Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Near East: Jordan-Yemen, Volume XIII

29. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Iraq¹

Washington, May 12, 1956—3:48 p.m.

944. For Gallman. Re Deptel 667² to Mallory. At earliest opportunity you should seek private talk with Nuri and acquaint him with Dept’s appreciation situation Jordan. You should point out view present trends in Jordan could well lead further ESS and communist penetration, increasing civil strife, and increasing threat Iraq from Arab world.

Iraq in position exercise maximum constructive influence during this critical period. We hope Iraq Govt would consider early and effective approaches Jordanians. Expression sympathetic attitude toward Jordan economic development projects would be helpful if coupled with firm commitments contribute appreciable amounts to potash works and superphosphate plant. Time may not permit further waiting to determine how crises develop. Perhaps Iraq could further economic aid in form assistance in financing road and Aqaba Port development. Projects in cultural and information fields including grant number scholarships for Jordanians to study in Iraqi institutions might be useful.

Also of prime importance would be development close ties between Iraq Army and Arab Legion.

Exercise constructive Iraqi influence in Jordan of vital importance to Iraq’s future role among Arab nations. Strong Jordan would represent important link between Iraq and other Arab nations—role Nuri himself foresaw in his suggestions re Saud–Faisal meeting (Embtel 1150³), matters now receiving urgent consideration in Washington.

Vital factor in strengthening Jordan–Iraq relationships and countering ESS influence is psychological. US under no illusions as to difficulties involved. At this time Jordanians might respond to gestures which showed friendship, respect for their legitimate aspirations, and sympathy for their problems.

You should stress need for secrecy these discussions and US interest in Nuri’s views as to how Jordan situation can be handled.

You should keep your British colleague informed substance your approach.⁴

London convey FonOff substance this message.⁵

Dulles

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 785.00/5–1256. Secret. Drafted by Bergus and approved by Rountree who signed for Dulles. Repeated to London and Amman.
2. Supra.
3. Not printed.
4. On May 13, Gallman informed the Department that he had met with Nuri that morning and covered the substance of the Department’s instructions. According to the Ambassador, Nuri shared U.S. concern, but expressed little hope that “anything constructive” could be accomplished with the Jordanian Government. Stabilizing the situation, Nuri continued, depended on checking “ESS maneuverings.” Gallman reported, however, that in spite of Nuri’s pessimism, the Prime Minister was working along two lines—economic and military. In the remainder of the telegram Gallman conveyed the details of Nuri’s proposed approach. (Telegram 1184 from Baghdad; Department of State, Central Files, 785.00/5–1356)
5. In telegram 5256 from London, May 14, the Embassy informed the Department that it had conveyed the substance of telegrams 667 to Amman and 944 to Baghdad, to the Foreign Office. (Ibid., 785.56/5–1456)