38. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State1
294. Reference Iraqi troops for Jordan. Appears this subject being fogged by welter divergent facts and interests. Stripped side issues naked point remains that Jordan no longer British strong point, is open game cut-throat struggle for influence. So far with lingering ties, annual British financial subsidy and some royal affinity to Iraq she is still shakily on side West. This at expense Arab unity Nasser style. He is bending efforts win Jordan and if he succeeds, through default or otherwise, I respectfully suggest that Iraq will come next.
The policy choices are therefore between trying keep part of Arabs Western oriented and in Baghdad Pact, or letting Nasser take over whole area.
Most arguments so far seen advanced against sending Iraqi troops here appear self-seeking or specious. Iraqi efforts have United States small arms sent Jordan strike one as diversionary red herring to cover unwillingness, hesitation or procrastination.
Israeli arguments about lack of armistice with Iraq are negated in same telegram (Tel Aviv’s 2952) by statement Israelis could occupy part Jordan if other Arab troops come. Moreover Israel by her own actions has rendered armistice agreement and UNTSO virtually useless. Little doubt Israel would be faced with far more serious situation if Iraq fails orient Jordan her way and armistice line becomes dominated by Nasser coalition. From this end of telescope it appears Israel may disregard the Anglo-Jordanian alliance since her arguments suggest build-up to justify warlike action. War by Israel this fall would be well justified from her point view. Next year likely too late and European intrusion in Near East, which she constitutes, will, remarkably like the crusaders, be then on defensive.
There is much justification for sending Iraqi troops here but only if Iraqis prepared for and assisted in real struggle for influence. [Page 56] Trying at moment to keep her troops out merely replaces today’s problem by larger less desirable one tomorrow.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 685.87/9–2956. Secret; Priority. Repeated priority to Baghdad and Tel Aviv, and to Ankara, Cairo, Damascus, London, Jidda, and Tripoli.↩
- Telegram 295 from Tel Aviv, September 27, reported, among other things, that there were indications that Israel was “apprehensive” about the possible movement of Iraqi troops into Jordan. According to Lawson, Ben Gurion indicated to him as early as July 1955 that he was concerned about Iraqi troops in Jordan and the implications of border clashes with an enemy state with no armistice agreement with Israel. (Ibid., 685.87/9–2756)↩