Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Near East: Jordan-Yemen, Volume XIII

274. National Intelligence Estimate¹

NIE 30–57

Washington, February 19, 1957.

THE BRITISH POSITION IN THE PERSIAN GULF AND ARABIAN PENINSULA

The Problem

To estimate the extent and importance of UK assets and interests in the Persian Gulf and Arabian Peninsula area, the main forces working in the area, and the will and ability of the UK to maintain its present position in this region in the light of recent developments.

Conclusions

1. The leaders of both major British political parties consider that continued and assured access to the oil of the Persian Gulf is vital to the UK. Accordingly, the UK will almost certainly make very great efforts to retain its special position in the area and would probably use force if necessary to do so. (Paras. 13–14, 23, 35)

2. Strong pressures against the British position exist, arising from the local unrest and agitation of nationalist-reformist groups, from territorial claims by Saudi Arabia and Yemen, and from the widespread influence of Arab nationalism supported especially by Egypt and the USSR. There is unlikely to be any major or lasting reduction in these pressures. (Paras. 14–22)

3. Over the next few years at least, the British appear to have a reasonably secure position in Muscat and the Trucial Sheikhdoms. It also appears unlikely that the British will be dislodged from Aden, although the containment of Yemeni pressures against the Western Protectorate is likely to be troublesome. (Paras. 28–30)

4. The outlook is more troubled and uncertain in Kuwait, where Britain’s material stakes in the area are most heavily concentrated, and in Bahrein and Qatar. While the situation there may remain stable for some time to come, the UK has failed to achieve a relationship with local elements which would enable it to make an orderly adjustment to the economic, social, and political pressures which are bound to mount over the years. The Suez crisis has strengthened ultranationalist influences and has bound the UK more closely to autocratic ruling families which may themselves become more susceptible to outside anti-British influences. (Paras. 31–33)²

[Here follows the Discussion portion of the Estimate, in numbered paragraphs 5 through 35, with sections entitled: I. The British Stake in the Area; II. Challenges to the British Position; III. Strengths and Weaknesses of the British Position; IV. The Outlook for the British Position; and Appendix I, Free World Oil Reserves and Production.]

1. Source: Department of State, INR–NIE Files. Secret. According to a note on the cover sheet, the estimate was “Submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence. The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and The Joint Staff.”

   The Estimate was “Concurred in by the Intelligence Advisory Committee on 19 February 1957. Concurring were the Special Assistant, Intelligence, Department of State; the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Army; the Director of Naval Intelligence; the Director of Intelligence, USAF; and the Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff. The Atomic Energy Commission Representative to the IAC, and the Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, abstained, the subject being outside of their jurisdiction.” Also included in the National Intelligence Estimate were two maps. The first entitled “Arabian Peninsula”; the second, “Arabian Peninsula Petroleum Concessions, Oil Fields, and Installations—January 1957”.

2. Notes on the Intelligence Advisory Committee meeting of February 19 by William McAfee recorded the following action taken on NIE 30–57:

   “Approved subject to minor changes. In discussing this paper the Chairman commented in particular on the strategic importance of the Kuwait oil reserves. Since the British are already established in Kuwait, he felt that the statement that the outlook there was uncertain should be deleted since the UK could put in requisite force to keep the peace. In response to a request from Mr. Furnas, Mr. Symmes who had been in Kuwait for two years spoke to this problem, noting the growth of the Nationalist movement and the present comparative isolation of the British from local forces. He noted that to solve the problem of local unrest by a clear and undisguised resort to force would in effect be an admission that the area was being held for a short period because of its strategic importance, and that long-range plans for cooperative development had been abandoned. He further noted that solution of the problem by force might bring the problem within the scope of UN consideration. Mr. Dulles indicated that these were all matters which would have to be given serious consideration and, therefore, withdrew his proposed change. He specifically requested that we ask our post in Kuwait for its comments on this estimate.” (Ibid., INR Files: Lot 58 d 776, IAC Meetings)