242. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, April 5, 1956, 12:15 p.m.1
SUBJECT
- Middle East Policy
PARTICIPANTS
- The Secretary
- Mr. MacArthur
- Mr. Ronald
- Ambassador Makins
- Mr. Rountree W. Bailey
Ambassador Makins said he had received from Mr. Selwyn Lloyd the latter’s views concerning policies in the Near East which were discussed by the Ambassador with the Secretary on April 1.2 He stated these views presumably were also those of the British Government. He had reduced to writing the substance of the message [Page 463] and handed to the Secretary and others present copies of this document dated April 5.3
After reading the paper the Secretary inquired as to the reason the British did not wish meetings with Saudi Arabia on the Buraimi issue to be held in New York, as suggested by King Saud. Sir Roger replied that they felt the atmosphere in New York, near the United Nations to which the Saudi Arabs had threatened to bring the issue, would not be suitable. Also, the British believed there were strong advantages in sending a delegation to Saudi Arabia where direct access to the King would be afforded.
Sir Roger informed the Secretary that he had just received a message from London setting forth details upon measures which the British were prepared to undertake with respect to the proposed Economic Board and other economic matters to be discussed at the forthcoming Baghdad Pact Council meeting in Tehran. A memorandum on this matter would be provided to the Department later in the day.4 The Secretary commented that we had been giving some thought to the economic aspects of the forthcoming Council meeting and were formulating a response to the recent British message on this subject.
The Secretary noted that in the paper which Ambassador Makins had handed him the British seemed concerned that many people had concluded that American and British policies in the Near East were different. He commented that the flood of press material from London had played up such differences. The story in the New York Times of April 5, filed by Drew Middleton, for example, emphasized this aspect on the basis of information presumably obtained in London.5 It was being said that our alliance might collapse as a result of US-UK policy differences in the Near East. If the UK felt, as we felt, that it was wise to avoid the impression there were vast differences between us, it would appear that they had to a considerable extent control over what was said to members of the press. He emphasized that it was not our effort to publicize differences; in fact we were disturbed at the publicity which was emanating from London.
Ambassador Makins commented that the point in the message from Mr. Lloyd concerned publicity and attitudes in the Near East area more than in the UK or the US. The Secretary responded that it would be difficult to avoid such news stories being picked up in the [Page 464] Near Eastern states. He went on to say that, while publicity regarding great differences between the US and the UK was harmful to our respective and joint efforts in the Near East, on the other hand we did not wish to give the impression that in every respect we were working together. If, for example, we claimed solid US–UK agreement on the Buraimi issue our position in Saudi Arabia would be gravely jeopardized. We could not be associated one hundred per cent with British policy which might be considered to be hostile to Saudi Arabia. Such an indication of US–UK solidarity might imply not only that we agreed with the British position at this time but also that we had been consulted by the British and agreed upon their previous actions on the Arabian Peninsula. He had understood that the British had intentionally not told us in advance about moves at Buraimi since they realized that such advance consultation might have placed us in an embarrassing situation.
Ambassador Makins agreed with these observations of the Secretary, commenting that the British did not expect to achieve one hundred per cent the objective of demonstrating US–UK solidarity. They had put forth the thought as a matter of general application with respect to broad policies in the area.
The Secretary emphasized the importance of placing the Buraimi negotiations and general UK-Saudi relations on some basis whereby the Saudis would not intensify their anti-British efforts. This, however, was largely up to the UK since it was clear that a mere demonstration of US–UK solidarity would not have a useful effect in overcoming Saudi Arabian anti-British programs in the Arab world.
Commenting more generally on the British paper, the Secretary said that, by and large, we appeared to be fairly close to agreement.
Referring to the Baghdad Pact, Ambassador Makins alluded to a number of messages which the British had received from other Pact members, disclosing doubt and frustration concerning the American attitude. They felt the US was not giving sufficient support to the Pact or following through in providing adequate material benefits to the Pact countries. Dismay has been caused particularly in Iran and Iraq.
The Secretary observed that one of the difficulties involved was that the member countries did not all view the Baghdad Pact undertaking in precisely the same light as the US. A similar problem existed with regard to SEATO, where the SEATO powers desired to undertake measures enhancing their security against the communists, but they also desired to gain support for their positions in disputes with other Free World countries. For example, Pakistan had in mind that SEATO membership might be extremely beneficial in its dispute with India. From the US viewpoint the purpose of engaging in such pacts was to prevent aggression from the Soviet Union or Communist [Page 465] China. When we adhered to the SEATO Pact, we felt compelled to make clear this reservation. Part of Iraq’s disillusionment regarding the Baghdad Pact probably derives from its desire for our support in their quarrel with Saudi Arabia and Egypt. A considerable amount of the opposition among the Arab states and India to the Baghdad Pact and SEATO results from their concern that the pacts were designed, in part at least, to support countries in disputes with them.
