Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1–July 26, 1956, Volume XV

87. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Missions¹

Washington, February 9, 1956—7:56 p.m.

540. Statement by President and British Prime Minister February 1² referred to provisions 1950 Tripartite Declaration and increasing danger of possible hostilities in Near East. Reference was also made to joint discussions in which French were invited to participate as to nature of action which should be taken in event of possible hostilities.³ Representatives of US, UK, France met in Washington February 8 for organizational and exploratory discussions.⁴ These discussions included various contingencies which might arise in NE such as 1) diversion of Jordan River at Banat Ya’qub 2) renewed hostilities in Al Auja DZ and 3) possible hostilities in Gulf of Aqaba. Discussion also included measures which might be taken individually or jointly both within and without UN to meet various contingencies. It was agreed Banat Ya’qub was presently most important and most critical point of conflict between Israel and Arab States.

Representatives of US, UK and France agreed report discussions to respective capitals including 1) question of Tripartite démarche in Israeli and Arab Capitals re support for Johnston Plan as means avoiding possible violence at Banat Ya’qub and 2) question of measures each might be prepared to take within or without UN to forestall development of hostilities at Banat Ya’qub. They agreed prepare short papers incorporating views of each covering possible contingencies and possible measures.⁵

Representatives of US, UK and France agreed on necessity for press release for purpose emphasizing continued Tripartite reliance on UN procedures in meeting threats to international peace and security.⁶ Early press reports from NE had indicated Tripartite discussions were being interpreted as imperialistic action. It was therefore believed reference to UN would be timely. Press release also indicated current discussions were preliminary exchange of views under Tripartite Declaration and that further consultations would take place (probably in week’s time).⁷

Dulles

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.41/2–956. Secret. Sent to Ankara, Amman, Baghdad, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, Jidda, Karachi, London, Paris, and Tel Aviv. Drafted by Wilkins and approved by Allen who signed for Dulles.
2. See footnote 2, Document 65.
3. See Document 65.
4. The memorandum of this conversation is not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.41/2–856)
5. The U.S. paper, February 14, entitled “Tripartite Courses of Action in Case of Threat or Outbreak of Israel-Arab Hostilities”, which dealt with the three contingencies that might arise in the Near East—the diversion of the Jordan River at Banat Ya’qub, the renewal of hostilities in the Al Auja Demilitarized Zone, and the possibility of hostilities in the Gulf of Aqaba—is ibid., NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Alpha—Memos, etc. during Eden talks. Dec. 11 to Feb. 15, 1956.
6. For text of this press release, February 8, see Department of State Bulletin, February 20, 1956, p. 286.
7. Representatives of the three governments met again at the Department of State on February 15. They discussed the latest developments with respect to the Banat Ya’qub situation and agreed that the three powers would make separate but coordinated approaches to the Egyptian Government urging Egypt to call a meeting of the Arab states to accept the Johnston proposals. No arrangements were made to conduct another of these tripartite meetings. (Memorandum of conversation by Geren, February 15; Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–WA/2–1556)