271. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State1
1063. I delivered President’s letter to Ben Gurion2 at his Tel Aviv office at 11 o’clock this morning. He looked tired from strain of recent days and spoke very quietly but nevertheless forcefully and in manner revealing he is still personally very much in control situation.
He said he would convey letter’s content to his colleagues as soon as possible probably tomorrow and because it was from American President it would be given serious consideration it therefore deserved. Personally, however, he found message most disappointing. He could not believe President fully realized situation in which whole population was daily terrorized. (I injected comment that I was confident President well aware of terrorist character of Fedayeen operations within Israel.) He said he would really like to know what we thought his people should do. If people of US terrorized by neighboring countries … by marauders sent by neighboring government …3 would they be expected just to take it? There no doubt Fedayeen sent by Nasser.
[Page 517]Perhaps he could ask President of US but he would ask me “would you expect us just to take it?” Right of self-defense is first right of human beings.
He spoke at length of difficulties of effective defense against Fedayeen. It not possible to accompany everybody everywhere and against such tactics people wouldn’t be safe if accompanied by whole company or battalion.
He could not tell his people they must sit helplessly by. They wanted to know why Nasser could not be told that he was aggressor and would be dealt with as aggressor.
Ben Gurion recalled his conversation with Burns (Jerusalem 404 to Department4) in which he asked Burns to urge unconditional cease-fire from Egyptians. Burns had asked him to exercise restraint for 24-hours Ben Gurion stating that he replied he would wait until noon April 10 or 48-hours. It was Burns who had suggested ceasefire was not enough but request should specifically include observance Article II, paragraph 2 of GAA in its entirety. He said in another half-hour (it was then 11:30) 48 would have expired.
He said he knew there was battalion of Fedayeen near Gaza and furthermore “this kind of people” were based in all countries surrounding Israel. (He specifically named Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon.) Israel knew they planning something “against Tel Aviv” although they had not been able to find out just what.
Some of recent Fedayeen incursions from Jordan even though new Commander of Arab Legion had said he opposed to such tactics. GOI had been prepared to believe him now (inference being that Jordan-based Fedayeen under Egyptian rather than Jordanian control).
At this point I informed him that we doing all possible to get Nasser to agree to cease-fire and stop Fedayeen terrorism and President had addressed personal letter to Nasser5 who should feel obliged to regard it most seriously.
Ben Gurion replied he saw no reason why Nasser would take it seriously. He obtaining help from Moscow and he knows Secretary of State who had said Nasser was only trying preserve his independence had refused arms to Israel. For similar reasons Ben Gurion had no real hope of Hammarskjold’s mission. After all Nasser had paid no attention to man with much greater authority … special envoy of President Eisenhower.
He said it difficult not to accept advice of President of US but he convinced President with all his responsibilities simply could not [Page 518] know details or he would not limit himself to advice contained in his letter.
At this point I argued that President did not question any country’s right to self-defense but was suggesting Israel avoid action which would jeopardize chances of obtaining peaceful solution in near future.
Ben Gurion said if Hammarskjold did come back with Egyptian agreement to compliance with GAA that would be something but he had failed in his previous attempt so had Burns and so had Allen.
If he did not succeed he could say quite frankly that third paragraph of President’s letter would be absolutely meaningless. If Nasser were to launch Fedayeen raids from three countries (excluding Lebanon) or Tel Aviv were attacked he would not tell his people to be quiet, that US was going to come to their rescue.
Israel was once attacked by six states. One helped her. There had been complete embargo in US on arms to Israel. There was embargo again despite fact Arabs receiving aid from Soviets.
In his “humble view” to ask Israelis to rely on US would mean to give then false hopes.
Present situation could not go on. Settlements being sabotaged nightly, people being killed on roads, Israel had to stop travel two nights (Embassy telegram 10556). Nasser did not think he going to be punished or reprimanded, in view of which he ordered Fedayeen attacks.
He could not reconcile President’s November 9 statement in Denver7 and his earlier letter8 with US denial of arms to Israel at time when US sending tanks to Saudi Arabia. Every tank to Saudi Arabia is tank for Nasser who is chief of staff of Syria and Saudi Arabia. Against this background he could not understand President’s letter.
I asked if it not possible Nasser using Fedayeen tactics in effort to provoke Israel into response that would put Israel in role of aggressor and that was it not reason for Israel to exercise restraint while efforts made to final peaceful solution? Ben Gurion asked rhetorically if that meant we advised him to tolerate Fedayeen. “Should we send murderers into Gaza to perpetuate similar outrages? No, Israel could act only against armed forces and if it struck it would be against armed forces.”
[Page 519]I replied that I am not suggesting patience beyond limit of endurance but until present efforts had been fully explored.
Comment: Ben Gurion spoke in reasonable vein I thought without excitement but leaving no doubt he means to act as he thinks circumstances dictate.
He convinced President for whom his respect and affection tracing from association in Frankfort remain undiminished, not fully aware of shattering effect of Fedayeen on people of small besieged country.
I think he deeply earnest about two remarks made this morning:
- (1)
- He will give Hammarskjold “a little time” to come up with peaceful solution. (I believe although he did not say so that he would require announcement Nasser’s agreement to cease-fire and strict compliance with Article II, paragraph 2 GAA before Hammarskjold leaves Cairo).
- (2)
- If and when GOI decides to act it will be by applying military action against military forces and not response “in kind” to Fedayeen incursions.
Although it evident Ben Gurion’s patience not without limits and he spoke decisively and firmly I think pressures on him have somewhat subsided. Tension here both within government and public has fallen off peak it attained over weekend (Embassy telegram 10629). It appears GOI for moment contemplates no extraordinary action if Fedayeen operations are stopped promptly and in absence new provocation.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/4–1056. Top Secret; Niact. Received at 12:15 a.m., April 11. Repeated niact to Cairo, Paris, London, Amman, Damascus, and Beirut. Repeated to the Mission at the United Nations eyes only for Ambassador Lodge. (Telegram 592 to USUN, April 11; ibid.)↩
- See Document 264.↩
- All ellipses in this document are in the source text.↩
- Document 256.↩
- See Document 263.↩
- The Embassy in telegram 1055, April 9, catalogued the various Fedayeen attacks inside Israel that occurred during the night of April 8–9 and reported that “Among unusual security measures taken was closure Jerusalem/Tel Aviv road to night traffic, stranding several hundred persons in Jerusalem …. Apparently most minor roads in country also closed.” (Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/4–956)↩
- See the editorial note, vol. XIV, p. 725.↩
- Presumably a reference to Document 132.↩
- Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 674.84a/4–1056)↩