Office of the Historian

110. Message to Cairo1

Washington, February 22, 1956.

REFERENCE

  • Message No. 85, Message No. 86 and Message No. 872
1.
Re Paragraph 6 of Message No. 863 you will have to play it by ear until after meeting we expect to have with … Anderson following the return of the Secretary of State tomorrow.4 You can go as far as you think wise but do not press question of meeting to point which would elicit clear negative or make it difficult for Anderson to reopen subject upon his arrival.
2.
U.S. Government policy for area is under intense and continuing study and undoubtedly Anderson will be fully briefed this subject before his departure.
3.
Re Paragraph 1–B above ref.5 Our view regarding shortage of time is based upon repeated Israeli assertions that subsequent to some future date, say August 1, they will have lost ability to protect themselves against growing Egyptian military strength in absence of immediate and substantial Israeli rearmament or clear cut international guarantees. We believe Nasr must realize this is Israeli view but how useful it may be to emphasize it we leave to your discretion.
4.
Re Message No. 87. We note that working document does not specifically refer to delivery of any arms to Israel as roadblock to carrying out steps indicated. Did Ali Sabri indicate this was implied or did subject go unmentioned.
5.
It is now contemplated that Anderson will proceed directly to Cairo Sunday6 or Monday but preferable you do not so indicate until confirmed following Thursday meeting.
  1. Source: Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Alpha—Anderson Talks w/BG & Nasser. Outgoing Telegrams—Jan.–March 1956. Secret.↩
  2. Message 85 is Document 108. Message 86 is not printed; see footnotes 3 and 5 below. Message 87 is supra.↩

  3. Paragraph 6 of Message 86 reads:

    “6. In view above at first meeting with Nasser I intended attempt sell him on direct negotiations forthwith but will do so without stating that this absolutely essential. Rather I will attempt show that a meeting will overcome major obstacle to advancement this project and that there are ways maintain absolute security. Prior second meeting (presumably evening 22 February) would appreciate further instructions how I should proceed especially with regard upcoming Anderson visit… . fully believes that unless Anderson can come prepared discuss project in terms U.S. Government policy for whole area there is no sense his coming.” (Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Alpha—Anderson Talks w/BG & Nasser. Incoming Telegrams—Jan.–March 1956. Part I)

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  4. According to Dulles’ Appointment Book, the meeting began at 3:08 p.m. and continued until after 6 p.m. Participants included Dulles, Anderson, Hoover, Allen Dulles, and Admiral Radford. (Princeton University Library, Dulles Papers) No account of this meeting has been found in Department of State files.↩
  5. Paragraph 1–B of Message 86 reads:

    “B… . predicts I will antagonize Nasser in pointing out to him that we have only limited amount of time. Nasser is sure to respond that if there is shortage of time it is only because Israelis plan aggressive action and not he. We cannot moreover, push Nasser by explaining how pressures are building up to give arms to Israel. Mere mention this subject will anger Nasser and tempt him drop operation. Moreover he will think we bluffing since he assumes we will solely be guided by a recognition of the grave consequences which would devolve upon our position in the whole area regardless Anderson mission developments.” (Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Alpha—Anderson Talks w/BG & Nasser. Incoming Telegrams— Jan.–March 1956. Part I)

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  6. February 26.↩