31. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State1
633. Called on King afternoon May 17 in response Department telegram 667.2 British Ambassador, who had similar instructions, came out as I went in.
Began conversation with story of Uncle Joe, desert rat gold prospector, who upon appeal of St. Peter had rid heaven of undesirable characters by spreading rumor of gold strike in hell and then joined the group, victim of his own fabrication. I then turned to current exaggerated stories of West arming Israel and to fear I entertained that certain people would follow Uncle Joe’s example [Page 46] and believe their own propaganda. (For example, Cairo’s 2260.3) It was human, I said, to try to get others to follow one’s example and it would be surprising if there were no arms offers made to HKJ by or through Egypt. I expanded on this, pointing out dangers either direct Egyptian offer or of Egypt being unwitting stalking horse for Soviet bloc and presenting all the usual arguments, including those in Department telegrams 6334 and 667. During conversation was able ask King point-blank if he had been offered arms or requested any… .
I dwelt at some length on fact US refuses enter arms race and on facts of offshore procurement in France. King said he understood the explanation but nevertheless unfortunate that arms were supplied to Israel by France and that France apparently engaged in such activity because of her involvement in North Africa. After all, Arabs had to stick together and if in addition to Algerian situation Israel’s armed forces were strengthened, it could only be to detriment of West as far as Arabs concerned. I gave him rather full enunciation our stand on arms to Israel, protection from aggression through UN, et cetera, pointing out as Department instructed that we would feel same way towards Jordan. This apparently had little effect.
King thanked me for statement about US intentions with respect Iraq. He hoped they would be fruitful.
King repeated desire to stay in middle of Arab extremes and try draw factions together. He went on to say this was purpose his recent trip Lebanon since he thought Lebanon and HKJ had much in common this respect and solid front of two would be mutually beneficial. In this connection Beirut’s 14635 strikes us as good and sound summary King’s general philosophy as he might express it to Arabs. He has developed considerable liking and respect for President Chamoun.
. . . . . . .
Were it necessary characterize King’s present state on basis yesterday’s conversation I would say that his heart is still in right [Page 47] place but am not sure what he will do…. He is up to his neck in swift currents. While some of these are his own making, strongest forces beyond his control and he cannot move against stream. The real determinants are major trend within Arab world and pressures from strong neighbors (Embassy despatch 3916). Hussein and Jordan cannot resist them indefinitely. Answer lies less in helping King resist being pushed into morass which he does not wish to enter than in blocking forces which are pushing him.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 785.00/5–1856. Secret. Repeated to Baghdad, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, London, Paris, Ankara, Jidda, Tel Aviv, and Tripoli.↩
- Document 28.↩
- Telegram 2260 from Cairo, May 16, reported indications that Nasser was “working himself into state of believing reports reaching him that decision taken Paris that piecemeal supply armament to Israel by various nations would continue until arms strength of Israel exceeded that of Arabs.” (Department of State, Central Files, 784A.56/5–1656).↩
- Document 27.↩
- In telegram 1463 from Beirut, May 16, Heath forwarded brief highlights of a conversation between Chamoun and Hussein as conveyed to him by the Lebanese President. Among other things, Chamoun noted that King Hussein expressed his determination to keep Jordan out of the ESS pact. (Department of State, Central Files, 785.11/5–1656)↩
- Not printed. (Ibid., 785.00/5–356)↩