276. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State1
1078. On invitation Ben Gurion Tuesday I joined him at his home Tel Aviv last night for after-dinner coffee and chat on existing critical conditions. We were alone.
Although he made effort include wide range general social topics he spent most of hour discussing arms question Fedayeen terrorism and Hammarskjold conversation with Nasser which proceeding that moment. He very tense, jumping up quickly when telephone rang or when messengers knocked at front door which was frequent. He wasted not 1 minute retiring to another room to talk with Chief of Staff Dayan who arrived during my short visit.
While affable and friendly he did not hesitate to express opinion US taken in by Nasser and making big mistake placing confidence there repeating at some length his usual line of reasoning; indicated US (President) only can by quick and strong warning to Nasser reduce immediate danger war and also ultimate Soviet penetration NE area and Africa.
However most immediate concern was Fedayeen terrorism which continuing unabated. He said earlier reports such attacks planned for Tel Aviv (Embtel 10632) now supplemented by report they delayed until Saturday. However Dayan brought in report of heavy attacks in vicinity Tel Aviv (Embtel 10763) which may indicate step-up in Fedayeen approach to Tel Aviv. I noted last night and this morning heavy police-soldier patrolling of main highway entrances to Tel Aviv with machine guns prominent and all traffic stopped and searched.
When Ben Gurion cited earlier radio report received in Tel Aviv that Nasser had turned down Hammarskjold’s demand for agreement conform article II GAA I cautioned him not to believe report until confirmed as it too early in my opinion for any authentic report to come out of Cairo. I also expressed opinion Hammarskjold would of necessity take firm line with Nasser in that agreement on article II would be essential to Hammarskjold’s entire mission. He thought this logical but waiting anxiously for next news broadcast over radio. He again described at length extreme dangers Fedayeen attacks to Israel and reasons Israel could not long endure them.
[Page 526]I left him tired but tense man awaiting further messages during night from his advisors. I unable determine particular reason for his invitation to visit him other than to reiterate and underscore extreme seriousness of Israel’s present position under Fedayeen attacks and need for US arms. I left with impression he thinking of extent of Israel enduring current conditions more in terms of hours rather than days but he gave no indication of having actually reached final decision to take violent action. But I felt that action would be triggered if Fedayeen attack reaches Tel Aviv on Saturday4 or before unless there immediate evidence incursions stopped.