234. Memorandum of a Conference With the President, White House, Washington, April 3, 1956, 10:30 a.m.1
OTHERS PRESENT
- Admiral Radford
- Air Chief Marshal Dickson
- Lt. General Whiteley
The President welcomed Air Chief Marshal Dickson, asked about the other members of the British Chiefs of Staff, and recalled some of his war service with them. Air Chief Marshal Dickson told the President that the ostensible reason for his being here is to get to [Page 447] know Admiral Radford—his opposite number—better, and to renew past friendships. A more specific purpose, however, is to engage in military discussions concerning the situation in the Middle East. The rest of the meeting was concerned with this subject.
The President and Air Chief Marshal Dickson both saw large hazards in an Arab “bloc” extending from Pakistan to Dakar, with weak and unstable governments and institutions, and resulting vulnerability to Soviet penetration. If it were necessary to protect the canal, the task would be extremely difficult if the whole Arab bloc were opposed to us, much less so if only the Egyptians were opposed.
The President spoke of the importance of our information, propaganda, and political warfare activities in the area. The output from Cairo and Moscow seems to be very great, and we are not making the gains we should in putting our story across. He thought that the United States and the UK should do a great deal toward concerting activities in this field. He said we have very considerable assets in the area, if we would just make use of them. Air Chief Marshal Dickson said that throughout that area, even in Syria, we still have friends, although they are becoming fewer and weaker.
The President thought we should try to build up a “design” for our actions in the Middle East. We should consider what would be the first step to restoring our fortunes there. To this end, each of the major countries might have to contribute, or concede, a little. Air Chief Marshal Dickson referred to the Baghdad Pact and then indicated need for greater US and UK support to it. The President thought there was a great deal we could do, even short of adhering. Air Chief Marshal Dickson mentioned that the Middle Eastern countries are sending their Prime Ministers to the April 16th meeting, whereas the British are unable to arrange for Eden or Lloyd to go. The President asked if it would not be desirable for Lloyd to be there.
Air Chief Marshal Dickson thought that Egypt is taking a bad turn. The British had worked with the Egyptians for quite a while but were now coming to feel that there is nothing to be gained through cooperation. They may initiate war against Israel—and sooner than we think. He said there is a base of anti-Communism in the Moslem religion and the Koran, on which we could build. Syria is in real danger of going Communist. He agreed that there are possibilities for putting the situation on a better basis, in spite of difficulties on every side. He confirmed that a few tentative approaches toward the Iraqis had been made by Saud. There are possibilities in the “greater fertile crescent” idea. It is not impossible that an understanding could be reached with Saud concerning the shiekdoms. The British feel very strongly about Buraimi, but would [Page 448] consider giving Saudi-Arabia a channel for access to the Persian Gulf.
The President saw need for bringing the political, military, and political warfare people of the United States and UK together to concert action. It is a highly “tangled skein.” Actions should be under the direction of selected, very astute individuals.
- Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Eisenhower Diaries. Secret. Drafted by Goodpaster.↩