Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1955, Volume XIV

125. Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Jernegan) to the Secretary of State¹

Washington,June 13, 1955.

SUBJECT

• Gaza Situation; Tripartite Declaration;NSC 5428²

Discussion

The situation in Gaza continues extremely tense and there is a strong possibility that the high level talks for which we, the British, the French and General Burns have been pressing will not eventuate.

General Burns has indicated his intention to apprise the Security Council of the situation, and the question may well come up for discussion there. On June 7 Ambassador Lodge, who is chairman of the SC this month, formally advised his colleagues on the Council of the dangers of the situation and indicated that the Council might well have to take up the matter once again.³

We have applied strong pressure on the Egyptians to participate in such talks on a basis acceptable to Israel but the outcome of our efforts looks rather dubious. It is quite possible that should the talks not take place the Israelis will maintain that the situation in Gaza requires strong military action. You will note from the attached telegram (Tab B)⁴ that the Israel Prime Minister has intimated that Israel might be pushed into a position whereby she had no course but to “move into the Gaza Strip and get it over with . . . . drive the Egyptians into the desert.”⁵NSC 5428 provides that if an armed attack occurs, the U.S. should take certain steps to deal with the situation, including discontinuance of U.S. aid to the aggressor, an embargo of trade and the freezing of funds (See Tab C).NSC also provides that at a time and in a way deemed appropriate the courses of action set forth therein should be made known to Israel and individual Arab states privately.

An OCB Working Party has been set up to look into specific actions which this Government must take to implement the policy set forth in the NSC document.

The British Embassy has informed us as follows:

“Mr.Macmillan thinks it desirable that Colonel Nasser should be reminded that the Tripartite Declaration means something. He accordingly wishes to suggest that the Three Powers should now make joint representations to both the Israeli and Egyptian Governments expressing concern at the present dangerous tension on the Gaza border and reminding them that under the Tripartite Declaration, the Three Powers would be bound to take action against an aggressor. Moreover it is clear that the situation in the Gaza salient is very explosive and Mr.Macmillan thinks we should consider whether, in addition to the warning proposed above, some move of forces in the Mediterranean is required to indicate that we mean business. So far as Her Majesty’s Forces are concerned H.M.G. could for example at short notice move an aircraft carrier to the Eastern Mediterranean. This should prove an effective way of reassuring Colonel Nasser of our serious intentions. Mr.Macmillan would be grateful for the U.S. Government’s views and to know whether they would contemplate any similar action.

“In the meantime, Mr.Macmillan is proposing to make a suitable reference to the Tripartite Declaration and H.M.G.’s obligations under it in the House of Commons in the course of the foreign affairs debate on Wednesday June 15.”⁶

Mr.Macmillan will undoubtedly be taking this matter up with you this week when he sees you.⁷ Our inclination is to be in a position of readiness to apply the economic sanctions set forth in the NSC document. We are dubious as to the wisdom of a show of military force as the opening gesture on the part of the Tripartite powers. For one thing, a naval demonstration on the part of the great powers against small countries could redound to our discredit for a considerable period. For another, in his Independence Day speech, Israel Defense Minister Ben Gurion stated that a British attempt to force a peace on Israel would be carried out only after a bloody war between the two countries. . . . We feel that economic measures or the threat of them would be much more effective as a way to begin in the present situation and that military action should be considered only in the event that economic measures have failed.

Recommendations

1. That the British and French be informed that we would like to consider in concert with them economic measures which we would adopt in case either Egypt or Israel takes aggressive action against each other and captures and holds territory not presently belonging to them.

2. That our Ambassadors in Cairo and Tel Aviv be instructed, in collaboration with their British and French colleagues, to express our grave concern over the situation.

3. That our Ambassadors in Cairo and Tel Aviv be authorized in their discretion to convey to the Prime Ministers of Egypt and Israel the measures which this Government would take (“a” thru “d” of Para 10 of NSC 5428) in the event of either an Egyptian or Israel aggressive attack against the other party.⁸

Tab C

Extract From NSC 5428, July 23, 1954⁹

COURSES OF ACTION

10. If in the opinion of the U.S. an armed attack occurs, the U.S. should be prepared to take the following steps either simultaneously or in stages:

a. Discontinue U.S. Government aid to the aggressor.

b. Embargo trade between the U.S. and the aggressor.

c. Prevent the transfer of funds from any source in the U.S. to the aggressor directly or indirectly.

d. Urge other countries, as appropriate, to take similar measures.

e. In the event none of the above courses of action are successful in causing the aggressor state to desist from armed attack and to withdraw within its own borders, consult (without prior commitment) with the U.K., and to the extent practicable with other powers, on whether to take concerted action to:

(1) Establish a blockade of the attacking state.

(2) Use military forces to compel the attacking state to relinquish any territory seized and to withdraw within its own borders.

f. Make every effort at the outset to secure UN sanction and support for the above measures; but, if it appears that UN action will not be forthcoming promptly, be prepared in an urgent situation to take such measures without delay.

11. In collaboration with the U.K., and to the extent desirable and feasible with France and Turkey, develop plans, including military plans as appropriate, to support the measures in paragraph 10 above.

12. At a time and in a way deemed appropriate, make the policy in paragraph 10 above known to Israel and individual Arab states privately.

13. As appropriate, enlist Congressional support for the measures in paragraphs 10 and 12 above.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/6–1355. Top Secret. Drafted by Bergus;Ludlow and Elbrick concurred in the memorandum.
2. For text of NSC 5428, see Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. IX, Part 1, p. 525.
3. For text of Ambassador Lodge’s letter of June 7 as President of the Security Council to the members of the Council, see U.N. doc.S/3406.
4. Ambassador Lawson informed the Department of State that he had spoken with Prime Minister Sharett at his home on the afternoon of June 1. In the course of this conversation,Sharett indicated to Lawson that unless the United Sates, the United Kingdom, and the U.N. Truce Supervision Organization were able to prevail upon the Egyptians to stop shooting at Israelis inside Israeli territory and to take other measures to reduce tension along the border, the people of Israel would soon reach the point, he believed, where they would say “to hell with them [the Egyptians], let’s move into the Gaza Strip and get it over with. Let’s drive the Egyptians into the desert.” (Telegram 1010 from Tel Aviv, June 1; Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/ 6–155)
5. Ellipsis in the source text.
6. No copy of this communication has been found in Department of State files. On June 13, however,Murphy and Bergus met with Sir Robert Scott and Ronald Bailey, the Minister and First Secretary, respectively, of the British Embassy. At this session, Scott and Bailey presented the same proposal. (Memorandum of conversation, by Bergus; Department of State, Central Files, 774.5/6–1355)
7. The Secretary of State was in New York from the afternoon of June 15 to the afternoon of June 17 to prepare plans with his British and French counterparts for the Heads of Government meeting in Geneva in July. For documentation on the Meeting of the Heads of Government of the United States, United Kingdom, France, and the Soviet Union at Geneva, July 18–23, 1955, see volume v.
8. Dulles initialed his approval of the first and second recommendations, but disapproval of the third, adding in his own hand the words “until cleared with Pres”.
9. Top Secret.