115. Letter From the Ambassador in Egypt (Byroade) to the Secretary of State1
Dear Mr. Secretary: Forgive me for addressing you directly in this manner. I have not done it before—and will not abuse the privilege—but I know of no other satisfactory way to communicate some of my thoughts to you in a way that would not be misunderstood. I would in fact hope that this letter would receive no distribution as I think it might be misunderstood by some of your staff.
The last two days have been one of the most soul-searching periods of my life. I was asked by Hoover how—not whether—the problem of arms to Israel could be handled.2 You will have seen my answer which, while very negative, was the best that I could conscientiously do.3 I realize that this reply is not helpful to those who think we must let Israel have arms. They will think that I have lost all sense of appreciation of the situation at home and the problems they confront. Believe me, I do not believe this to be the case. I have not been away from the domestic scene long and have kept, through many channels, perhaps closer to it on this issue than would be imagined.
We are indeed in a most regrettable dilemma. I have sensed from knowing you that one of the things you wanted most to accomplish during your tenure as Secretary was the solution to the Arab-Israeli problem. You have maintained good policies toward that end and in spite of all our difficulties in the area—many of which have been caused by acts of others over which we had no control— you have made real progress. You are now trying to capitalize on your policies in a most sensible fashion by means of the Anderson Mission. This may not work, but it is the only chance of preventing disaster in this area that I can see. Furthermore I am not gloomy about the prospects. If we keep at this it may work—and I know of no other alternative. The great problem is that if we talk about it it will not work—and without talking about it we give the impression of floundering hopelessly with a dangerous situation. I have wracked my brain to think up some cover plan of activity about which you could hopefully talk but have been unable to conceive of any that [Page 211] does not carry with it almost the same dangers as exposing the Anderson mission.
It is not my function to advise you on matters at home but I can see only one way out of the present dilemma. We can’t remain on the defensive because we cannot expose the strength of our defense. The only answer therefore is to take the initiative domestically.
I was tremendously encouraged while I was home by the change in public opinion in the space of one short year since I have been gone. America never has been able to understand the Arab-Israeli issue—it was too complicated—too far away, and there has been nothing in America to match the distortion of the Zionists. We now have a situation however that the American people can understand— and that is the threat from the Soviet Union in this part of the world. The problem of Israel and of Zionism at home can be put in the proper context for the first time.
I respectfully suggest that this can only be done by the President personally. What I have in mind is a television “fireside chat” type of thing (perhaps I have used an unfortunate phrase!). The President, by laying all the facts on the line (except the Anderson Mission) could probably still take this issue to a satisfactory degree out of domestic politics. I would think he could talk about the overriding interest in this area of America as a whole in such a way as to practically break the back of Zionism as a political force. You can judge better than I whether this is possible but I give you one example. At my appearance before the Council of Foreign Relations in New York4 there was an unusual turnout of high-caliber people. I gave them nearly the whole picture in as honest a manner as I could. I believe if a vote had been taken of that group after my talk at least 99% of those present would have voted against arms for Israel. I even believe this would have included most of the Jewish people present.
If what I suggest could be done there would be great relief in many circles. I recall my talk with Senator Saltonstall who has a problem of his own regarding this matter. He would be relieved no end if the personality of the President could take the matter far above his own level. I believe many Democrats who are forced into a position on this question, against what their conscience dictates, would be content to ward off future pressures with this assistance. This would not stop them all by any means but neither, in this particular year, would any other action. I am convinced Adlai Stevenson could be counted upon, and possibly by prior collaboration, would even give positive support. I have just had a long talk [Page 212] with Sam Kopper who passed through here but did not mention of course the specific idea that the President might take the initiative. Incidentally I believe Sam should be kept better informed by your staff as he no longer has the argumentation to use as ammunition to help Stevenson ward off his pressures. This procedure worked well before the last Congressional elections and I do not believe it’s too late to make it effective again.
The kindest act we might make for the long-range good of Israel might be shock treatment to clear up our situation at home. Without knowing any of the details I would bet my paycheck that the activities of Eban in the past two weeks in connection with the Saudi arms deal clearly exceeded that of an accredited foreign diplomat. People such as Nahum Goldman have demonstratedly violated the right to U.S. citizenship. To suggest action along these lines may seem completely rash. I believe however if it is done now we can tide over and control anti-Semitism in the United States. If we wait for what may well happen in the Middle East—when the record will have to be exposed—this may not be possible. I say this in all sincerity although I may be somewhat prejudiced and affected by the attitude of the Middle West as I saw it on my last visit.
All this may make little sense unless one could visualize the type of draft the President might use. You could probably do the best job of drafting if you could spare the time. There are others however who could be put to work on the problem to assist you. If I could be of any help, even at this distance, I would be most happy to do so.
All this comes from an ex-Indiana farm boy who has never had the slightest feelings about race or creed—yet who now is labeled anti-Semitic. Believe me, I make these recommendations in what I consider to be the best interests of the United States—and in the firm conviction that they are in the long-range best interests of Israel—whether they agree or not.5
Sincerely,
- Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, Israeli Relations 1951–1957. Top Secret; Eyes Only; Personal and Private.↩
- See the enclosure to Document 106.↩
- Document 113.↩
- Not further identified.↩
- Dulles responded with a personal letter to Byroade on February 29, in which he assured Byroade that he had given his remarks “very careful thought”, but went on to say that “I do not see how we can go on indefinitely refusing to let Israel buy any type of armament here, even the most clearly defensive, unless this is essential to some constructive program which has a reasonable chance of success.” (Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, Israeli Relations 1951–1957)↩