Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1–July 26, 1956, Volume XV

240. Memorandum of a Conversation, Secretary Dulles’ Residence, Washington, April 4, 1956, 6:30-7:10 p.m.¹

Washington, April 4, 1956, 6:30—7:10 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Middle East

PARTICIPANTS

• The Secretary
• Mr. MacArthur
• Sir Roger Makins, British Ambassador
• Air Chief Marshal Dickson, Chairman of the British Joint Chiefs

Sir Roger Makins said he and Air Chief Marshal Dickson appreciated very much the Secretary taking time from his very busy schedule to receive them. Sir Roger made reference to his talk with Mr. MacArthur a few hours earlier,² and said he had received a flood of additional telegrams and would hope to see the Secretary tomorrow³ and would try to bring along an informal paper summarizing London’s comments⁴ on his conversation with the Secretary on Easter Sunday afternoon.⁵

The Secretary said he had received a report from Mr. MacArthur regarding the talk earlier in the afternoon with Sir Roger, but had noted that there had been no British reaction with respect to the points the Secretary had made on Saudi Arabia. Sir Roger said that since his talk with Mr. MacArthur he had received additional messages and hoped that by the time he saw the Secretary tomorrow he would have full comments on their conversation of Easter afternoon.

A.C.M. Dickson then expressed his own appreciation for being received by the Secretary. He said that when he had left London the British had been in a bit of a flap about the situation in the Middle East and felt the current was running against them. More recent messages which Sir Roger had received since Dickson’s departure from London seemed to indicate that while there was serious concern, London was not in a state of flap. (Sir Roger told Mr. MacArthur aside that London’s messages since Sunday had been considerably calmer in tone than the ones he had been receiving in the last ten days.)

Dickson then said that while a few weeks ago the British had feared the Israelis would attack Egypt, they now felt the situation was reversed and that there was more danger of an Egyptian attack against Israel in the next few months. Since the final withdrawal of British troops from the Canal Zone on March 31, the British believed Nasser felt he was under less restraint than when there were even a small number of British troops at the Suez Base. The British believed Nasser may have felt that even with a small number of British troops at the Base, these might seriously have interfered with Egyptian communications if Egypt had attacked Israel.

Another cause of British apprehension about possible aggressive action by Egypt was their feeling that Nasser might wish to initiate hostilities with the Israelis in the hope that he could have an early success against them, which would consolidate his position, particularly with respect to Jordan and Iraq, and might enable him to extend his influence over these two countries.

Finally, the Egyptians were unquestionably cocky as a result of their receipt of substantial military equipment and new weapons from the Soviet bloc, and they probably felt they could now successfully take on the Israelis. The British did not concur in this view, although Dickson stated that the Egyptians now had marked superiority in modern and heavy weapons and aircraft. However, they had not fully assimilated these arms, and the Israeli army was a tough little force which if attacked in the next several months would almost certainly make an initial success against the Egyptians.

A.C.M. Dickson then turned to the situation in Jordan, and said it had gone against the UK…. He said that if the Jordan situation deteriorated, the effect on Iraq would be very bad. He mentioned that the removal of Glubb Pasha and the British officers from their posts of command in the Legion removed a restraining influence on the action of the Legion, and the King had made the situation worse by moving the Legion to the Israeli frontier. The British hoped to be able to keep 20 or 30 officers with the Legion, but if this were possible, their situation and status would be most unsatisfactory in that they would not occupy any of the command posts in the Legion. Dickson added that he understood the Israelis would probably not recommence work on the Banat Ya’cub water development project. …

Dickson then reiterated that the British were very concerned that the Egyptians might initiate hostilities. He said the concern and flap in London was in considerable part due to the fact that the UK did not feel they had any adequate understanding with the US regarding what would be done in the event of trouble. As military men, he and Admiral Radford had been directed to develop some military concepts as to what could be done militarily if Israel attacked Egypt or vice versa or if the situation developed where the aggressor could not be identified. He said he and Admiral Radford both felt this was not simply a military matter but was riddled with political aspects and difficulties. Therefore, it was essential that the UK and US military have political guidance from the Department of State and the Foreign Office as to what political assumptions they should base their estimate on. He said that while he and Admiral Radford would go ahead with developing the military concepts, this work would be meaningless without political guidance.

He then made brief reference to the disastrous effect on the UK and on NATO should the Suez Canal be closed. He said that if the Egyptians initiated action which would lead to the closing of the Canal, it might be necessary to undertake military operations to open up the Canal under UN auspices.

Dickson mentioned Iraq briefly, saying that when, following the SEATO Conference in Karachi, he had accompanied Selwyn Lloyd to Baghdad, both the King and Nuri were extremely unhappy that they had not received additional radio transmitting facilities to enable them to step up Iraq broadcasts to the Arab world. They complained that the Iraqi people and other Arabs were exposed to listening to the poison emanating from the Cairo radio broadcasts and they hoped as a matter of great urgency that they could be assisted in developing additional broadcasting facilities.

