25. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State1

691. Re Deptel 456, February 14.2 Message delivered personally and orally to Prime Minister who although seemingly somewhat harrassed as result of past few days quizzing by Foreign Affairs Committee and Security Committee of Knesset was obviously very much pleased at receiving Secretary’s assuring words. He expressed his appreciation of message which he said was very helpful. He regarded it as token of understanding by Secretary of Israel Government’s position and indication that formula was being sought for relief of Israel’s sense of isolation and insecurity. He expressed pleasure at recognition of his policy of moderation and his efforts to maintain a period of calm.

He accepted opportunity of replying to the two principal points of the message, that is (1) need for period of relative calm, and (2) progress in unified Jordan Valley plan negotiations.

With respect to the first item, he said he fully appreciated the need for calm and hoped that situation would continue but was confident it could not continue indefinitely. He said that whereas Israel was maintaining calm attitude “positive actions were occurring all around Israel, in which Israel was not participant and which further emphasized her isolation”. (He was obviously referring to the Turco-Iraqi pact and the US supplying arms to Iraq.) He said he had no conception of what plan Secretary Dulles might have in mind nor was he pressing for any details or indications at this time. However, he was hopeful that a plan would develop which would be useful for area peace and would also be acceptable to Israel.

He stated that Israel’s self-restraint had been particularly difficult recently and hoped that too great a strain would not be put upon Israel people for too long a time. He commented at some length on the fact that the Syrian-Israel border had become very active recently and concluded that this represented action approved by Syrian Government. He arrived at this conclusion on grounds that heretofore border had been very well policed by Syrian troops thus preventing irregulars and marauders to operate to any great extent. At all times the Syrian military forces had been well disciplined. Now, however, it was the Syrian military forces which were causing the trouble and obviously this was done with the approval [Page 64] of the Syrian Government. The Prime Minister said he was under considerable pressure as result of these developments and the Israeli public is asking the government whether it is not time to “give the Syrians a lesson”.

Most of the Jordan-Israel border had been quiet with exception one sector he said. The Prime Minister was quite upset over a MAC decision which condemned both Jordan and Israel for an exchange of military action recently whereas there was no question but that the action was started by Jordan. (Presumably reference Jerusalem’s 187 to Department).3 “What do they expect us to do when we are attacked—do they believe that we should run away and not respond to such attacks? This we do not believe should reasonably be expected nor do we feel that it would improve the situation. I am going to speak to General Burns about this matter as soon as he returns to Jerusalem as we feel it is unfair on the part of MAC to censure us in cases of this kind.” Following these remarks he said he thought that it was highly essential that increased efforts to maintain a “period of relative calm” on the border should be made by the Arabs and in that connection was it not possible that the “US Ambassador in Damascus appeal to the Syrian Government to control their border troops.”

With regard to the unified Jordan plan, he was very much discouraged. He said that he was “shocked” to learn that the plan which Ambassador Johnston had left with him prior to his departure for the Arab capitals had now been changed radically to the disadvantage of Israel. Although the Israel Government was not prepared to accept the plan (January 30)4 as it stood he considered that it was a basis from which negotiations could start but now apparently Ambassador Johnston had discussed with Arabs a plan which would give Israel even less water. The Prime Minister said, “it would be a sad day if Ambassador Johnston and I should have to part company as result of our inability to agree on an equitable plan for the distribution of Jordan water but Israel cannot give away its vital resources. At no time have we ever agreed that we would supply sufficient water to irrigate every square inch of land in the Jordan Valley. We believe that our estimates of Jordan’s need for water are correct and we believe that not sufficient provision was made for the future use of underground water which is available to Jordan.[Page 65]Furthermore there are large quantities of water from the Litani River in Lebanon which are going to waste and it seems to us that a fellow Arab state could divert that water for the use of Jordan rather than Israel being required to supply some of its meager water supplies to Jordan”. He fully appreciated the importance of a successful negotiation of a unified plan but at the moment it was obvious that he was greatly discouraged at the prospects.

He made it clear that in offering these comments on the two principal points involved he did not in any way wish to discount his great appreciation of the Secretary’s action in sending him this personal message.

I said I was pleased to note his appreciation that maintaining a period of calm until a satisfactory formula has been worked out is vital; and that time is necessary to develop such a formula; and that an agreement on the Jordan River plan is of great importance. I assured him that his efforts toward moderation were understood and appreciated and expressed hope they would be successfully continued.

Lawson
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/2–1755. Secret; Alpha; Limit Distribution. Received at 10:37 a.m.
  2. Document 22.
  3. The Consulate General in Jerusalem reported in telegram 187 on February 10 that the Mixed Armistice Commission, meeting in emergency session the previous day, had decided that both Israel and Jordan should share responsibility for incidents that had occurred on January 26 in the Beit Awwa area. (Department of State, Central Files, 684A.85/2–1055)
  4. On January 30, the Israelis outlined their objections to Johnston’s Jordan Valley plan; see Document 14.