Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1–July 26, 1956, Volume XV

109. Message to Washington¹

No. 87

Cairo, February 21, 1956.

Following is full text of paper agreed to by … Ali Sabri as working document for second Anderson visit. Summary this paper previously sent in Message No. 83.² “Plan for Step 3 on Time Table”. (As revised by Ali Sabri … on 18 February 1956).

1. Step 2

Step 2 is the essential preliminary to Step 3. Objectives to be achieved at this stage are:

A. Agreement on general plan.

B. Assurances by all parties of intent to work toward a settlement.

C. Agreement on plan for Step 3.

2. Step 3

Step 3 will consist of two parallel and inter-related programs, the first to reduce tensions between the Arab States and Israel and the second to reduce tensions throughout Arab area. The objectives to be achieved at this stage are:

A. To create an atmosphere favorable to negotiation and conclusion of a settlement.

B. To create an atmosphere favorable to bringing the Arab State leaders and the Arab public to accept a settlement.

C. To gain time in which to work out the details of final settlement.

D. To provide cover for secret negotiations. (It must be recognized by all parties to the agreement on Step 3 that complete success in achieving the objectives of this step is highly unlikely. The parties must agree to make the maximum effort to reduce tensions and create an atmosphere favorable to a settlement, while recognizing that perfect conditions will probably never come about and that if a settlement is to be obtained sooner or later they must seize a favorable moment and proceed with the plan even though some risks will be involved.)

PART I OF STEP THREE: EASING ARAB ISRAELI TENSIONS

The essence of this part of Step 3 is to be a systematic program under United Nations auspices. For the development and application of measures to reduce incidents along the armistice lines and the tensions that they create.

Initiation of Program

The Secretary General of the UN on returning from his visit to the ME will recommend new project to devise and apply measures to reduce tensions on the Arab Israeli borders. Egypt and Israel will accept the Secretary General’s recommendation.

Level of Discussions

Discussions will be carried on in the mixed armistice commission setting. Care will be taken to avoid any steps which would seem to indicate a change in the basic situation and thus give rise to speculation that some understanding has been reached. When proceedings of the mixed armistice commission make it appear desirable General Burns, the UNTSO Chief of Staff, can meet with the Egyptian Foreign Minister and the Israeli Foreign Minister independently to discuss matters which have come up in the course of the discussions.

Measures To Be Explored

It will be the purpose of discussions under UN auspices to review all past recommendations for relieving border tensions and to seek to devise new and more acceptable measures. Among those measures which will be explored, the following will probably receive major attention:

A. The increase in the number of UN truce observers.

B. More effective means of getting UN truce observers on the spot as soon as an incident takes place.

C. Improvement of UNTSO equip and other resources.

D. Construction of physical barriers at strategic spots on the armistice lines.

E. The withdrawal of forces a fixed distance between the armistice lines.

F. Patrol of the armistice lines by UN personnel.

G. Redisposition of Egyptian and Israeli forces at a greater distance beyond armistice lines.

Other Measures To Reduce Tensions

Egypt and Israel will agree to use all possible means within their own countries to take preventive action, within the limits of their capabilities, to solve the problem of infiltration. Military raids or any other use of military forces in such a way as to create or imply a threat must cease as a part of Step 3.

Refugee Problems

As a part of Step 3 an examination will be made of the possibility of ameliorating the condition of the refugees in advance of a settlement and otherwise preparing them for ultimate acceptance of a settlement.

Propaganda Settlement

All countries which are parties to agreement on Step 3 must agree to give the United Nations program for easing border tensions the most favorable possible propaganda treatment. They must also, of course, take fullest possible advantage of the development of this program to use their propaganda resources to create disposition among members of the general public to favor the idea of a settlement.

PART II OF STEP THREE: EASING AREA TENSIONS

The second part of Step 3 will be a program to ease tensions in the Near East by eliminating factors which tend to disturb the relations of the States in the area, create suspicions among those States and create fear of actions by outside powers. The ultimate objective of this program will be to bring about state of calm in the relations of the States of the area with each other and the Western Powers favorable to the eventual acceptance of an Arab Israeli settlement. In this field, as in the field of Arab Israeli relations, it must be recognized that no program in advance of a settlement and revision of [or] reorientation of Western policy can produce a state of entire calm.

Program To Reduce Tensions in the Area During the Period Preceding a Settlement

All parties to the understanding on the plan for Step 3 must review factors now creating area tensions and agree to exchange views on such factors as can be eliminated by the action of one of the parties involved. They must also give assurances of their determination, within the limits of their capabilities, to cease such actions as they have engaged in in the past which are believed to create area tensions. The following are the principal factors to be reviewed:

A. Alignment of the States of the Area

During Step 3 and up to the conclusion of a settlement all parties must agree to refrain from any action—diplomatic, propaganda, military, clandestine or otherwise—to change the present alignment of the States of the area to create new ties or alliances or to establish new organizations or States. Assurances must be given by the U.S. that all possible efforts will be made to prevent the Bagh Pact nations from exerting any pressure or influence upon any additional Arab State to join the Bagh Pact and to refrain from doing so itself. U.S. must seek to bring UK action into line with this general plan without revealing the existence of the plan. At the same time Egypt will give assurances of its intention during this period at least of refraining from putting pressure on Iraq or otherwise influencing Iraq to break its association with the Baghdad Pact. All measures must be taken to improve relations between Egypt and Iraq during this period. All discussion of Iraqi influence closer relationship with Syria are to be discouraged and assurances given Egypt of the opposition of the U.S. to any such development. Egypt’s capability for doing this, of course, will depend on UK action with regard to the Baghdad Pact.

B. The Sense of Emergency in the Area

Public statements, official and unofficial, which create a sense of emergency and of threat of impending war should be discouraged and insofar as possible eliminated. It must be recognized that statements by the Israelis by Egypt by the U.S. or by the UK which indicate fear of impending war between the Arab States and Israel and/or reveal that preparations are being made for war have disturbing and unsettling effect upon area.

C. Plans for Action in the Event of War

Public statements which reveal that any State in the area or out is making plans for action to be taken in the event of an Arab Israeli war not only have disturbing effect upon the area but raise the issue of the sovereign rights of the States within the area and the right of outside powers to take it upon themselves to intervene in the affairs of the States of the area. Such statements must be discouraged and, insofar as possible, eliminated beginning with the inauguration of Step 3.

1. Source: Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Alpha—Anderson Talks w/BG & Nasser. Incoming Telegrams—Jan.–March 1956. Part I. Secret.
2. Document 107.