Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Near East: Jordan-Yemen, Volume XIII

58. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, February 18, 1957¹

Washington, February 18, 1957

SUBJECT

• Jordan

PARTICIPANTS

• Mr. R. W. Bailey, British Embassy
• NEA—Mr. Lampton Berry
• NE—Richard B. Parker

Mr. Bailey called at his own request to discuss Jordan. He opened the discussion by recalling that in January there had been an initial approach by the British Ambassador regarding the future of Jordan and that there was an informal commitment on both sides to further discussions (see Secret Memorandum of Conversation, January 17²). It would be one of the questions on the agenda at Bermuda³ and perhaps it would be well to do a little preliminary spadework so that each side knew something about the other’s thoughts and intentions.

Jordan had decided to terminate the Anglo-Jordan treaty and the British were not sorry about it.⁴ There had been some discussion about the United States taking over some of Britain’s obligations under the treaty but the conclusion of the Egyptian-Syrian-Saudi aid offer pretty well obviated this. However, the British understood that we were seriously considering increasing our economic aid to Jordan by a small amount and that this would be done in connection with the Richards Mission.

He presented papers showing that in the eight years from 1948 to 1956 the British had contributed nearly £ 60 million for the support of the Arab Army and that termination of the treaty under which this had been paid would save about £ 10 million per year. Development assistance since 1950 had totaled £ 7½ million in interest-free loans. In addition, the British were committed to construction of the Aqaba Deep Water Port and the Desert Road from Aqaba to Amman. Total cost of these two projects was estimated at £ 4½ million, of which £ 630,000 had been spent already.

The British did not envisage any further military assistance to Jordan following the termination of the treaty. Consideration would probably be given to Jordanian requests to purchase British spare parts, ammunition and supply items since their equipment was all British. The development loans could probably be terminated without serious dislocation. However, the Aqaba Port and Desert Road projects are of major importance and withdrawal of British assistance in their construction would be a serious matter to Jordan.

The British are now considering whether or not to continue available economic assistance to the Jordan Government after the termination of the treaty. The course of the negotiations for the termination of the treaty, and the extent to which British stocks and installations in Jordan can be satisfactorily removed or disposed of, will clearly be important factors governing this decision.

Mr. Bailey stated that the British were using the question of possible continuance of British economic assistance as a lever in the current treaty negotiations and asked that we not make any public or private promises or statements of intent to increase United States economic assistance to Jordan until after the treaty negotiations have been completed. Mr. Berry gave Mr. Bailey assurances that we did not intend to make any such promises or commitments before completion of the treaty talks. He said he felt able to give these assurances since we were unlikely to reach any firm decision with respect to what we could or should do for Jordan until after the Richards Mission had visited the country and submitted its report. Since Mr. Bailey had said that the British-Jordanian talks would be completed by March 31 at the latest and since it was not contemplated that the Richards Mission would visit Jordan until after that date, Mr. Berry said there seemed little likelihood that any U.S. commitments to Jordan would conflict with the British-Jordanian talks.

Mr. Bailey also asked that we collect our thoughts on the whole question of the future of Jordan and British and American roles there prior to the Bermuda meeting. He read an excerpt from a Foreign Office memorandum which suggested that if the Department of State has as many doubts as the Foreign Office does about Jordan, perhaps it would be a good idea for the British and American Ambassadors in Amman to get together and write a joint report for everybody’s enlightenment. Mr. Berry replied that we would be glad to get together our thoughts on Jordan but that he doubted that much purpose would be served by a joint ambassadorial report.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 785.5–MSP/2–1857. Confidential. Drafted by Parker on February 20, and revised by Berry on February 23.
2. Document 55.
3. Between March 21 and 24, President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Macmillan met at Bermuda to exchange views on various matters of concern to both countries.
4. On March 13, representatives of the Governments of the United Kingdom and Jordan signed an agreement to terminate the Anglo-Jordanian Treaty of 1948. Among its provisions, the agreement provided for the withdrawal of British forces and disposal of their stores within 6 months.