. Anderson, Washington, April 24, 1956¹

Washington, April 24, 1956

1. On Tuesday, 24 April 1956, Mr. Anderson met in Washington with Mr. Kollek at the latter’s request, from 0745 hours until 0845 hours.

2. Mr. Kollek stated that he had been instructed by Mr. Ben-Gurion to contact Mr. Anderson and to express the Prime Minister’s thinking on the current situation. Mr. Kollek emphasized that Mr. Ben-Gurion was greatly concerned lest the United States be misled by the Hammarskjold Mission. He argued that at best it was only seeking to bring about a ceasefire—a condition of minor importance when compared with the more necessary objectives of the Anderson Mission. Kollek said that, while the Israeli Government had cooperated fully and had agreed to everything proposed by Hammarskjold in order to relax tension, nevertheless, they were firmly convinced that Nasr had gone along in seeming agreement for the sole purpose of gaining time, knowing that the ceasefire could be terminated effectively whenever it suited his purposes. Kollek stated that his Government believed that the danger period would be in June and July 1956.

3. Mr. Kollek then stated that in regard to the question of arms, the Israeli Government had consulted with various allies and had received a universal reaction that the United States should at least make available a token shipment. He stressed that France felt quite strongly that one item of armament should come from the United States. He said that Canada, though less blunt than the French, had also spoken of a “token” from the United States. Mr. Anderson replied that in conversations with the State Department he had received the impression that energetic steps were being taken to secure the needed weapons from Western suppliers. Mr. Kollek replied that his Government feared that the arms would come too late and that, in any event, they would not have the deterrent effect which Mr. Ben-Gurion believed they should have.

4. In response to a question as to whether the Israelis believed seriously that Nasr would attack, Mr. Kollek replied to Mr. Anderson in the affirmative stating that they were convinced that there would be a provocative, though not necessarily a frontal, attack from Egypt.

5. In regard to the Soviet pronouncements in London on the Middle East, Mr. Kollek expressed the view that the Russians were afraid that Nasr would move too quickly into hostilities or at least before they, themselves, were ready for him to move. By way of explanation he pointed out that in recent Communist Party meetings in Stockholm, the Communist delegates from South America and Europe had heckled the USSR representative and expressed concern regarding the sale of arms to Egypt. In Mr. Kollek’s opinion, the USSR had to make some gesture of peace in order to offset the unpopularity which they had run into by virtue of the sale. He also stated that the USSR position vis-à-vis Socialist parties was injured by the transaction.

6. Kollek went on to say that he had had several talks with Johnston over the Water Plan,² and that Johnston had expressed the view that the Israelis should begin work in the demilitarized zone.³ Johnston believed that such a step was in the interests of both Israel and the United States, since Nasr would otherwise be convinced that blackmail could be advantageously used against the West. Kollek stressed that it was strongly in the interests of the United States to call Nasr’s bluff over the Water Project, arguing that if the work was commenced war would not break out and consequently Nasr would lose tremendous personal prestige amongst the Arabs. Kollek suggested that it would be worthwhile for Anderson to meet with Johnston and review his thinking. Kollek also stated that Johnston did not intend to return to the Middle East. Kollek argued further that, by beginning the work, Nasr’s influence would be lessened, which he thought to be consistent with the objectives of current U.S. policy. Kollek then argued that the United States was putting Israel in a very unfair position and was negotiating in order that the seventy-five million dollar loan be used exclusively for other river projects. He stated that this was as though someone negotiated a loan for a car but was presented with the condition that the loan would be contingent on the money being spent for a house. He stressed that these tactics were a source of great embarrassment to the Israeli Government and that the proposals were “unfair”. He stressed that the two water projects were in fact separate and that his Government could not afford to abandon the JVP.

7. Commenting on talks in Washington, he stated that in conversations with himself, Eban, and Shiloah, most everyone in the Department of State agreed that the Israeli Government should have token arms from the United States, but that at the level of the Secretary there has been a consistent block “beyond whom we don’t seem to be able to pass”. He would not indicate by name those in favor of giving the token arms, but did state that on the Secretary level the impasse on this matter contradicted the expressed views of the lower levels.

8. Mr. Anderson returned to the subject of the Johnston Plan, recalling to Mr. Kollek that on a previous occasion in Greenwich⁴ he, Kollek, had stated that the Israeli Government would be prepared to build the lower construction of the Project if they could receive guarantees from the United States that water from the North would be made available later. Mr. Kollek acknowledged the previous conversation, stating that the Israeli Government could not afford to expend this sum on the Southern projects without such guarantees. Mr. Kollek then repeated what he had told Mr. Anderson some weeks ago, namely, that if there was not an agreement reached with the Arabs resulting in the implementation of the Plan, the Israeli Government would be forced to go ahead and commence the work in the North on the 15th of May. Mr. Kollek than stated that, from a purely personal point of view (which might be in contrast to Mr. Ben-Gurion’s), he believed that if the United States raised its voice strongly enough against the commencement of work, the Israeli Government would desist. He explained that the Israeli Government could not afford to offend the United States as long as they were unarmed.

9. Mr. Kollek stated that he believed that the “paper agreements” between Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen⁵ were of little consequence and that the struggle for Arab leadership “was as hot as ever”. In response to a question, he expressed the thought that, while Nasr possessed the capability for creating a civil war in Jordan against Hussein, he doubted that he would bring it about since this would call for British intervention, to which Nasr is fundamentally opposed. He stated that their information shows that the relationships between Nasr and Hussein are as strained as ever.

10. Mr. Kollek concluded the meeting by saying that Mr. Ben-Gurion desired to know if there were any messages from Mr. Anderson. Mr. Anderson replied that he remained “on the sidelines” and that, in view of the Hammarskjold Mission, everything must be held in abeyance until it was concluded. Mr. Anderson pointed out that if there should be a leak regarding parallel negotiations it would have a disastrous effect in the UN. Mr. Kollek reiterated that the Israeli Government had little hopes for the Hammarskjold Mission and that, in their view, the only possibilities for peace remained in the framework of the negotiations commenced by the Anderson Mission. Mr. Anderson replied that he was not taking an active part in such negotiations at this time, but that he would be willing to hear anything from the Israelis which they desired to tell him. Mr. Kollek then asked whether Mr. Anderson would also be prepared to discuss from time to time various questions with Eban and Shiloah, even though they did not depend directly on Mr. Ben-Gurion. Mr. Anderson stated that he would be happy to see them since he was not bound by protocol.

1. Source: Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Alpha--Anderson Talks w/BG & Nasser. Jan. ’56--memos, etc. Top Secret. No drafting information is given on the source text.
2. No record of these conversations has been found in Department of State files.
3. Ambassador Johnston expressed this view in a conversation with Secretary Dulles on April 14. (Memorandum of conversation by Dulles, April 14; Department of State, Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199)
4. No record of this conversation has been found in Department of State files.
5. Egypt concluded a mutual defense pact with Syria on October 20, 1955, and with Saudi Arabia on October 27, 1955. On April 10, 1956, Imam Ahmad ben Yahya of Yemen initialed a similar agreement which aligned Yemen as well with Egypt. On April 21, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen concluded a mutual defense pact.