Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1–July 26, 1956, Volume XV

243. Letter From the British Ambassador (Makins) to Secretary of State Dulles¹

Washington, April 5, 1956.

My Dear Secretary of State: I have had the following comments from Selwyn Lloyd on the views which you expressed to me about the Middle East during our conversation at your house on April 1.² Mr. Lloyd believes that our objective should be to agree [on] a general policy for the area and specific plans for each country, and he is glad to think that we are not far apart on the common issues.

However, he has some concern about the desire on the part of the United States Government to keep the extent of Anglo-American understanding and cooperation in this area secret because the result is that many people make the deduction that our policies are different. For instance, it is generally believed in Iraq that the United States is backing the Saudis against the Iraqis.

There will be no change in United Kingdom policy as a result of the impending talks with the Russians in London³ but a discussion of Middle East questions will be inevitable and I shall shortly be letting you have, for your information, a summary of the line which the Prime Minister and Mr. Lloyd propose to take.

The following are comments on individual countries.

Egypt

We agree with the view which you expressed on April 1st to the effect that so far, Nasser had had it all his own way and that it had gone to his head and his leadership of the Arab world even extended to Central Africa. We think it is essential, without coming into the open in any way, that we should prove that it is unlucky to play with the Russians. If we could split off the Saudis and build up the Iraqis’ position, this would in any case be all to the good and it might lead Nasser to have second thoughts. …

We should not publicise this action, it will gradually reveal itself. … It will be generally a matter of keeping Nasser guessing about our intentions. We should do all we can to strengthen our policy and that of our friends in the area to counter his activities. But, at the same time, it would only arouse his suspicions if we took smilingly his recent propaganda campaign against us. Mr. Lloyd agrees with the view that negotiations with Nasser about the Aswan Dam should be allowed to languish and he welcomes the steps which you and the United States propose to take in relation to the allocation of surplus wheat and the C.A.R.E. operation.

I expect to receive some more detailed proposals in the near future for discussions with you.

Sudan

Mr Lloyd agrees that this is a key area. Our aim should be to keep the head waters of the Nile and the principal gateway into Central Africa free from Egyptian and Russian control. He also agrees that in this case, Her Majesty’s Government should take the lead, but he is very glad to know that the United States stand ready to help. I expect to receive some suggestions shortly on this point also.

Saudi Arabia

Mr. Lloyd agrees that it is important to wean the Saudis away from their present alignment with Egypt, although they would not go so far as to wish to build King Saud up to the extent to which the United States Government may have in mind. He thinks we should aim at a “front to protect Islam against communism”, which because of Nasser’s involvement with the Russians would naturally be at odds with him and in which there would be room for both Iraq and Saudi Arabia (and others) without any one being necessarily paramount.

With regard to British relations with Saudi Arabia, I am asked to emphasize that Her Majesty’s Government is as anxious to improve them as the United States Government is to see them improved, and that they realize the urgency of attempting to do so. Mr. Lloyd is glad to know that you do not rule out the alternative of postponing the Buraimi problem without a definite settlement. Buraimi is a particularly difficult matter for us and the only way in which we can cooperate over it is by seeking a long and measured negotiation covering all the outstanding problems accompanied, we would hope, by a gradual improvement in relations. Apart from Buraimi, there are numerous frontier matters and a number of other questions which have been at issue for some years, and if our relations are to become stable and friendly, a general settlement is desirable which would enable King Saud’s face to be saved over Buraimi. This does not mean that Mr. Lloyd wishes to delay the opening of the talks. On the contrary, he believes that the sooner they begin the better. He therefore proposes to suggest to the Saudi Government that a British mission should go to Riyadh before the end of the month, as a gesture and to re-establish effective contact between our two Governments. Its task would be to discuss with the Saudis the best way of initiating substantive talks. He would see what emerged from this meeting before deciding on the next stage. There are a number of possibilities, including a visit from the Saudi Foreign Minister to the U.K. I explained to you, on April 1st, the reasons for which Her Majesty’s Government dislike the idea of a meeting in the near future of Foreign Ministers in New York.

Israel

Our policy is still to work for an Arab/Israel settlement, but since the prospect of this has now become remote, Her Majesty’s Government think that we shall have to concentrate in the immediate future on keeping the peace in the present situation. We have of course supported the latest United States proposal to send the Secretary General of the United Nations to Palestine.⁴

As regards the supply of arms, you already know that Her Majesty’s Government have agreed to release six Meteor night fighters and six Bofors A.A. guns to Israel. It is our intention to continue this trickle and we hope that it will be endorsed by the Ambassadorial Committee in Washington.

Jordan

I confirm what I told you on April 1st. We are anxious to improve our relations with Jordan by making some use of the Anglo-Jordan Defence Board. Our policy is to support the King …. Her Majesty’s Government are preparing against these eventualities.

Libya

Mr. Lloyd agrees that … we should not let the Libyans play us off against Russia and Egypt. But since we must expect both these countries to make serious efforts to undermine our important strategic positions there, we should take corresponding steps to maintain it. The Parliamentary Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Dodds Parker is in Libya at the moment and I shall pass on to you any conclusions he may send about means for keeping Libya on our side. We also hope that the Libyan Prime Minister will visit London during the course of the summer.

Meeting of the Council of the Baghdad Pact on April 12

I await your observations on Mr. Lloyd’s message which I sent to you under cover of my letter of March 30.⁵

Yours sincerely,

Roger Makins

1. Source: Department of State, S/S–NEA Files: Lot 61 D 417, Omega #2. Top Secret.
2. See Document 232.
3. Bulganin and Khrushchev visited the United Kingdom April 18–27.
4. See Document 206.
5. In this letter, Lloyd expressed his hope that the United States would show support for the Baghdad Pact by appointing a special representative to attend the forthcoming meeting of the Baghdad Pact Council which was to begin in Tehran on April 16. (Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/3–3056)