24. Despatch From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State 1

No. 2354

SUBJECT

  • Transmitting Text of Sir Anthony Eden’s Brief for His Visit to Cairo

With reference to the Embassy’s Top Secret telegram dated February 15, 19552 there is enclosed the text of Sir Anthony Eden’s brief for his visit to Cairo on February 20, 1955. The brief is in the form of a Memorandum from Mr.C.A.E. Shuckburgh, Assistant Under Secretary of State at the Foreign Office, to the Foreign Secretary (referred to as the “Secretary of State”) and contains Mr.Shuckburgh’s suggestions as to what Sir Anthony Eden might say to Colonel Nasir regarding a settlement of the Arab-Israel dispute. The record of Mr.Shuckburgh’s meeting with Secretary Dulles referred to is the Department’s Memorandum3 which was furnished to the Foreign Office by the British Embassy in Washington. The Department will recall that during Mr.Shuckburgh’s visit to Washington it was agreed that the Foreign Secretary’s brief when prepared would be given to the Department for any possible comment.

For the Ambassador:

Evan M. Wilson
First Secretary of Embassy

Enclosure

“BRIEF FOR SECRETARY OF STATE’S VISIT TO CAIRO

“Prospects for a Settlement of the Arab/Israel Dispute

“I attach copies of my telegrams from Washington Nos. 311 and 312, and of the record of my meeting with Mr.Dulles and members of the State Department on January 27. I suggest that you might speak to Colonel Nasser on the following lines.

[Page 60]

2. Effect of the Arab/Israel dispute on the Middle East

You are concerned at the damage which the tension between the Arab states and Israel is doing to the Arab world. Its most obvious effect is that it draws out the sufferings of nearly a million Arab refugees; but its concealed workings are wider and even more serious. It offers unlimited opportunity for Soviet designs on Arab society and on the freedom of the Arab countries; and it blinds the Arab peoples and many of their statesmen to the real danger which threaténs them—communist infiltration. As long as the Arabs nourish an active resentment against Israel’s very existence, their responsible leaders will find it very difficult to turn their full attention and energies to the positive tasks of reconstruction and to create the conditions of stability out of which powerful nations might emerge.

3. Removal of the main obstacle to fruitful cooperation with. the West

H.M. Government want to see a strong and progressive Egypt exercising a constructive influence in the Eastern Mediterranean. You admire Nasser’s efforts to develop the country and pull it together, and you are genuinely anxious to help him. The same is true of the United States Government. But the dispute with Israel hampers our efforts to help them in many ways. For example, both the Americans and we are anxious to help Nasser over military supplies, but our hands are tied whilst the dispute with Israel continues. We have to defend ourselves against the charge that we are encouraging an arms race and increasing the instability of the Middle East, and we are liable to have to justify every delivery of arms to Israel’s immediate neighbours. Egypt suffers particularly from this, for she has a common frontier with Israel.

The continued dispute with Israel also makes it difficult for us to assist Nasser in his plans to develop Egypt’s economy.

If Nasser could help you and Mr.Dulles work for a settlement, the main impediment to Western cooperation would be removed and his aims for Egypt’s future would be greatly furthered.

4. An appeal to Nasser

You have not spoken of this possibility to any other of the parties to the conflict. You believe you can speak frankly to Nasser because you know he has the realism to recognise that Israel has come to stay, and you believe that he has the courage to lead the Egyptians and other Arab peoples away from their sterile recriminations towards a settlement that will release their energies and strengthen their self-confidence.

It is clear from his talks with Mr. Nutting last year that Nasser understands the damage that the dispute is causing. You have been [Page 61] glad to see Egyptian influence used effectively to bring the other Arab states to adopt a positive attitude to Mr.Eric Johnston’s proposals for the Jordan waters. This has raised Egypt’s stature in the eyes of the world. The task of achieving a wider settlement is a challenge to Nasser’s statesmanship, as it is to the statesmanship of Britain and the United States. If all three of us worked together we would have a chance of achieving something.

