405. Letter From the Chargé in Syria (Strong) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Rountree)1
Dear Bill: I have been pondering, perhaps too long or perhaps not long enough, advocacy of a modification of the United States posture toward Syria. A letter to you now appears to be timely. Since my proposals are controversial I thought I might submit them informally, formal transmission to occur later only if desired.
United States efforts … toward Syria having failed, what alternatives do we have? Force is ruled out. … A hard line from the West alone would only drive Syria closer to the Soviet Bloc. Unhappily there is no satisfactory alternative, as far as I can see, to leaving the handling of the problem to King Sa’ud and other moderate Arabs. They are as deeply or more affected than the United States by the Syrian situation, and in their own interest they must try to modify it. However, they can do better if allowed to take the initiative in their own way; whatever the United States does should be (1) quiet, from behind the scenes, and (2) designed to assist our Arab friends.
Pronouncements by United States officials hostile to Syria serve to strengthen Syrian extremists and weaken our Arab friends, both in and outside Syria. Public questioning of the friendship and motives of Sa’ud (and the Iraqis) merely assist the extremists to undermine Sa’ud’s influence. Limited economic warfare measures which annoy but do not have any serious effect only justify the extremists in their course and render a Syrian return to sanity and to better relations with the United States that much more difficult. Continuation of … military threats simply gives the Soviets and Syrian extremists another golden propaganda opportunity.
The Soviet Union, thanks to the Palestine problem, has gotten a foothold in Syria. In my opinion we cannot now destroy that foothold. Therefore we should endeavor to prevent the Soviets from gaining a grip on Syria and from obtaining first a foothold in and then a grip on other Arab states. We cannot by ourselves, even with the cooperation of King Husayn, keep the Soviets out of Jordan and later Iraq. Husayn and his moderate regime can be sustained only by Sa’ud and the Iraqis, and by Israeli silence (any serious act of violence by Israel against Jordan or Syria would be catastrophic).
[Page 719]The best we can hope for from Syria for a long time would be genuine neutrality. No one in Syria can bring Syria back into the western camp under any foreseeable circumstances. We can contribute to adoption of truer neutrality by Syria and to insulation of other Arab states, but we cannot do it by ourselves.
Therefore the course I propose for the United States, difficult as it may be, but less dangerous than continuation of an overtly hostile line toward Syria, is as follows: place our trust in the friendly Arab states; seek ways in which we can strengthen them quietly (arms and economic aid in small quantities are not the answer) by political measures and propaganda; tell them of our trust and consult with them on measures, within our political possibilities, which will be helpful to them; endeavor to keep the Israelis and Turks quiet, and maintain relative silence ourselves; avoid making our Arab friends appear to be United States stooges; seek to place our relations with Syria on a better footing including termination of embargoes and quotas; permit normal travel to Syria; accept Syrian neutrality and attack only unneutral acts by Syria; be subtle in propaganda, avoiding material of obvious United States origin; ignore acquisition of Soviet arms by Syria; examine alternative methods of assistance to Syrian development ambitions including peaceful uses of atomic energy; should this course appear to produce some results, assign a new Ambassador, replace Funkhouser and myself, and reinstitute cultural exchange.
The foregoing course may involve some loss of face, and the Syrians in any case will be difficult. The Israelis will probably accuse us of selling out, but in fact they are in no danger from the Syrians for twenty years unless the Soviets get hold of their army and turn it into something.
I believe that such a course would not only help our Arab friends but also would assist measurably the forces of moderation inside Syria.
There are many other details I might have included but I believe that the lines of thinking are clear. I have discussed this with all elements of the Embassy, who are in full agreement, ….
Sincerely,
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 783.00/10–1657. Secret; Official-Informal.↩