244. Memorandum of Conversations, New York, April 5, 19561
SUBJECT
- Developments on the Johnston Plan
PARTICIPANTS
- United Nations Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold
- Ambassador Wadsworth, USUN
- Mr. Norman Armour, USUN
- Mr. James Ludlow, UNP
- (Separate Conversations)
- Mr. Fuad Ammoun, Secretary General of Lebanese Foreign Office
- Mr. Edward Rizk, Lebanese Delegation to the United Nations
- Mr. James Ludlow, UNP
Following the Security Council meeting yesterday afternoon we met with Mr. Hammarskjold at his request to brief him on the status of the Johnston Plan. He commenced the conversation by stating that he felt it important that he should know what were the most recent developments with regard to the Jordan Valley Plan. He assumed that despite his carefully circumscribed terms of reference for his forthcoming visit to the area, the Arabs would want to talk to him about the Plan. He said he already had proof of this likelihood since several Arab delegates (whom he did not name) were already putting forward to him the proposals (which Colonel Nasser has already mentioned in a recent talk with Ambassador [Page 471] Byroade). Under these proposals each individual state would merely agree to adopt those parts of the over-all water development plan which relate to it without reference to what Israel would get. He said that it was his opinion, and he had already expressed it to the Arabs, that this was an exceedingly clumsy way of putting the multi-nation plan into effect. He felt that it was important, however, to know precisely how far we had gotten in our discussions with the parties and what further we felt he should know.
I informed Mr. Hammarskjold that we had already ourselves heard of the proposals for the overlapping agreements and we agreed with him that there were serious objections to them. I said that at the time we had concluded our discussions last October we had gotten to the point where there was in effect virtual agreement as to the wording of the plan which on the one side the Arab states would sign, and by separate document the Israelis would sign. The extent of agreement was such at the time that there were nearly five pages of identical understanding with regard to water allocation, storage and the international control authority. Mr. Hammarskjold broke in to say that he found this very interesting information. He had not realized we had gotten so near to full understanding. I said that, as of the time we had decided to return to the United States in October, all the Arab technicians had been in full agreement that the plan was technically feasible and acceptable; that they understood all of the aspects of the problems which we had discussed with them. As for the Israelis, they also had fully understood what we had set forth. The only actual disagreement which had existed at that time of a technical nature related to a small difference on the water quantity and quality to be assigned to Israel and Jordan.
I then went on to point out that we were prepared on the shortest notice to consider with any of the parties any proposals of the technical or legal substance which the interested states might put forward. The qualification, however, was that the proposal should be new and not one which we had already explored with the parties and dismissed. I said that I felt that the counter-proposals he was most likely to face would relate to the nature of the control authority, and to the “high dam” for total storage on the Yarmuk River instead of partial storage in Lake Tiberias. We had already explored these ideas with the parties to the fullest extent and at the “less than political level” all had understood and accepted our views, namely: (1) The nature of the international control authority was such as to guarantee no contact between Israeli and Arab representatives either at signing or at any other subsequent time; (2) There was no known way of assuring full storage on the Yarmuk River on any sound economic basis.
[Page 472]Mr. Hammarskjold expressed appreciation for this information and asked if we had any knowledge as to what the attitudes of various governments were. I said that our present understanding of the attitudes of the governments led us to believe that the Jordanians still were very anxious to have the plan put into effect; that there was opposition to it in Jordan, but we were fairly confident that the King and some of the influential members of the cabinet favored the plan. As for Egypt, it continued to be our understanding that Colonel Nasser favored the plan and would push it if he felt the situation appropriate. The Syrian Government remained opposed to the plan despite Prime Minister Ghazzi’s personal assurance to Ambassador Johnston last fall that given time he could get Syrian acceptance. As for Lebanon, it was my estimate that the present Prime Minister, Abdullah Yafi, and Emile Bustane were personally bitterly opposed to the plan. Mr. Hammarskjold indicated that his information coincided basically with what I had said.
Mr. Hammarskjold then went on to say that, as he had indicated while he had been at the Department last month, he felt that the problem of acceptance of the plan was a thoroughly political one. I said that we completely agreed. However, much of Ambassador Johnston’s success out in the area, particularly in Jordan, had been based on the fact that the acceptance of the Jordan Valley Plan was a matter separable from other political problems confronting the Arab countries and it was of the utmost economic and humanitarian importance to the Arab countries. We hoped, therefore, that nothing would be done to undermine this position although we of course fully understood that the real stumbling block to acceptance was the Arab governments’ political concern that acceptance might constitute a break in the refugee question. I said that in our discussions in the area without either our or the Arabs’ saying so in so many words, we both knew of the political impact of acceptance and therefore the position which we had taken had been designed to help the Arab governments in overcoming their political problems. Mr. Hammarskjold said that it was most unrealistic of the Arabs to take this position. I agreed but said that if this were necessary, we were more than anxious to try to help. I then stressed again our earnest desire to pursue negotiations at any time that fruitful discussions could be had, but that we had no intention or desire to renegotiate what had already been explored.
I pointed out that we also desired to be of any assistance to him we could, should the matter be raised with him out in the area. I assumed, in conclusion, that he knew it was our intention that the facilities on the Arab side should be erected under arrangements worked out with UNRWA and we were, of course, thinking of his (the Secretary General’s) future role when it came to the setting up [Page 473] of the proposed neutral body to supervise the plan. Mr. Hammarskjold said that this role was a long way off. He thanked us for the information we had given.
In the course of our exchanging pleasantries in the delegates’ lounge Tuesday afternoon,2 Fuad Bey asked me when I would be returning to the Near East. I replied that I did not know, but I assumed that if for any reason Ambassador Johnston returned to that area to complete negotiations on the Jordan Valley Plan, I would accompany him. Fuad Bey looked a little sadder than usual and, shaking his head, said that he did not know when that would be because there were new plans that were being considered by his government and the other interested Arab states. I asked him if they were “new” and said if they were, of course we would be interested in knowing about them. He merely replied that we ought to talk further about them if we had a chance, and with that the conversation concluded. He seemed manifestly unhappy in referring to the “new plans”.