236. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Rountree) to the Under Secretary of State (Hoover)1
Washington, April 3,
1956.
SUBJECT
- Meeting with Ambassador Makins Concerning Aswan Dam
I understand that you are meeting with Ambassador Makins at 12:15 p.m., April 3 to discuss the High Aswan Dam, and that you wish me to be present.2
Since our policy concerning the project has been discussed at length during the past several days, I believe that an extensive briefing will not be necessary. The present situation may be summarized as follows:
- 1.
- Following Mr. Black’s negotiations with Nasser in early February, the Egyptians suggested a substantial revision of the US and British aide-mémoire setting forth their willingness to participate in the project. The changes recommended by the Egyptians appear to have been motivated primarily by three factors:
- a.
- They wished to extract from the US and Great Britain more definitive and favorable commitments concerning financial participation;
- b.
- They wished the offers to be in terms more satisfactory from the propaganda viewpoint; and
- c.
- The Egyptian Government decided, contrary to earlier expectations, to defer work on the Dam until after concluding an agreement with Sudan on division of the Nile Waters.
- 2.
- Even if we were prepared to go forward with the project at this time, substantial amendments in the Egyptian counterdraft would be required. In view of recent developments with respect to Egyptian policy, however, we have not considered it timely to consult with the British and the IBRD on the Egyptian proposals. Unless and until circumstances are such as to warrant our participation in the project, discussion on the details of the offer would be a fruitless pursuit.
- 3.
- We have not, of course, indicated to the Egyptians that we might not now be prepared to move forward with the negotiations. We believe that delaying tactics should be employed, at least for the time being, so that we will not be in the position either of breaking off negotiations or of giving the Egyptians encouragement to believe that we are anxious to complete the arrangements.
- 4.
- We hope that the British will agree to employ similar delaying tactics and, if queried by the Egyptians, respond along the lines simply that the Egyptian counter-proposal presented a number of difficult questions which were still under study; the fact that Egypt decided to withhold work on the project pending an agreement with the Sudan removed much of the urgency for concluding the arrangements.
- 5.
- It is our thought that, in view of the possibility that the Egyptians might decide to enter into a contract with the Soviet Union for the Dam project, we should make every effort to develop a situation in Sudan whereby a Nile Waters agreement between Sudan and Egypt could be blocked. It is important that we gain enough time to set straight our position in Sudan.