Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Near East: Jordan-Yemen, Volume XIII

37. Telegram From the Embassy in Iraq to the Department of State¹

Baghdad, September 29, 1956—1 p.m.

530. I saw Nuri at his home this morning (Embtel 520,² September 28). I found him most earnest and quite disturbed. He had, he said given most careful consideration to my letter. Pressure on him from Jordan was so strong that he would have to give Jordan immediate concrete evidence of support. He could not abandon plan for storing supplies within Jordan. He would proceed to store supplies at Hotel–4 and Hotel–5 and then at Mafraq. He wanted to make it clear that only a very small force would accompany the supplies as guards. Perhaps the force could be kept down to a few hundred troops. Iraq’s aim he said he wished to emphasize again was solely to keep Jordan out of the Communist camp. If Iraq did not proceed now to do at least that much Jordan already receiving some Soviet aid from Egypt would most assuredly “pass over to Communist camp”. Mafraq is quite some distance from the present scene of clashes. Even so he would guarantee that the small guard that would accompany supplies into Jordan would not get involved in any skirmishes.

I told Nuri we fully respected his guarantee but we greatly feared that the appearance of even a small force would be interpreted by Israel as an act of aggression and would precipitate powerful countermove.

Nuri replied that he was fully aware of that danger and that was why he had earlier asked that we make it clear in Tel Aviv that what he contemplated doing was no act of aggression but intended solely to give heart to Jordan in resisting Communist influence. Along with this explanation he was adding his guarantee that these few Iraqi soldiers would not take part in any fighting.

Here I interjected that it would be tragic if Jordan confused Israeli retaliatory raids with an Israeli build-up for war. I had seen no evidence whatever I told Nuri of such Israeli intentions. I then returned to the great potential danger of sending even a token Iraqi force into Jordan. Nuri persisted, however, in his line that he must give Jordan immediate evidence of support.

At this point I asked Nuri whether he could not turn over the supplies he had in mind to the Jordanians at the frontier. That Nuri said, was out of the question. He did not have that much confidence in the Jordanians. “The supplies I am afraid” he said “would simply disappear”.

Nuri then returned to the need of giving Foreign Minister Hadi some definite word of help before he returns to Amman. He said he would be seeing Hadi again this evening. Hadi was planning on returning to Amman tomorrow the thirtieth. Almost in desperation he asked whether we could not in the course of the day give him a definite answer on his request for some small arms and blankets which Iraq in turn could pass on to Jordan. I told him I would immediately urge Department again to give me a definite answer.

Could I, I finally asked Nuri, assure the Department that he would take no steps in moving supplies and guards into Jordan until I had had Department’s reply on his small arms and blankets request and we had had further talk. He said I could guarantee the Department that. He also said he wanted to give us the guarantee now that in case of Israeli aggression in force he would not move any Iraqi troops in force across frontier until he had consulted with US and British.³

Gallman

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 685.87/9–2956. Secret; Niact. Repeated priority to Amman and Tel Aviv, and to Karachi, Ankara, Cairo, London, Damascus, and Beirut.
2. See footnote 3, supra.
3. On September 30 Gallman reported that Nuri had called on him at the Embassy inquiring about his request for small arms and blankets. According to the Ambassador, Nuri added, among other things, that the British Ambassador to Iraq had assured the Jordanian Foreign Minister Awni Abd al-Hadi, among others, that in case of Israeli aggression against Jordan, the United Kingdom would “immediately” assist Jordan under the provisions of the Anglo-Jordanian treaty. (Telegram 533 from Baghdad; Ibid., 685.87/9–3056) That same day, the Department informed Gallman that the question of small arms and blankets was still under consideration. The Department added that it was doubtful that arms could be furnished, but it was hopeful that a way could be found to supply blankets. (Telegram 489 to Baghdad; Ibid.)