Office of the Historian

57. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State1

Amman, February 13, 1957—3 p.m.

928. Tehran for Harold Nelson.2 A new political situation is fast emerging in Jordan with possibility proper action by US may put this central and now virtually buffer state on side of west.

Only year ago we saw anti-Baghdad pact anti-western riots here. March 1, 1956 Glubb Pasha was dismissed and British lost any influence over events in Jordan. Arab nationalism rose rapidly under Gamal Nasser’s leadership and reached an apogee during Suez Canal attack. Since then there is evidence of changes and shifts which may be turned to our use. In Jordan changes appear caused principally by concern over rapid rise leftist influence both within and without government; stand of UN and US over Suez; substitution of Arab for British aid army; British willingness terminate treaty on friendly basis; and suspicion on part Kings Hussein and Ibn Saud of both Egypt and Syria. In many respects present is moment of pause and appears as the morning after the emotional display.

Hussein has come out with strong anti-Communist stand employing Arab traditions and Islam as vehicle. By comment favorable to Eisenhower doctrine he has publicly shown himself on our side. He is now legitimate target for regime in Syria and Communists and Bathiyiin in Jordan. He cannot expect genuine support from Nabulsi Government. … So far as generally known he has not opposed King yet but has not supported his policies. Prime Minister shows no disposition to dispense with Communist and Bathiyiin supporters in government, who, if put in opposition could help out extremist elements. Balance of power at moment is army which generally assumed loyal to King… .

Time of decision whether Jordan to continue relatively unfettered independent entity, or go way of Syria is near. First phase in that decision will be Cairo meeting chiefs of state with Saud on return from US probably February 23.3 Subsequent position of Hussein will depend in great measure upon strength of purpose maintained by Saud and Nasser. If Saud wins then Hussein may be expected to be bolstered to point where US assistance to Jordan could assure favorable posture. If Nasser wins then Hussein will be [Page 85] in weak position and while US assistance might still be worth the gamble the chances of success would be greatly diminished.

Respecting such assistance, development of Eisenhower doctrine and trip Ambassador Richards certain facts and recommendations are given below.

1.
US assistance to Jordanian military is presumably not needed since former UK subsidy has been assumed by Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Syria. The possibility that form and manner payment of this Arab subsidy would be such as place HKJ in untenable financial position investigated by the Embassy and found not to be valid. Appears Jordan can make out militarily and otherwise up to year or two even though there are delays and even though manner of payment may prove awkward.
2.
A request for assistance in procurement of arms could well arise in future but appears unlikely for a time in view military agreements with Egypt Syria which provide joint military arrangements.
3.
Non-military aid both for technical cooperation and economic development have in past been provided by both UK and US. What UK may do respecting future development loans not known. Possible they might continue at reduced level if present treaty negotiations finished amicably. If non-military aid from UK–US were cut off, Jordan would almost certainly seek it elsewhere.
4.
Granting too much aid would be serious mistake, tending engender inflation, raising local living costs, giving very poor return per dollar and tending make Americans held in low esteem.
5.
Absorptive capacity of Jordan for investments and aid to sound development projects is limited. However there is also room for impact projects, realizing that returns are to be in political coin.
6.
The project which combines great impact value with substantial development potential use Yarmuk River irrigate eastern Ghor Jordan Valley. This uppermost in planning all Jordanian officials. Could be worked out as part of unified plan for valley. Much investigation and planning done on this but grant of funds is essentially political decision with broad area implications. Recommend Department review.
7.
There must be adequate understandings re Jordan’s obligations, which in past she has overlooked and point made clear that such understandings are to be respected. If we are to get anywhere we cannot accede to repetitious local chant aid can be accepted if no strings attached.
8.
Technical cooperation should be continued at about present or slightly reduced level. However fine working relationship between many technicians and Jordanian counterparts would be strengthened if technical cooperation could be more separately identified as continuing US policy, with fewer American technicians unburdened with duty administering economic aid.
9.
Any increase in economic aid should be identified as result acceptance Eisenhower plan and announced request by HKJ. Were aid given merely as additional ICA funds, then new total would become accepted as norm expected year by year from “Point IV”.
10.
To determine aid level will require additional review and perhaps negotiations. Depending on what UK is disposed do in future I would recommend in addition to technical cooperation of about $2 million per year, that total economic assistance should be about $15 million.
11.
Basic agreements with Jordan Government should be revised to promote assumption greater operating responsibilities by HKJ.
12.
Some flexibility in granting and withdrawing aid is badly needed. If King Hussein can keep Jordan in western camp he should in our own interest be supported. If Prime Minister seeks to defy King, inhibit his powers, or depose him, we need possibility withdrawing aid. As matters stand local Arabs can rely on our administrative inertia to present us with fait accompli. Aid should be a useable diplomatic tool and weapon.
13.
Washington must provide suitable increase qualified personnel to bolster ICA staff administer increased aid.

Up to present I have been opposed to any more aid to Jordan on grounds that they could not make good use of it nor would it gain us any particular credit. The battle is now joined. At least one champion is in the lists in person King Hussein. If he able to sustain anti-Communist stand by HKJ (not necessarily pro-American) and if aid requested following pro-Eisenhower doctrine stand, I recommend it be granted.

Mallory
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 685.00/2–1357. Secret. Repeated to Baghdad, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, Jidda, London, Tehran, Ankara, Jerusalem, Tel Aviv, and Tripoli.↩
  2. Harold Nelson, ICA Director in Amman.↩
  3. On February 24 King Saud met in Cairo for discussions with Nasser, Quwatli, and Hussein.↩