Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1955, Volume XIV

10. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, January 27, 1955, 4:05 p.m.¹

Washington Washington, January 27, 1955, 4:05 p.m. to 5:13 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Operation Alpha

PARTICIPANTS

• Mr. C.A.E. Shuckburgh, CMG
• The Secretary
• Under Secretary Hoover
• Mr. John D. Jernegan
• Mr. Francis H. Russell
• Mr. Raymond A. Hare
• Sir Robert Scott, Minister, British Embassy
• Mr. Parker T. Hart

Mr. Shuckburgh expressed appreciation of this opportunity to make a joint progress report to the Secretary regarding the conversations which he and his associates had been holding with officers of the Department regarding the prospects of Arab-Israel peace. All had reached the general conclusion that it was worthwhile to proceed with the “package” idea, to be tried out separately on the two parties to the dispute. One of these parties, Israel, desired a settlement while the Arab side showed little desire for a settlement. It therefore followed that incentives were needed on the Arab side. These must include some sacrifices by Israel as well as supplementary inducements furnished by the United States and the United Kingdom. Among the Arab states, Egypt appeared to be the most likely prospect for a move toward settlement. We were therefore primarily concerned with the question of the attractions which a settlement might have, or be made to have for Egypt. These attractions appeared to fall into two categories.

The first category consisted of the following elements:

(1) Territorial adjustments in favor of the Arabs.

(2) Some repatriation of refugees.

(3) Compensation to refugees not repatriated.

The second category consisted of a necessary US–UK guarantee of whatever settlement might finally be reached.

The most important specific attraction to Egyptians seemed to be an offer by the US and the UK to increase Egypt’s influence in the Middle East via military and economic aid. It was thought that the recent move by Iraq toward a treaty with Turkey might assist in spurring Egypt in the desired direction.

Special factors in our efforts toward a settlement must relate to the refugee problem: (1) the Johnston Mission with its prospects for large refugee resettlement in the Jordan Valley; (2) repatriation of some refugees to Israel; and (3) the development of labor-absorbing programs in those Arab states harboring refugees, in order to draw refugees from the camps and make them self-sustaining. . . . an increase in Israel’s territory would require that Israel compensate by releasing other territory; for example, a wedge of land to Egypt above Elath to create overland communication between Egypt and Jordan. (At this “pinpoint” contact Israel and Jordan traffic would cross under some form of international supervision); territorial concessions by Israel to Jordan, including adjustments to reunite Jordan villages with their lands to the extent possible without excessively narrowing the “waist” of Israel . . . .

The Secretary asked what was planned for Jerusalem. Mr. Shuckburgh replied that it was expected . . . to push for a decision on the Holy places along the lines of the Swedish resolution;² to maximize the presence of international authorities in Jerusalem at Government House; . . .

Mr. Russell indicated that a plan for US–UK guarantee of borders was being worked on by the Legal Adviser’s office of the Department.³

The Secretary asked what the views of the group were regarding procedure and timing. Mr. Russell replied that it was planned to hold the next meeting in London, perhaps in late February. Mr. Eric Johnston would return to the United States in late February. Ambassador Byroade might be able to make his first approach to Prime Minister Nasser by mid or late March allowing necessary time to establish himself and develop contacts following his arrival in Egypt toward the end of February. He remarked that Ambassador Byroade did not wish to make the first subject of business with Nasser the problem of settlement between the Arab states and Israel. Sir Anthony Eden would be going to Bangkok via Cairo in late February.

The Secretary inquired how the group expected to keep Jewish leaders in this country quiet during this period of preparation. Mr. Russell replied that it was thought that the Secretary himself might inform the Israelis that Israel’s security would be taken care of in any measures we might adopt in the area and that in addition he might at a press conference give some reassurances along the lines of Eden’s statement to the House of Commons or alternatively merely indicate that he was working on the problem. It was also thought during his visit to Cairo Sir Anthony might tell Nasser personally that the West desired to make Egypt become a greater focus of strength. All had agreed that the first real approach to Operation Alpha would be made by Byroade to Nasser. The fact that Nasser was approached first would serve two purposes: It might be flattering and it would in any case indicate the possibilities of progress from thereon. Israel would not be approached first. . . . However, if Israel were approached in second place and she reacted badly, the onus of failure would be on Israel. . . . Israel is the petitioning power. The Secretary rejoined that this was not clear to him. Mr. Russell further explained that certain factors in the plan would be unattractive to Israel. . . . However, Israel would not wish to appear to be the party who wrecked the project. . . .

The Secretary remarked that this procedure seemed complicated. After Egypt and Israel, what came next? Mr. Russell replied that Jordan would then be approached since she had “built in” inducements to make a settlement. Lebanon would come in third place among the Arabs. Mr. Shuckburgh remarked that it would be necessary to consult Nasser on all subsequent approaches to Arab countries if he reacted favorably to the plan.