The Secretary said the entire Middle Eastern situation was a baffling problem since it was terribly confused politically. He made reference to the US Congressional Resolution regarding the use of troops in the defense of Formosa, and said that had been a comparatively simple and clear-cut issue and the Congress had responded affirmatively to the Administration’s desire. However, the Middle East situation was very confused, and there were all kinds of different possibilities: the Israelis might attack Egypt; the Egyptians might attack Israel; or hostilities might break out under circumstances which would not make it possible clearly to identify the aggressor. He did not believe the Congress would adopt a resolution which would encompass all the various possibilities, and in this connection made reference to the President’s press conference today where the President had said he would not act to send troops to the Middle East in the event of war without Congressional authority.⁶

The Secretary also mentioned that he was having our legal people look into the Suez Canal Treaty,⁷ to which we were not signatory, with a view to seeing whether a plausible legal position might be developed for the employment of troops in the event the Egyptians took action to close the Canal.

The Secretary then said that while he thought the military studies which Dickson and Radford were undertaking were useful, he doubted that a solution to the Middle East problem would be found by military means. He felt for a number of reasons, including our inability to guarantee to take military action, that other means for finding a solution would have to be sought.

The Secretary then mentioned that he had asked Sir Roger whether the UK had a good study on the oil situation and what might be done if the pipelines were blown up and if the Suez Canal were blocked. He discussed the problem in general terms along the lines of his previous discussion with Sir Roger last Sunday, and said that whether we liked it or not, this situation could arise, and there should be a serious and detailed study as to what might be done. He mentioned that he felt the primary Soviet objective was to deny Middle East oil to the West rather than to acquire the oil itself, since the Soviet Union had sufficient production to get along on. The Secretary said that if we had plans as to how to mitigate the loss of Middle East oil, we would be in a somewhat stronger position with the Arabs since if the West did not take their oil they would lose the oil revenues on which they depended.

Dickson said Admiral Radford had mentioned a recent study that the US had undertaken regarding oil,⁸ and said the UK was also engaging in studies on what the loss of the Suez Canal would mean in terms not only of oil but other export and import products.

In the course of this discussion, the Secretary said he would direct that our economic people analyze carefully the position of Egypt in terms of what its financial and economic position would be if the Canal were blocked and it received no revenue from the Canal traffic, if it received no aid of any kind from West, and if its free world market for long staple cotton could be denied it. Sir Roger said he thought this was a good idea, and in this connection the International Bank had a mass of economic material on Egypt which might be useful. The Secretary … reiterated that he thought the present struggle going on in the Middle East to prevent Soviet penetration would be won by political, economic, and counter-subversive actions rather than by military actions.

Dickson mentioned again that the Israeli army was out-gunned by the Egyptian army, but for the period of the next six months he believed the Israeli army could defeat the Egyptians in the field. He thought it was a good thing the French were sending some Mysteres and that Canada also might send some planes since it would be a great temptation to the Egyptians if the Israeli level of defense were not somewhat increased. At the same time, he felt that both the US and the UK should not send military equipment to the Israelis as this would impair their position and influence with the Arab states. Dickson mentioned that for a while the British had opposed the French sending Mysteres to Israel as they feared that if hostilities broke out the UK would have to honor its commitment with Jordan, and might be fighting against Israel with Jordanian aircraft which were inferior to the Mysteres. In the light of the recent Jordan action, however, it was extremely doubtful that the UK would become involved on the side of Jordan in a conflict with Israel.

In response to a direct question by the Secretary, A.C.M. Dickson confirmed that the Indians were buying aircraft from the UK, but he said the UK was not sure whether the Indians might also purchase some aircraft and other military equipment from the Soviets.

1. Source: Department of State, S/S–NEA Files: Lot 61 D 417, Omega #1. Secret; Omega. Drafted by MacArthur.
2. During this conversation, Makins showed MacArthur several telegrams from the British Foreign Office that dealt with Makins’ meeting with Dulles on April 1 (see Document 232). In his memorandum of the conversation, MacArthur noted that the most important of these telegrams “agreed with the Secretary’s summing up of the extent of Nasser’s commitment to the Soviets.”“The telegram went on to say that if the US and UK could work out a new policy for dealing with Nasser, it should not be publicized. … It was desirable to keep Nasser guessing regarding our intentions, but it would only arouse his suspicions if ‘we took smilingly his recent propaganda attacks against us’. The telegram went on to say that at the same time we should do our utmost to strengthen our friends in the area to counter Nasser’s activities.” The telegram concluded by noting Foreign Office agreement that decision on the Aswan Dam be delayed. (Department of State, S/S-NEA Files: Lot 61 D 417, Omega #1)
3. See Document 242.
4. See Document 243.
5. See Document 232.
6. For the transcript of the President’s press conference, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1956, pp. 368–381.
7. Reference presumably is to the Constantinople Convention of 1888. For text, see British and Foreign State Papers, 1887–1888, volume 79, pp. 18–22, or The Suez Canal Problem, July 26–September 22, 1956 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1956), pp. 16–20.
8. See footnote 4, Document 224.