Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1955, Volume XIV

123. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State¹

Cairo,June 9, 1955—9 p.m.

1881. No Distribution Outside Department. Met with Nasser at Presidency for lengthy meeting this morning. Found him friendly and apparently endeavoring to correct impressions of strain last meeting. He said we might have to disagree but he never again wished to have strained relations with me personally.

Despite friendly atmosphere conversation disturbing. Because of urgency report re Gaza situation sent separately.² Remainder of summary follows in three sections.

I.

Nasser and I were able to agree upon general policy objectives in Middle East. He wishes Middle East spared from Communism and wants to see adequate defense against Russian overt or covert activity. He wishes build stronger Egypt and does not wish war with Israel which may mean his destruction and stoppage his plans for a better Egypt. On tactics we could not agree and I told him frankly Egypt’s position today was one of spreading disruption throughout Middle East. . . . Continuation of bad relations between Egypt and Iraq benefited no one. If he felt he in stronger bargaining position as regards the West with a block of Arab states behind him, he basically wrong. . . . He stated he did not know honestly whether ESS pact would ever be accomplished. He agreed situation in Syria dangerous. He agreed with long range dangers of Egypt’s policy but stated we seemed to ignore his short range dangers re Israel. Re Egypt-Iraq relations, he had suffered extreme insult while at Bandung to receive letter from Iraqis quoting “conditions” he must meet for them to stop Radio Free Egypt. He did not start either this series or the present tenseness with Israel. He would not be humiliated either by Israel or Iraq.

II.

Nasser repeated to me his feeling of personal guilt at deaths of his soldiers in Gaza. He had been led by Israeli contacts and to some extent by US into complacency that Israel really wanted a settlement. He had ended Hakim American [Hakim Amer’s] funds for army. He had himself told officers that he believed there was good chance of making better arrangements with Israel and that he was taking funds from military for economic development. Under these conditions the Gaza February 28 raid left him in almost impossible position. He would not and could not issue orders that troops could not defend themselves if they had reason to believe approaching Israeli vehicles were intent upon attack. It was for this reason he said that he had suggested separating the troops.

Nasser spoke with discouragement of his belief during past three years that military equipment could be obtained from the US. Realized he had not been willing to sign military aid agreement but could not understand why we unable to increase economic aid funds or take some other measure which would allow Egypt be able to purchase equipment from us with its own funds. This after all was what happened with Israel. She had obtained funds from the US, Germany and elsewhere which enabled her to buy equipment to keep her armed forces in top condition. He stated that as a matter of principle as contrasted to available funds he was able to buy equipment from every nation except the US. He had concluded that he should accept Russia’s offer of military equipment and plans to send a mission there next week. I responded that surely he would not put himself in a position of depending upon Soviet spare parts and ammunition and that he must realize the long range implications of such a move. Refuted his contention that he had been denied right of purchase US arms but even so he had stated could buy from Britain, France, etc., so why turn to Russia? He replied that in his view if Israel really started a war the Western powers would again boycott the Arab world as they did before, but still let Israel obtain equipment. Although Russian motive undoubtedly dangerous in long run to Middle East, Russians at least would not blockade Arab world attempt to get arms. Department can imagine my response to stupidity of his position. It included, however, categorical statement that if Israel started war, US would not embargo Arab states and leave Israel free to obtain support. (In this connection, heard yesterday Nasser had received report from Hussein stating his view US would not act under tripartite declaration if major aggression started by Israel. This is only rumor here but if true this may be cause of Nasser’s mood.) It only logical for any reader this message consider this aspect of conversation attempt by Nasser to threaten us into supplying equipment. Do not believe this the case. He speaking his conclusions and convictions however illogical and dangerous they may appear to us.

In this connection was approached last week through indirect channels as to whether US policy prohibited Egypt buying any arms from America. Did not choose to give reply through channel used. Last night Fawzi talked to me at some length about problem, stating Nasser really wished to know our position. I reviewed history of matter over last three years. He said, nevertheless, would I find out now whether Egypt could now purchase under previously signed 408E agreement.³ We understood there would be limitations upon amount and type. Nevertheless, as matter of principle, he thought it important that they know.

Nasser today took position we had denied purchase of equipment by Egypt. I told him I thought this was not correct. He asked if I would determine Washington policy. I reminded him of recent approval of British equipment and asked what specifically he had in mind. He said he could not go into types and quantities at the moment but merely wished principle defined. I told him types and quantities might well affect the principle. He said he not thinking in big terms but wished to know whether under present conditions we would deny Egypt the right of purchase.

Regret putting this question to Department under present conditions but felt I could not refuse Nasser’s request that I ascertain Washington’s views. If he has large amounts equipment in mind, suppose both US policy and Egyptian financial status would prohibit. On other hand, if he thinking of modest expenditure which would not really affect situation would regret outright refusal in principle which would only drive him to deeper gloom and feeling we really with Israel when the chips are down. Request instructions.⁴

III.

While this may sound inconsistent,Nasser talked with sincerity of his desire to be friends with America. He felt it still possible and that we should continue talking until we see whether something might evolve that could get us back in step. He took my extremely strong criticism Egypt’s policies calmly and without sign of hostility but gave impression of person fully convinced he acting in best short range interests of Egypt. At present moment it clear he would pull down temple on top of regime rather than suffer what he considers humiliation and pressures upon him, particularly from Israel. This is indeed a dangerous and most unfortunate situation, particularly as I completely convinced there no desire here to have war with Israel.

Can only hope this talk may produce some moderation. Can conceive of no pressure that will have desired effect upon Nasser. Believe only power we have is one of persuasion and personal contact which shall try do utmost. Difficulty in dealings with this fellow is that he honestly agrees with our criticism and dangers of Egypt’s policies in long run yet seems convinced he must move as he does in the short run.

Request Department repeat portions or entire message as desired other capitals.

Byroade

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/6–955. Top Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Received at 12:24 a.m., June 10.
2. Seesupra.
3. On December 9 and 10, 1952, Prime Minister of Egypt at that time, General Mohammed Naguib, and then U.S. Ambassador Jefferson Caffery, exchanged formal notes to bring into force a Mutual Defense Assistance Understanding under Section 408 (e) of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949 (64 Stat. 373) and the Mutual Security Act of 1951 (65 Stat. 373). For texts of these notes, see TIAS No. 3565, printed in 7 UST 844.
4. See footnote 2, Document 132.