Office of the Historian

124. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State1

Tel Aviv,June 12, 1955—1 p.m.

1052. Delivered message to Sharett last night (Deptel 711,2 [Page 241] Embtel 10513). He obviously much disappointed and gave impression considerable discouragement over trend of developments in this field. (This confirmed later by Herzog who was present.) Prime Minister said he assumed that no definite answer required this moment as he would have to receive message through UN channels (Burns) before GOI decision could be stated. But he was most appreciative of advance information which would give GOI time to think over matter before reaching decision.

Although declining to comment definitively, he did refer to continuous paring down of original high level talks concept. He referred sadly to fact that “whole thing has fizzled out.” But I did not take that to mean that matter had come to an end without talks on Gohar level. I urged that GOI not reject idea solely on basis of lower level military talks than he had anticipated and referred to topsy-turvey military hierarchy with Nasser a Lieutenant Colonel only and with many junior officers possessing much more power than general officers. I also referred to expectation that Nasser would grant Gohar wide powers—much wider than in past conversations between Gohar and Israeli officers. Furthermore, I underlined understanding that Gohar had always reported direct to Nasser thus bringing conversations closer by direct line to high level.Sharett listened, but rather scorned idea that Gohar would have much real authority and would have to refer back to Nasser frequently. I did not press point, but commented as in our last conversation, on net gain which might come from any discussions of broad problems of border tensions, even at proposed military level. Although he made no comment I was encouraged by fact he gave no indication Gohar level talks would be rejected. However, he did not know at that time of Egyptian restrictive agenda proposal.4

Lawson
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/6–1255. Secret; Priority. Received at 9:53 a.m. Repeated priority to Cairo, London, and Jerusalem.↩
  2. In light of Nasser’s apparent willingness to give Gohar authority to act, as reported by Byroade in telegram 1880 from Cairo (Document 122), the Department instructed the Embassy in Tel Aviv on June 10 to urge Sharett to accept Nasser’s offer to have Israeli representatives meet with Gohar. (Ibid., 674.84A/6–955)↩
  3. Not printed. (Ibid., 674.84A/6–1155)↩
  4. See footnote 3, Document 122.↩