You therefore ask whether Nasser would be disposed to accept the kind of settlement that is now practicable and to help us work for it. You are not trying to impose anything on him: you are convinced that a settlement is an urgent necessity and need his help. He can rely on our discretion and we are trusting his, for secrecy is vital at this stage.

5. The argument for urgency

Nasser may well accept all this in principle but say that the time is not ripe. The following arguments may be used to convince him of urgency:

(a)
Events are moving fast in the Middle East, and not all of them are favourable to peace. We can not afford much longer to run the risks which this dispute entails. Political weakness in Syria and Jordan might become very dangerous, and some act of Israeli impatience is always possible.
(b)
The policy of the present United States administration had had the effect, over the last two years, of deflating Israel to a large extent. They have refused her arms and resisted her attempts to obtain defense agreements and guarantees. Financial assistance from the United States, both public and private, has fallen off. As a result, Israel is probably more likely now than at any previous time to contemplate a reasonable settlement.
(c)
But this policy, though it survived the recent Congressional elections, cost the Republican Party many votes. It is very doubtful whether it can be maintained firmly through the next Presidential election. In 1956 Palestine will again be a factor in United States domestic politics, and there is a danger that the Republicans will be forced to match Democratic promises of measures to please American Jewry. It is in the Arabs’ own interest to take advantage of the present situation in which the United States is able to put pressure on Israel, by working towards a settlement this year. If they do not do so, Israel may get what she wants out of the United States without having to earn it by making concessions.
(d)
You realise, of course, that gestures will be required from Israel. You are not thinking of a one-sided move by Nasser. All you are saying is that you believe the next six or eight months to be probably the most hopeful in which to secure reasonable offers from Israel; and that, if he is interested, you are prepared to pursue this further.

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6. Further discussion depending on Nasser’s reaction

(a)

If Nasser is receptive

You do not want to make definite proposals at this stage. But now that you know he is interested, you will give instructions for something to be worked out with the United States and let him know what we think as soon as possible. You could say that Mr.Dulles’ ideas on the subject coincide pretty well with your own. In general you have in mind a slightly smaller Israel, but do not think the Arabs could expect large transfers of territory—certainly nothing like the U.N. partition resolution of 1947.4 There would have to be arrangements for the compensation and resettlement of the refugees and a specific guarantee of the frontiers would have to be given to both sides by the Western powers. The Arabs would have to abandon their economic warfare, including restrictions on transit through the Suez Canal. But they would not necessarily have to enter into direct relations with Israel, and we would do all we could to make the settlement as palatable as possible to Arab opinion. The Israelis would find it difficult to make the necessary concessions, and we should obviously have to discuss these with them first, unless Nasser feels that he can negotiate directly with the Israelis. However we tackle it, secrecy will be of the essence; and we should be glad to hear Nasser’s view on the best means of conducting negotiations and what roles we and he can play.

(b)

If Nasser refuses cooperation or insists on delay

In this case you might say that you understand his difficulties and do not wish to press him for a quick answer. You hope he will consider the matter seriously and bear in mind its urgency; and that he will be prepared to discuss it further with Sir R. Stevenson and Mr.Byroade in strict confidence and frankness. You rely on his statesmanship in this and hope to be able to show him that it hold[s] advantages for him. Between us we settled the Anglo-Egyptian dispute, which once seemed very difficult, to everybody’s advantage: let us see whether we cannot approach the Palestine problem in the same realistic spirit.”

  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/2–1555. Top Secret; Alpha; Limited Distribution. Drafted by Wilson.
  2. The Embassy in London informed the Department of State of its receipt of Eden’s brief and the British Foreign Office’s request that the Department submit any comments it had about the brief by February 18. (Telegram 3626;ibid.) The Department replied that the British Embassy had been notified on February 16 of the Department’s approval of Eden’s brief. (Telegram 4253 to London, February 18;ibid.)
  3. Document 10.
  4. For text of General Assembly Resolution 181 (II) concerning a future government for Palestine, which the General Assembly adopted on November 29, 1947, see U.N. doc.A/519. Text is also printed in Foreign Relations, 1948, vol. V, p. 1709.