The Secretary remarked that it was desirable to have alternatives in the case of an early rejection in order to convince Egypt that the US and the UK meant business and that the present situation would not be allowed to continue. The Arabs must be made to comprehend the continued power of American Jewry and the fact that if Arab attitudes continued to be unreasonable the balance of focus may shift from their side. Mr. Shuckburgh remarked that pressures on Israel would be indispensable yet difficult to apply. The Arabs were in a favorable position. They could sit by and if, after Israel made concessions, they rejected these we might be at an impasse. The Secretary rejoined that Nasser should not be allowed to feel that he can say no and that matters would then stand until he was ready to say yes. The United States Government rode out the recent Congressional elections at a sacrifice. Whether it could ride out a Presidential election is uncertain. After 1955 the Arab-Israel problem would be in US domestic politics and if the Republicans failed to offer measures acceptable to American Jewry the Democrats would surely promise them. The Administration had succeeded in deflating Israel in order to make a reasonable settlement possible. As a result the Israeli position was now weaker than it ever had been, but by 1956 it was likely to gain new strength. The Arabs should be reminded of this and shown that now was the best time for them to negotiate from a position of strength unless they were prepared to see Israel once again undertake faits accomplis at their expense. The US was now in a position to put pressures on Israel. If Israel rejected a reasonable proposal, it would jeopardize public and private aid to Israel from the United States, for American Jewry was not disposed to throw its money away recklessly on a bad venture. The Secretary had been given to understand that the Banat Yaqub affair had had a bad effect on Israel’s bond sales in the US. To both sides there should be an immense attraction to make a settlement now with the indispensable Anglo-American guarantee to that settlement. That guarantee was necessary since there was genuine fear on both sides. How far the US could go in such a guarantee was a serious question. The Secretary felt that the Senate would probably go pretty far despite the fact that it was not America’s practice to guarantee the territories of other countries, because of American domestic considerations pertaining to Israel. Mr. Russell asked whether the extent of Congressional willingness to back a guarantee should be verified in advance of the first approaches on Operation Alpha. The Secretary advised against approaching any groups in Congress or Defense at the present time.

Mr. Shuckburgh inquired whether if Israel should complain of parts of the “package” the US and the UK would stand firmly behind the “package”. In order to clarify this question, the Secretary asked whether it was intended to obtain Nasser’s general concurrence to the plan and then discuss the specific elements of the “package” with Israel. Mr. Shuckburgh replied in the affirmative.

The Secretary suggested that Sir Anthony Eden might during his visit to Cairo discuss with Nasser the general situation in the United States as he had just outlined it to Mr. Shuckburgh pointing out the wisdom of making a move now toward a settlement with Israel. The Secretary felt that the real issue with Nasser would be whether Egypt could live with any concept of peace with Israel. Mr. Shuckburgh responded that current plans did not include a formal peace treaty but rather a settlement. The Secretary inquired how it was possible to make a Western guarantee without a peace treaty. Mr. Russell pointed out that the parties would be agreeing to final boundaries and that that the US and UK would guarantee only those final boundary lines. There would be a settlement of other issues which we would not guarantee, such as refugee repatriation, resettlement, compensation of refugees, elimination of the secondary boycott against Israel and of the Suez blockade. The Secretary felt that the absence of peace would make very difficult the obtaining of a guarantee from the United States. For example, what would be done about extraditing nationals of one side found in the territory of the other. Would they be treated as alien enemies? Mr. Russell replied that this point had not yet been faced. Mr. Shuckburgh stated that it would be necessary to put an end to the present state of war and particularly to end the Suez blockade. The Secretary inquired whether Mr. Shuckburgh was confident that there was no use in trying for a formal peace. Mr. Shuckburgh replied in the affirmative and gave his view that the chances were only 51 to 49 in favor of achieving a settlement short of formal peace. The Secretary concluded that Operation Alpha was worth undertaking but again pointed out that the US Government would have trouble on the guarantee provisions unless it could be said that peace had been achieved between the parties. Mr. Russell pointed out that Ambassador Eban and Prime Minister Sharrett of Israel desired a guarantee before peace in order to be able to negotiate from secure strength with the Arabs.

1. Source: Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Washington Talks, Jan.–Feb. 1955; Memos, etc. preceding actual meetings (Dated 11/15/54 thru 1/27/55). Top Secret; Alpha. Drafted by Hart between January 29 and February 1. According to Secretary Dulles’ appointment book, this conversation concluded at 5:13 p.m. (Princeton University Library, Dulles Papers)
2. For information concerning the Swedish draft resolution dated December 5, 1950, on the Jerusalem question (U.N. doc. A/AC.38/L.63) which was submitted to the Ad Hoc Political Committee of the General Assembly, see the editorial note and footnote 3, Foreign Relations, 1950, vol. V, pp. 1071 and 1074.
3. Documentation concerning the preparation of a joint plan to guarantee borders is in Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Alpha Treaty: Successive drafts of Legal Aspects—Forms and Guarantees.