Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1–July 26, 1956, Volume XV

116. Memorandum From the Secretary of State’s Special Assistant (Russell) to the Secretary of State¹

Washington, February 23, 1956.

SUBJECT

• Middle East Policy

Mr. Hoover asked me on Tuesday to chair an ad hoc committee to recommend policies which should be pursued with respect to Israel and the Arab states,² assuming that efforts to find an early solution of the dispute should be unsuccessful. In view of your imminent departure for the Far East³ and your discussions during the next few days with Congressional leaders, I thought that it might be useful to you to have some quick impressions of the committee, realizing that fuller consideration may well result in a different analysis and recommendations.⁴ The attached papers provide such a highly tentative discussion on the following questions:

1. Shipments of arms to Middle East countries;

2. Measures for increasing security and preventing hostilities in the Middle East; and,

3. Measures for dealing with specific situations likely to lead to an early outbreak of hostilities.

F.H.R.

[Attachment 1]

U.S. MIDDLE EAST ARMS SHIPMENTS POLICY⁵

Problem:

During the past six months the U.S. has based its policies relating to arms shipments to the Middle East on the dual objectives of: (a) creating conditions most conducive to an Arab-Israel settlement, and (b) preventing an all-out arms race in the area which the Soviet-Egyptian arms deal threatened to touch off. Israel’s apprehensions at the shift in the balance of power in the area as a result of Egypt’s absorption of military equipment from the Soviet bloc has reached a point where it threatens to embark upon preventive action and where the Western powers must consider their moral responsibility for Israel’s security in the face of a shift in the balance of power.

Discussion:

In formulating an arms shipments policy for the period ahead, the following should be our objectives: to lessen the likelihood of war between Arabs and Israelis; to promote conditions favorable to a solution of the Arab-Israel problem; to avoid a position in which the U.S. backs and supplies Israel while the Soviet bloc backs and supplies the Arab states; to minimize Soviet penetration of the area; and to support the Baghdad Pact without unnecessarily complicating our relations with the neutrals.

There are three principal alternative policies:

1. Establish an embargo on arms shipments to the Middle East, with the exception of Libya and Iraq. This policy would require our coming to an understanding with Saudi Arabia regarding our commitments to their five-year plan and the Dhahran air base. Such a U.S. embargo might contemplate both Israel and the Arab states getting limited deliveries of arms from other Western sources, including France and the U.K. The advantages of this policy would be: that it would give the U.S. a favorable moral position, and that it would be less onerous for us in our relations with the Arab states. Among the disadvantages would be the continued pressure to which we would be subjected by Israel and its friends for arms and a security guarantee; the difficulty of getting the Saudis to understand why we were not living up to our commitment to them and preventing them from turning to the Soviets; and likely objections by the British and French to our assuming a moral position and putting the burden of arms deliveries on them.

2. Continuing to supply arms to Israel on the basis of preserving Israel’s previous ability to ward off an attack from all Arab states combined and making it clear that we were also prepared to sell arms to such Arab states as do not have significant contracts with the Soviet bloc. The principal advantage of this approach would be that it would remove the Israeli incentive to undertake preventive war. The disadvantages of this policy would be that it would foster an arms race, leading the Egyptians to increase their orders with the Soviets and leading towards a situation in which the Soviets backed the Arabs while the West increased its identification with Israel.

3. The Western powers would provide a limited amount of arms to both sides on the following conditions:

a. Israel would agree that it would no longer attempt to maintain an arms establishment equal to that of all of the Arab states combined but would base its security upon (a) a combination of an arms establishment capable of dealing with a sudden armed thrust and blunting an armed attack and (b) the security afforded by the U.N. and the Tripartite Powers. Israel would not maintain a capacity of defeating the Arabs or even holding out indefinitely against them. The object would be to provide Israel with the means of defense during a limited period in which the Tripartite Powers could consult and take necessary action and in which the U.N. could act.

b. The types and amounts of arms to be provided would be calculated on the basis of existing stocks and sources available to both sides apart from those coming from the U.S. In making agreements to provide arms, we would need to secure information concerning the current military establishments and procurement efforts.

c. In addition to making the usual stipulations, such as use for defense only, the recipient countries might be required to agree to other conditions. These might include: full cooperation with the Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervisory Organization, covering, inter alia, full access by UNTSO at all times to places in the demilitarized zones, withdrawal of troops behind agreed lines, etc. It might also be desirable to obtain agreement upon such matters as the commencement of construction of work at Banat Yaacov.

d. In order to secure reasonable implementation of U.S. arms shipments policies, consideration should be given to strengthening the machinery which now exists to consult on the provision of arms by Western powers to countries in the Near East.

