Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1–July 26, 1956, Volume XV

235. Message to Washington¹

No. 132

Cairo, April 3, 1956.

1. … conferred at length on first April with Ali Sabri who said he and Nasr extremely upset by fears that U.S. Government and U.K. Government have taken some secret policy decision to destroy Nasr and position his Govt in area. Ali Sabri said Nasr had hoped their grounds common after Egypt and U.S. Government work to solution Arab area problems; said he did not say goodbye to Anderson in expectation that Anderson mission was finished. When pressed for explanation Nasr worries about anti-Egyptian policy, Ali Sabri referred two principal concerns:

A. U.S. Government Palestinian Resolution in UN² and

B. Propaganda campaign in UK and United States to fix Nasr with Blame for all trouble in area.

2. With respect to UN Resolution Nasr principally disturbed that announcement was made without … Ambassador Byroade … consulting or informing him in advance. He reported feel his relations with Ambassador Byroade such as would have made decision of Resolution prior to announcement normal and helpful. In circumstances Russian ambassador³ had fine opportunity make gesture good will to Egypt by offering make any changes in Resolution Egypt desired.

3. Another source concern was fact that Resolution made without any reference to Anderson mission …. He forced speculate on possibility that UN Resolution involved some ulterior motive which not apparent surface, otherwise he could not understand why work of weeks had been ignored.

4… . assured Ali Sabri that UN Palestine Resolution was continuation of plans discussed under Anderson mission and that motives and objectives of Resolution were same as those involved in Anderson mission, Step Three. Ali Sabri said Egypt would give full support to UN Resolution and had urged other Arab States to cooperate, though feeling the need for clarification on several points. He said Nasr still feels he has not been given explanation U.S. Government position and objectives and connection present moves with Anderson mission … anxious for guidance on this point, suggests it advisable effort be made maintain continuity Anderson mission and good will generated by Anderson visits.

5. On subject anti-Egyptian line in United States and UK Press. Ali Sabri … had long and not very profitable conversation… . argued that anti-Western line in Egyptian Press equalled anti-Egyptian line in Western Press and that improvement of situation required moderation on both sides. Ali Sabri argued that Egyptian Government could control but not dictate to press and that Egyptian Press about as moderate as possible under circumstances. If anti-Egyptian line maintained in UK Press, he said, the time will come when we can no longer control our press’ treatment of the UK to the extent that we do now. Egyptian relations with the UK, said Ali Sabri, are now so bad and are steadily deteriorating that “I don’t know what’s going to happen”.

1. Source: Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Alpha—Anderson Talks w/BG & Nasser. Incoming Telegrams—Jan.–March 1956. Part II. Secret. A note dated April 3 attached to the source text indicates that Russell forwarded this message to Dulles and Hoover. The note bears Hoover’s initials and a marginal note indicating that Dulles saw the message.
2. See Document 206.
3. Yevgeniy Dmitrievich Kiselev.