Ambassador Makins said that several of the Pact countries had assumed the attitude that, having joined, they were being subjected to heavy criticism by the Soviets and others who opposed their membership. They therefore were asking themselves whether what they had obtained from membership outweighed this criticism and pressure. They have been impressed with the argument, often used, that non-Pact countries receive almost as much from the US as the members. The British Government had been particularly troubled by this attitude and had therefore instructed the Ambassador to convey to the Secretary certain specific proposals regarding measures which might be taken or announced at the Baghdad Pact Council meeting which would provide substantial encouragement to the other members. These would be included in the memorandum which he previously said would be sent to the Department later in the day.
The Secretary said he had received some indications that new orders for arms had been placed by Egypt in Czechoslovakia. Considering the limited absorptive capacity of Egypt, and the fact that orders obviously far exceed Egyptian requirements, he wondered to what use the arms would be put. He assumed that many would be passed on to other countries, such as Yemen. Receipt of additional quantities also rendered it possible for Egypt to declare as surplus their own Western arms which might be delivered to Saudi Arabia, the latter having indicated reluctance to obtain weapons from communist countries.
The Secretary noted that the communication handed to him by Ambassador Makins expressed doubt as to the wisdom of building up King Saud, suggesting that we should instead aim at a “front to protect Islam against communism.” The view was expressed that in order to get King Saud to assume greater leadership in anti-communist policies it would appear imperative to play him up as a spiritual leader of Islam and, as such, encourage him to take the lead in making clear to the Arab world the dangers to Islam of communist penetration. It would seem that if we were to succeed in breaking King Saud away from Nasser, something along the lines of developing his prestige in the Arab world would have to be done. The Secretary thought that the word “front” appearing in the British paper connoted some sort of alliance, presumably between Saudi [Page 466] Arabia, Iraq and possibly other Arab states. Since this is not now a practical possibility, perhaps the term “movement” would be more appropriate. The Ambassador agreed with the latter observation.
The Secretary commented that current developments in Libya seemed to be quite favorable. Aside from noting that we would be glad to endorse in the Ambassadorial Committee the suggestion in the British paper regarding arms to Israel, the Secretary said he had no further comments to make at this time on the communication.
Ambassador Makins said that an additional point which he wished to raise concerned military planning. He thought that we should of course move ahead with economic and political measures designed to accomplish our objectives in the area, but that at the same time military planning should be completed and held in reserve. He thought it unfortunate, although necessary, that the US must take the public position that military forces could not be employed in the area without Congressional approval,6 since this gave disruptive elements considerable comfort. He realized, however, that little could be done about it in the circumstances.
Referring to the imminent departure to the Near East of the UN Secretary General,7 Ambassador Makins said that he had hoped to try to instill in Mr. Hammarskjold more realism before he undertook his task. It appeared, however, that he would avoid Western capitals. In any event, Mr. Dixon would see him in New York and would have a frank talk with him. The Secretary said he would also ask Ambassador Lodge to meet with Mr. Hammarskjold. He observed that both the British and the US had told UN officials that if they wanted more observers, helicopters, equipment, or other forms of help, we would be glad to cooperate; it was surprising that no requests had been made. It appeared that they may be far less concerned than we. Perhaps their evaluation of the gravity of the situation was entirely different from our own.
The Secretary read to Ambassador Makins a proposed press announcement in connection with American representation at the forthcoming meeting of the Baghdad Pact Council.8 Ambassador Makins thought the statement excellent and expressed pleasure that the US was sending such high representatives to the meeting.
- Source: Department of State, S/S–NEA Files: Lot 61 D 417, Omega #2. Top Secret; Omega. Drafted on April 6 by Rountree. A notation on the source text reads: “Not cleared by the Secretary 4/9”.↩
- See Document 232.↩
- Infra.↩
- Makins transmitted the memorandum, entitled “Baghdad Pact”, to Dulles under cover of a memorandum on April 5. Copies of these documents are in Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/4–556 and ibid., NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Omega—Re Baghdad Pact 1956.↩
- The article was entitled “Eden Will Stress Mideast to Soviet”.↩
- See footnote 6, Document 240.↩
- U.N. Secretary-General Hammarskjold left for the Near East on April 6.↩
- Reference is to Department of State Press Release 180 of April 6. For text, see Department of State Bulletin, April 16, 1956, p. 637.↩