The advantages of such a policy would be: that it would hold out to Israel a reasonable degree of security; that it would terminate a situation, which has been unacceptable to the Arabs, of maintaining a balance between the armed forces of Israel, a state of one and a half million, and those of the six Arab states combined, with aggregate populations of 40 million; that it should not touch off another round of Soviet arms purchases by the Arab states; that it would give the Western powers some leverage to require of Israel greater cooperation with UNTSO.

[Attachment 2]

PREVENTION OF WAR BETWEEN THE ARAB STATES AND ISRAEL⁶

Problem:

There is an increasing possibility of an outbreak of hostilities between the Arab states and Israel. For the next few months the principal danger is that Israel, becoming desperate as it sees Arab military strength growing, will set off a preventive war against Egypt and Syria either by overt aggression or, more likely, by non-military action that will provoke a military response from the Arabs. In the subsequent period when Egypt has integrated its new Czech arms into its military establishment, the principal danger will lie in an Arab initiative.

Discussion:

Several proposals have been put forward with a view to preventing an Arab-Israel war.

1. The first of these provides that the U.S., and perhaps the U.K. and France, should enter into bilateral security pacts with Israel and the contiguous Arab states. The primary difficulty with this proposal is that it would not be acceptable to the Arab states unless it were accompanied by boundary changes that would reduce the territory presently under Israel’s control. Hence, if the proposal were pursued prior to an Arab-Israel understanding on boundaries, only Israel would accept it and the U.S. would find itself aligned with Israel against the Arabs. It could safely be anticipated that ties between the Arab states and the Soviet Bloc would in this circumstance be considerably strengthened. Moreover, in the absence of at least partial settlement of the Arab-Israel dispute, the present pitch of tension would continue and a security pact, or pacts, would have little effect unless the U.S., and the U.K. and France if they participated in the pact offer, had military forces obviously ready for prompt deployment in the area.

2. A second proposal is that the U.N. be used to prevent war in the Near East. The principal difficulty here is to find a suitable and practicable means of effectively interposing the U.N. between the disputants. The Soviet veto in the Security Council and the Arab-Asian strength in the General Assembly make it unlikely that any proposed action unacceptable to the Arabs would be approved—and the Arabs can be expected to oppose any action that does not clearly favor their cause.

Even assuming that Security Council or General Assembly approval for U.N. action could be obtained, the probable types of action would not remove the danger of war. The creation of a new watching and reporting agency, either on an ad hoc basis or utilizing the Peace Observation Commission machinery would not add significantly to the present capability of UNTSO in this area of activity. In fact, such a new body might merely duplicate or seriously interfere with the continued effective operation of the UNTSO. The establishment of a new version of the Palestine Conciliation Commission to make a resurvey of political problems and possible solutions might for a time inhibit the Arab states and Israel from resorting to hostilities but this would be only a temporary palliative. The composition of such a commission, posing as it undoubtedly would the question of Soviet participation, raises doubts as to the advisability of such a body being created now or in the immediate future.

3. The third proposal is that the Tripartite powers, the U.S., U.K. and France, make a new declaration of their intention to prevent war between the Arab states and Israel. This declaration might be in the following sense:

“The Governments of the U.S., U.K. and France reaffirm their deep interest in and their determination to promote the establishment and maintenance of peace and stability in the Near East and their unalterable opposition to the use of force or threat of force between any of the states in that area. The three Governments, should they find that any of these states intends to violate, or had violated, frontiers or armistice lines, would, consistently with their obligations as members of the U.N., immediately take action, both within and outside the U.N., to deal with the situation.

