416. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Rountree) to the Chargé in Syria (Strong)1
Dear Bob: Thank you for your interesting letter of October 162 giving me your views regarding our relations with Syria. It is very useful for those of us in the Department dealing with this problem to have your carefully considered opinions and to compare them with our own. Since your presentation treats the problem in considerable detail, my comments will follow your points in the order presented.
I think that all of us here agree with your basic assumptions. A “hard line” toward Syria has not brought about the desired change in the internal situation there…. We do believe, however, that the “hard line” was initially the correct one both as a necessary response to Syrian charges against personnel of the Embassy in Damascus and to alert the world, including the other Arab states, to the extent of Soviet penetration of the Syrian Government and Army. Although our Arab friends have not found the courage to stand up and confirm their concern, the pro-Soviet trend in Syria has been highlighted in such a way that Syria has been placed on the defensive vis-à-vis her Arab neighbors, and in world opinion. We believe this development may have been helpful in inhibiting pro-Soviet elements in Syria from consolidating the advantage they acquired in August when moderate elements were removed from the Syrian Army.
The disadvantages of … continuing a “hard line” toward Syria led us in recent weeks to work toward decreasing tensions in the area and encouraging the initiative of King Saud and other moderate Arabs.
Regarding pronouncements by U.S. officials, we are aware of possible adverse reaction in the area to overt hostility toward Syria. On the other hand, we must meet threats by the Soviet Union with firmness whatever the reaction of the Syrian Government or press may be. However, you have probably noticed that lately we have concentrated our fire in public statements on the Russian role in the Near East and have refrained from public comment on the Syrian regime. Of course, we must face the fact that through a controlled [Page 736] press and radio Syria is able to distort statements, whatever their content, to its own advantage.
The Turks have a genuine, and I think reasonable, fear of the implications for their security of the build-up of Soviet presence in Syria. That they should move their forces within their territory as a result is understandable. I agree, however, that such a course has important disadvantages and I believe that the Turks will place less emphasis on troop movements in the future.
I agree with your statement that “The best we can hope for from Syria for a long time would be genuine neutrality”. I would add that we must also live with the fact that the Syrian Army will be equipped with Soviet bloc arms for the foreseeable future. I should like to expand your proposition, however, to include the following negative, but I believe important, objective: the hope that the Syro-Soviet relationship may prove disadvantageous to Syria as compared to the relationship of Syria’s Arab neighbors with the West. In other words, a Soviet-oriented Syria should not be allowed to serve as a successful example of the benefits of “positive neutralism” which is really “pro-Sovietism”. We should, I believe, use every effective means at our disposal to achieve the above objective.
Your suggested tactics (page 2, para. 3) for the most part are in accord with those developed in the Department. I shall, therefore, comment only on those to which we take some exception as to substance or timing.
- 1.
- We do not now favor an unrestricted economic policy toward Syria as we believe the present regime would thereby be strengthened. We do, however, intend to keep our policies continuously under review so that unrealistic or unproductive restrictions are not perpetuated.
- 2.
- As tensions ease we should expect travel to Syria to become more normal. At the present time, as you know, there is no prohibition on such travel.
- 3.
- We realize that publicity concerning the acquisition of Soviet arms by Syria provokes varying reactions in the Middle East. Although we can exercise caution in official statements in that regard, we cannot expect that the subject will be entirely ignored.
- 4.
- Any initiative by the United States to assist Syrian economic development ambitions could, we believe, at this time have unfortunate repercussions in the Middle East, without affecting substantially Syria’s pro-Soviet orientation. We have constantly in mind the position of our friends in the area. We feel that with good reason they would be dismayed by any steps on our part which would seem to indicate acceptance by us of present Syrian policies. We do not wish to contribute to the stabilization of the Syrian regime unless there are solid grounds for belief that such a contribution would cause Syria to make a significant move toward real neutrality rather than merely to strengthen the appeal of pro-Soviet “positive neutrality”. The time may yet come when antagonism toward the [Page 737] Syrian Communists and dissatisfaction with Syrian dependence on the USSR might be exploited in the ranks of Arab nationalists and socialists by an offer of assistance from the United States that would seriously undermine the Soviet position in Syria. At the moment, however, development assistance to Syria would, we think, do much more harm than good in terms of our area relations.
- 5.
- Reinstitution of cultural exchanges (which have never been extensive on an official level) would constitute a gesture rather than a significant step to influence Syrian cultural orientation. We would, therefore, consider taking such a step only when some such gesture might be expected to produce a small but useful advantage.
In spite of the above reservations, I believe it is apparent that we agree on basic assumptions and that our ideas on tactics diverge primarily on the question of timing. For the immediate future of our relations with Syria we hope to achieve a degree of dégagement that will permit the moderating influences of Saud and others to be most effective. Our official relations with Syria should continue to be correct but no more. We intend that the size of the staff in Damascus should for the time being be kept at the present level. There is no objection to the development of personal relations between members of the staff and Syrian Government and Army officers on as friendly a basis as the Syrians make possible. We should, of course, remain firm in asserting our rights and diplomatic privileges.
A period of dégagement would, we hope, provide an opportunity for the traditional elements of instability to undermine the cohesion of the Syrian Government and Army coalitions. Furthermore, with time, the natural advantages to Syria of maintaining satisfactory relations with the West might become more apparent to the Syrian Government. Piecemeal offers to the present Syrian Government that do not effectively compete with support given Syria by the Soviet Union should, we believe, be avoided. Rather, Syria should be brought to realize the value of those elements of economic and political support that can only be found in the West.
As far as Israel is concerned, we believe that Tel Aviv is aware that its own interests require non-involvement in the Syrian issue at this stage.
I want to tell you again how much we here have appreciated the fine performance of the Embassy in Damascus under your direction, during an exceedingly difficult period in our relations with Syria.
Sincerely yours,
- Source: Department of State, NEA/NE Files: Lot 59 D 38, Syria—Correspondence Damascus. Secret; Official-Informal. Drafted by Waggoner on October 28.↩
- Document 405.↩
- Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.↩