Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1955, Volume XIV

23. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State¹

Tel Aviv,February 14, 1955—6 p.m.

683. We submit the following comments regarding questions raised numbs telegram 446 February 9.²

1. GOI thinking reveals no interest in and little sense of obligation toward resettlement Arab refugees in Israel territory and it may be assumed, therefore, that acceptance proposal to resettle any large number in this country would be contingent on other phases general settlement being so favorable to Israel in tangible terms improved security, lifting Arab blockade, opening up of nearby markets, et cetera, as to make “sacrifice” desirable in national interest. Department in better position than Embassy to weigh these considerations as well as the advantages of timing any approach on this point with overall policy developments.

With Negev unusable except with water which is being developed for Jewish settlers and coastal plain already largely settled, best prospect Arab settlement would be on hillsides in the north near Lebanese border. Some Arabs have been withdrawn from these areas for security reasons but change of policy GOI possible in framework general settlement which might tangibly reduce security problem. Any pinpointing these sites or estimate of settlement capacities would require survey work not possible under security limitations Arab-Israel project.

Opportunities for refugees find urban employment believed to be very limited and would depend largely expansion general level Israel economic activity which might prove possible if enough external funds poured in here next several years [as result of] implementation united water development and as result accelerated industrial activity responsive to removal Arab economic boycott. Modest opportunities absorption might result from redefinition eligibility under “reunion of family scheme”, which however resulted in admission to Israel only 2382 Arabs between 1949 and 1952.

Re Gaza strip, we doubt whether any country really wants this area under current circumstances because there are no resources to go with people located there. Only economic possibility permanent settlement any large number Gaza strip would appear to be along lines making some Litani floodwaters available to that area. This possibility mentioned only because Sharett’s recent discussion with Johnston indicated that Israel might not be averse to use its reservoir and transit system for Arab refugee purposes and because Lebanon might not have same strong objection use of Litani waters for Arab refugees as it has for use in Israel.³ While Litani water applied Gaza strip would be expensive it might not be much more so than Jordan waters which will be applied by Israel to contiguous Negev area.

New obstacle resettlement here Arab refugees is the resumption of large-scale immigration to Israel. Finance Minister Eshkol in budget address last week said that Israel population would increase 100,000 this year, of which 60,000 new immigrants. This change GOI policy directed primarily at transfer here of North Africans due to deterioration political situation Tunis, Algiers, and Morocco. Although joint statement yesterday Jewish-Agency-Cabinet indicates financial limitations may result smaller number than target, it is apparent that Israel’s absorption capacity will be severely strained this new movement. It may be taken as axiomatic that in distribution available land, water and other facilities, these Jewish immigrants will have priority over any Arab refugees.

In any analysis prospects Israel cooperation in settling or easing refugee problem it seems clear that no GOI will make concessions which will oppose its present basic policy of accepting persecuted Jewish immigrants. If Israel agrees to use what it considers its water for purposes aiding Arab refugees it is likely to consider request for resettlement refugees in Israel as additional concession its part.

2. We believe GOI would find financing through strengthened USOM setup more acceptable than through UNRWA with which Israel has severed all connections and which is regarded here as having Arab viewpoint. (We understand that Johnston contemplates under unified development plan US financing through UNRWA for Arab side but directly through USOM Israel side.)

In view different living standards and way of life do not believe Israel settlement costs are useful in connection Arab resettlement. Suggest instead that as a rule of thumb Department use family cost estimates prepared by UNRWA for Jordan Valley settlement.

3. We believe that the most obtainable from Israel would be a statement that it would extend to returning Arabs the same civil and other rights enjoyed by Arabs already resident in the country.

4. With US or UNRWA financing raw material and fuel import components Embassy believes it would be possible for Israel industry to contribute added value $5 million the first year rising gradually to $10 million in final year or total net contribution $35–$40 million. Greatest possibility appears to be in field of building materials, including cement, glass, plywood and masonite, and plumbing fixtures, which presumably could be absorbed in the Arab resettlement projects outside Israel. There also appears to be some unused capacity in textile production. Jeeps could be made available from Kaiser–Willys assembly plant although added value would be much smaller than 30 percent average used by Embassy foregoing calculation. Translation goods into cash case of building materials would presumably take the form of payment by US or UNRWA into a fund from financial appropriations made available for resettlement with possible redistribution cash to refugees on an individual basis according to their valid claims for compensation.

Lawson

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/2–1455. Top Secret; Priority; Alpha; Limit Distribution. Received at 7:45 a.m., February 15.
2. Document 16.
3. See footnote 2, Document 14.