28. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan1
667. For Mallory. Dept continues gravely concerned re deteriorating situation Jordan. From evidence available here apparent events since December and departure Glubb have seriously jeopardized prospects continuing political viability Jordan. King obviously seeking strengthen personal power on basis popularity with mob and relationship with Nuwar faction in Legion. Nuwar faction presently in control Legion but its uneasy leadership seriously questioned by rival factions. PriMin and Cabinet seem almost have disappeared as far as their influence on political developments concerned. ESS powers continue efforts penetrate Jordan for number reasons not necessarily consistent with each other but including: 1) desire eliminate bridgehead British influence; 2) opposition to enlargement Baghdad Pact; 3) removal Jordan as potential threat Saudi Arabia; 4) latent territorial aspirations in Jordan; 5) desire solidify Arab anti-Israel front; 6) traditional Arab pleasure in political machination.
King may perceive risks but hope bring about situation where ESS powers (with Soviet arms available) would be competing with West and Iraq as to which side would shower most political and material favors on Jordan. Popularity Nasser and ESS sentiments among Jordan mob prevent him from opposing their efforts directly. [Page 42] At same time he keenly hurt by what he considers Iraq’s failure appreciate his stature as Arab leader or willingness quickly respond his appeals for support.
We believe that in critical weeks ahead you should bring to King’s attention considerations outlined Deptel 633.2
Following further points which expand para 5 of Deptel 633 should also be included:
- 1.
- Even if assurances given Jordan that Soviet bloc arms can be obtained under cover transaction between Jordan and another Arab state and without necessity introduction Soviet technicians into Jordan, King incurring grave risks by reliance on assurances. Experience indicates difficulties encountered limiting or restricting Soviet personnel and influence once dependence on Soviet bloc as ultimate source of arms and spare parts developed.
- 2.
- Backbone Jordan internal and external security will continue to be Arab Legion which publicly sworn loyalty King. National Guard acted as militia enforce order along HKJ frontiers and resist violations armistice lines until superior force Legion brought to bear. Were Guard now strengthened with Soviet bloc arms and perhaps foreign instructors in use, serious logistic problem would be created. Furthermore opportunities could be created for those who would wish foster competing loyalties in Guard and Legion rather than integrate into effective force for defense sovereignty of Jordan.
- 3.
- Once Soviet bloc had established beachhead in Jordan inevitable it would seek eliminate elements known for desire maintain independent state and preserve longstanding relationship with West.
As King and other Jordan officials may hear of US discussions with Nuri you should include in your approach statement that US is continuing to use such influence with Iraq as it has and would appreciate King’s suggestions.
You should keep British colleague informed substance approaches.
London inform FonOff substance this message.
Embtel 6223 received since drafting foregoing. Information therein further emphasizes importance of early discussion between you and King Hussein … to retard movement by Jordan into ESS grouping.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 785.00/5–1256. Secret. Drafted by Bergus and approved by Rountree who signed for Dulles. Repeated to Baghdad and London.↩
- Supra.↩
- In telegram 622 from Amman, May 11, Mallory informed the Department that the possibility that Jordan might receive Soviet bloc arms and become associated in a joint command with Egypt has “sharply increased”. According to Mallory, reports indicated that Hussein had informed a British officer that Jordan might receive two jet squadrons, heavy artillery, and tanks from Egypt. The Ambassador commented, however, that in his view the information had a 50 percent chance of being accurate. (Department of State, Central Files, 785.56/5–1156)↩