With reference to the Embassy’s Top Secret telegram dated February 15,
19552 there is
enclosed the text of Sir Anthony
Eden’s brief for his visit to Cairo on February 20, 1955.
The brief is in the form of a Memorandum from Mr.C.A.E. Shuckburgh, Assistant Under
Secretary of State at the Foreign Office, to the Foreign Secretary
(referred to as the “Secretary of State”) and contains Mr.Shuckburgh’s suggestions as to what
Sir Anthony Eden might say to
Colonel Nasir regarding a settlement of the Arab-Israel dispute. The
record of Mr.Shuckburgh’s
meeting with Secretary Dulles
referred to is the Department’s Memorandum3 which was
furnished to the Foreign Office by the British Embassy in Washington.
The Department will recall that during Mr.Shuckburgh’s visit to Washington it was agreed that the
Foreign Secretary’s brief when prepared would be given to the Department
for any possible comment.
Enclosure
“BRIEF FOR SECRETARY OF STATE’S VISIT TO CAIRO
“Prospects for a Settlement of the Arab/Israel
Dispute
“I attach copies of my telegrams from Washington Nos. 311 and 312,
and of the record of my meeting with Mr.Dulles
and members of the State Department on January 27. I suggest that
you might speak to Colonel Nasser on the following lines.
[Page 60]
2. Effect of the Arab/Israel
dispute on the Middle East
You are concerned at the damage which the tension between the Arab
states and Israel is doing to the Arab world. Its most obvious
effect is that it draws out the sufferings of nearly a million Arab
refugees; but its concealed workings are wider and even more
serious. It offers unlimited opportunity for Soviet designs on Arab
society and on the freedom of the Arab countries; and it blinds the
Arab peoples and many of their statesmen to the real danger which
threaténs them—communist infiltration. As long as the Arabs nourish
an active resentment against Israel’s very existence, their
responsible leaders will find it very difficult to turn their full
attention and energies to the positive tasks of reconstruction and
to create the conditions of stability out of which powerful nations
might emerge.
3. Removal of the main obstacle to
fruitful cooperation with. the West
H.M. Government want to see a strong and progressive Egypt exercising
a constructive influence in the Eastern Mediterranean. You admire
Nasser’s efforts to
develop the country and pull it together, and you are genuinely
anxious to help him. The same is true of the United States
Government. But the dispute with Israel hampers our efforts to help
them in many ways. For example, both the Americans and we are
anxious to help Nasser over
military supplies, but our hands are tied whilst the dispute with
Israel continues. We have to defend ourselves against the charge
that we are encouraging an arms race and increasing the instability
of the Middle East, and we are liable to have to justify every
delivery of arms to Israel’s immediate neighbours. Egypt suffers
particularly from this, for she has a common frontier with
Israel.
The continued dispute with Israel also makes it difficult for us to
assist Nasser in his plans
to develop Egypt’s economy.
If Nasser could help you and
Mr.Dulles work for a settlement, the main
impediment to Western cooperation would be removed and his aims for
Egypt’s future would be greatly furthered.
4. An appeal to Nasser
You have not spoken of this possibility to any other of the parties
to the conflict. You believe you can speak frankly to Nasser because you know he has
the realism to recognise that Israel has come to stay, and you
believe that he has the courage to lead the Egyptians and other Arab
peoples away from their sterile recriminations towards a settlement
that will release their energies and strengthen their
self-confidence.
It is clear from his talks with Mr. Nutting last year that Nasser understands the damage
that the dispute is causing. You have been
[Page 61]
glad to see Egyptian influence used effectively
to bring the other Arab states to adopt a positive attitude to
Mr.Eric Johnston’s
proposals for the Jordan waters. This has raised Egypt’s stature in
the eyes of the world. The task of achieving a wider settlement is a
challenge to Nasser’s
statesmanship, as it is to the statesmanship of Britain and the
United States. If all three of us worked together we would have a
chance of achieving something.
You therefore ask whether Nasser would be disposed to accept the kind of
settlement that is now practicable and to help us work for it. You
are not trying to impose anything on him: you are convinced that a
settlement is an urgent necessity and need his help. He can rely on
our discretion and we are trusting his, for secrecy is vital at this
stage.
5. The argument for
urgency
Nasser may well accept all
this in principle but say that the time is not ripe. The following
arguments may be used to convince him of urgency:
- (a)
- Events are moving fast in the Middle East, and not all of
them are favourable to peace. We can not afford much longer
to run the risks which this dispute entails. Political
weakness in Syria and Jordan might become very dangerous,
and some act of Israeli impatience is always
possible.
- (b)
- The policy of the present United States administration had
had the effect, over the last two years, of deflating Israel
to a large extent. They have refused her arms and resisted
her attempts to obtain defense agreements and guarantees.
Financial assistance from the United States, both public and
private, has fallen off. As a result, Israel is probably
more likely now than at any previous time to contemplate a
reasonable settlement.
- (c)
- But this policy, though it survived the recent
Congressional elections, cost the Republican Party many
votes. It is very doubtful whether it can be maintained
firmly through the next Presidential election. In 1956
Palestine will again be a factor in United States domestic
politics, and there is a danger that the Republicans will be
forced to match Democratic promises of measures to please
American Jewry. It is in the Arabs’ own interest to take
advantage of the present situation in which the United
States is able to put pressure on Israel, by working towards
a settlement this year. If they do not do so, Israel may get
what she wants out of the United States without having to
earn it by making concessions.
- (d)
- You realise, of course, that gestures will be required
from Israel. You are not thinking of a one-sided move by
Nasser. All you
are saying is that you believe the next six or eight months
to be probably the most hopeful in which to secure
reasonable offers from Israel; and that, if he is
interested, you are prepared to pursue this further.
[Page 62]
6. Further discussion depending on
Nasser’s
reaction
- (a)
-
If Nasser is receptive
You do not want to make definite proposals at this stage. But
now that you know he is interested, you will give
instructions for something to be worked out with the United
States and let him know what we think as soon as possible.
You could say that Mr.Dulles’ ideas on
the subject coincide pretty well with your own. In general
you have in mind a slightly smaller Israel, but do not think
the Arabs could expect large transfers of
territory—certainly nothing like the U.N. partition
resolution of 1947.4 There would have to be
arrangements for the compensation and resettlement of the
refugees and a specific guarantee of the frontiers would
have to be given to both sides by the Western powers. The
Arabs would have to abandon their economic warfare,
including restrictions on transit through the Suez Canal.
But they would not necessarily have to enter into direct
relations with Israel, and we would do all we could to make
the settlement as palatable as possible to Arab opinion. The
Israelis would find it difficult to make the necessary
concessions, and we should obviously have to discuss these
with them first, unless Nasser feels that he can negotiate directly
with the Israelis. However we tackle it, secrecy will be of
the essence; and we should be glad to hear Nasser’s view on the best
means of conducting negotiations and what roles we and he
can play.
- (b)
-
If Nasser refuses cooperation or insists on
delay
In this case you might say that you understand his
difficulties and do not wish to press him for a quick
answer. You hope he will consider the matter seriously and
bear in mind its urgency; and that he will be prepared to
discuss it further with Sir R. Stevenson and Mr.Byroade in strict
confidence and frankness. You rely on his statesmanship in
this and hope to be able to show him that it hold[s]
advantages for him. Between us we settled the Anglo-Egyptian
dispute, which once seemed very difficult, to everybody’s
advantage: let us see whether we cannot approach the
Palestine problem in the same realistic spirit.”
