Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1–July 26, 1956, Volume XV

143. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Radford) to the Secretary of State¹

Washington, March 1, 1956

SUBJECT

• Military Discussions in connection with Actions to be taken under the Tripartite Declaration of 1950

1. As a result of the Washington talks between the United States and United Kingdom, the U.K. Chiefs of Staff have submitted a paper entitled “Report on the Military Problems Involved in Action Under the Tripartite Declaration of 1950”.² The U.K. Chiefs of Staff have approved this report as a basis for discussion, and further emphasize that the report has not been approved by the Ministers and sets out purely military considerations. They further state in the introduction to this report that as a result of the Washington talks the United Kingdom and the United States have agreed as a first step to undertake some measure of combined planning.

2. It is apparent that as a result of the Tripartite Meeting held on February 8,³ both the British and French expect that military discussions will take place within the framework of the Tripartite Declaration. This has been confirmed by General Valluy, French Representative to the NATO Standing Group, who, in a discussion with me on February 13,⁴ stated that he had been advised by the French Ambassador that military discussions would take place.

3. As a result of my discussion with you on this subject on February 23,⁵ it was agreed that the Joint Chiefs of Staff would undertake some measures of combined planning with the British. As an initial step in implementing this agreement, Rear Admiral Hedding, of my staff, and Rear Admiral Currie, Chief of Staff to General Sir John Whiteley, are, on an informal basis, preparing a revision to the British report for submission to the U.S. and U.K. Chiefs of Staff for comment. This was to be followed by the initiation of staff level combined planning conferences in connection with military actions that might be taken under the Tripartite Declaration.

4. Subsequent discussions between Mr. Rountree, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State (NEA) and Rear Admiral Hedding⁶ disclose the deep concern felt by the State Department in the event the French are brought into this combined planning …. I, too, share that concern, however, I am more concerned with the necessity for undertaking some measures of combined planning with the British, planning that will involve detailed consideration of military courses of action that may be required in the event of an outbreak of hostilities in this area. I feel we would be most derelict if we fail to undertake this required planning with the British.

5. My understanding of the State Department proposal in this matter is as follows:

a. We will go ahead with Tripartite Military Discussions, including French participation, within the framework of the Tripartite Declaration of 1950 and the recent U.S.–U.K. statement from the Washington talks.⁷

b. For the next two or three weeks we will exchange general information only with the British. Subsequently, combined planning with the British will be undertaken.

c. If the above is agreed to, the State Department will call in the British Ambassador, expressing concern over the recent leak in London, and obtaining a firm promise that in the event combined planning is undertaken between the U.S. and U.K., proper security will be maintained.⁸

d. It is hoped that the French will be satisfied with the military discussions to be undertaken as outlined in a. above. Should they not be satisfied or propose combined planning, then the problem will require reconsideration.

6. I would like to comment briefly on this proposal. My first and major concern is with the necessity for undertaking combined planning at an early date with the British, planning that will probably be quite detailed in order to provide the degree of coordination necessary in military operations. Nothing less can be acceptable from a military point of view. I further feel that in the military discussions to be held within the framework of the Tripartite Declaration we will be forced to discuss with the French the broad aspects of the military actions that may be required under the Declaration, even though we are successful in keeping from them the fact that we are engaged in combined planning with the British. I feel they will not be satisfied with less, even though it is recognized they will have little to contribute to the military actions. I feel that it is almost inevitable that the French will learn of our bilateral planning with the British. In any event I must again point out that we must proceed with this combined planning with the British whether or not the French learn of this planning and insist on participating. The State Department should therefore be prepared for this possibility.

7. Subject to the above comments, I agree to this proposal and will initiate the following actions in the order as listed:

a. Complete the informal revision of the British report and submit it to the U.S. and U.K. Chiefs of Staff for comment. This will take a minimum of from three to four weeks.

b. Initiate combined planning with the British.

c. Conduct military discussions with the British and French within the framework of the Tripartite Declaration and the U.S.–U.K. statement from the Washington talks. It would be desirable to hold off on these discussions until the comments on the British report have been completed, although this may not be possible.

I would like to point out that we should be prepared to have the French enter into this combined planning almost from the start.

8. This memorandum is being given very restricted distribution and should be handled on a strict “need-to-know” basis. The Office of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, will take the required implementing actions, keeping holders of this memorandum advised of the necessary details.⁹

Arthur Radford

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/3–156. Top Secret.
2. See footnote 4, Document 104.
3. See Document 87.
4. General Valluy did inform Admiral Radford that the French expected that military discussions would take place within the framework of the Tripartite Declaration and inquired if any military planning or military actions had occurred. Admiral Radford replied that there had only been the Naval demonstrations in the Eastern Mediterranean and that the French Ambassador had been advised of these operations. (Memorandum for the Record by Rear Admiral Truman J. Hedding, Special Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, February 13; Radford Papers A–1, Memos for the Record)
5. No account of this conversation has been found in Department of State files, but see footnote 4, Document 110.
6. No record of these discussions has been found in Department of State files.
7. See footnote 2, Document 65.
8. Hoover, after receipt of this memorandum, did meet with British Ambassador Makins. See Document 169.
9. According to a memorandum dated April 18 from MacArthur to Hoover, Murphy, Allen, and Rountree, MacArthur inquired about the status of U.S.–U.K. military planning for the Middle East and had learned “that the JCS had reached agreement on the first six paragraphs and paragraph 7a of the letter to the Secretary, dated March 1, on this subject. In other words, the actions thus far were those outlined in the paragraphs indicated above and the JCS was continuing its work and had reached paragraph 7b.” (Department of State, S/S–NEA Files: Lot 61 D 417, Omega #3)