“The action contemplated would, if necessary, include military action as contemplated under Chapter VII of the Charter⁷ or under the Uniting for Peace Resolution. Its objectives should a significant armed offensive occur, would be to bring about an immediate cease fire and the restoration of the status quo ante and to provide assistance to the state or states subjected to such an offensive.

“The three Governments are in continuing consultation on the means to give effect to their joint commitment to the maintenance of peace in the Near East.”

If this type of declaration were to have real effect in the Near East, it would have to be buttressed, as regards the U.S., by appropriate Congressional action and/as regards all three Governments, by overt evidences that they were in fact making the military dispositions that would enable them to intervene promptly if the need arose.

It might be desirable to give Turkey an opportunity to associate itself in some way with this declaration. The Turks have previously indicated an interest in participating in arrangements for maintaining peace between the Arab states and Israel, and they have substantial forces at hand. Countervailing considerations are that Turkey is to some extent suspect among the Arab states by virtue of past history and that Turkey’s participation might involve its Baghdad Pact partners with consequent embarrassment to Iraq.

As is clear from the suggested language of the declaration, every effort would be made by the Tripartite powers to obtain U.N. approval and sanction for their actions in the event of Arab-Israel hostilities. As these actions will be consistent with their obligations as U.N. members and as the U.N. has heretofore, either in the Security Council or the General Assembly, responded positively to an actual breach of the peace, there is reason to expect that approval and sanction would be given.

Conclusions:

1. Three courses of action to prevent war between the Arab states and Israel have been proposed: i.e., unilateral U.S. security pacts with Israel and the contiguous Arab states; recourse to some form of U.N. action; and renewed and stronger action by the Tripartite powers.

2. In the absence of boundary adjustments that would reduce the territory now under Israel’s control, none of the Arab states would accept a U.S. offer of a bilateral security pact, whereas Israel would accept the offer. The net effect would, thereby, be to align the U.S. with Israel against the Arabs. Moreover, unless other steps were taken to lessen the prevailing tension in the Near East, such pacts would not be effective unless they were reinforced by obvious U.S. military forces that could be rapidly deployed in the area.

3. Because of the Soviet veto in the Security Council and the Arab-Asian strength in the General Assembly, it would be very difficult to achieve U.N. action that would be effective in preventing the outbreak of war in the Near East. Should war occur, appropriate action by the Council or the Assembly could be expected.

4. A firm public stand by the U.S., U.K. and France that they would take necessary action, including military action, to maintain or restore peace between the Arab states and Israel offers the best hope of preventing war. If this is to be effective, Congressional action in support of the U.S. Administration’s position would be required.

[Attachment 3]

MEASURES TO MINIMIZE DANGER OF IMMEDIATE HOSTILITIES IN ARAB-ISRAEL DISPUTE⁸

I. General

This paper is written on the assumption that the measures proposed would be taken in the context of other steps to lessen tensions in the Near East. These could include the strengthening of area security through announcement of intention to take action in the United Nations or under the Tripartite Declaration, and a decision to provide limited military assistance to Israel.

The three most potentially and immediately dangerous trouble spots in the Arab-Israel area are: 1) the Straits of Tiran (Gulf of Aqaba); 2) the Egyptian-Israel frontier (Gaza and the El Auja demilitarized zone); and 3) the Israel diversion project on the upper Jordan River at Jisr Banat Ya’qub.

II. The Straits of Tiran.

A démarche should be made to the Israelis which would include the following points: 1) We support Israel’s contention that the Egyptian thesis of belligerency is unsupportable in the light of the Security Council resolution of September 1, 1951; 2) we have made our position clear to the Egyptians and are willing to consider further diplomatic measures which could usefully be taken under the UN Charter and other international undertakings looking toward the gradual relaxation of present restrictions on Israel shipping in the Straits of Tiran; 3) in the light of 1) and 2) above and the generally tense situation in the area, we seek from Israel an undertaking that Israel will eschew the use or threat of forceful or provocative measures against Egypt in the dispute over the Straits of Tiran.

III. The Egyptian-Israel Frontier.

A. General Burns has been charged by the Security Council to put into effect practical measures to reduce tension along the Egyptian-Israel frontier. Among these measures have been suggested:

1) Separation of forces by a demilitarized zone perhaps a kilometer deep on each side of the Armistice lines; stationing of UN observers within the demilitarized zones.

2) Erection of physical barriers along strategic portions of the Armistice lines.

3) Joint Egyptian-Israel patrols along the Armistice lines.

4) Direct communications between local commanders on the two sides of the Armistice lines.

5) Use of only regular forces by each side in areas close to the Armistice lines.

B. General Burns and his observers require further assistance before they can operate with maximum effectiveness. Problems they face include:

1) Restrictions on freedom of movement. Both Israel and Egypt are wont, at crucial times, to disregard the provisions of the Armistice Agreement which accord full freedom of movement to UN observers.

2) Limitations of men and equipment. General Burns places major emphasis on his requirement for freedom of movement, but has from time to time indicated that he might use a few more observers and some additional equipment such as helicopters and communications equipment.

C. General Burns should be approached informally and his views sought as to which of the measures set forth above would be the most effective in assuring tranquillity along the Egyptian-Israel frontier and what action the U.S. could usefully take in urging the parties to cooperate in such measures.

D. Once General Burns’ views have been obtained, we should approach Israel and Egypt and urge them to cooperate in the implementation of a program of practical measures based on full observance of the Armistice Agreement. We should be prepared to condition assurances and assistance to Israel on Israel’s cooperation.

IV. Jisr Banat Ya’qub.

A. The Three Powers are in the course of making démarches to the Egyptians and Israelis on this subject. Ambassador Johnston has sent a personal letter to Nasser, reminding him of his undertaking to obtain Arab agreement to the Jordan Valley plan.⁹ The Three Powers’ démarche emphasizes our support for General Burns, our belief that unilateral action by Israel in the absence of a decision of General Burns would be a violation of the Armistice Agreement and the Security Council resolution, the fact that the use or threat of force by either party would be contrary to UN Charter obligations. We urge the Arabs to accept the Jordan Valley plan and indicate that Ambassador Johnston is ready to meet with the Arab Foreign Ministers if it is felt that a useful purpose would be served by such a meeting.

B. Measures should be considered to strengthen and underline the authority of General Burns in the demilitarized zones. If the above efforts prove unfruitful, it is likely that General Burns will continue to hold that unilateral resumption of work by Israel would be in violation of the Armistice Agreements. General Burns has already indicated to us that he would not change his ruling without consultation with the Three Powers and the UN Secretary-General. In the course of the informal consultation on the Egyptian-Israel frontier (see III. C. above), General Burns’ views should be sought as to how his authority in the demilitarized zones might be strengthened by tripartite action.

C. On the assumption that timely Arab acceptance of the Jordan Valley plan will not be forthcoming, ways should be sought to enable Israel and Jordan to begin work to develop portions of Jordan River waters. The possibility of arranging tacit acceptance of unilateral non-competing development should be explored. The key country in any such arrangement would be Syria, because of her rights in the demilitarized zone with Israel and the fact that she is a riparian state on the Yarmuk with Jordan.

1. Source: Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Alpha—Memos, etc., Feb. 16 to March 31, 1956. Top Secret.
2. In a memorandum of February 21, Hoover informed Allen, Wilcox, Merchant, Bowie, Phleger, and Russell that, since the United States was confronted “with problems of an especially acute and difficult nature in the Middle East”, he was establishing an ad hoc Middle East Policy Committee “that can work intensively on the formulation of policy for this area”, with Francis Russell as chairman.” (Ibid.)
3. Secretary Dulles left Washington on March 2 to attend the second meeting of the SEATO Council at Karachi.
4. As of February 29, the Middle East Policy Committee had held four meetings. (Memorandum from Russell to Hugh G. Appling of the Executive Secretariat; Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Alpha—Memos, etc., Feb. 16 to March 31, 1956) No record of these meetings has been found in Department of State files.
5. Top Secret. Drafted on February 23.
6. Top Secret. Drafted on February 22.
7. Reference is to Article VII of the U.N. Charter. (59 Stat. (pt. 2) 1031)
8. Secret. Drafted on February 23.
9. See Document 119.