Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Near East: Jordan-Yemen, Volume XIII

273. Memorandum of a Conversation, White House, Washington, February 8, 1957, 10:30 a.m.¹

Washington, February 8, 1957, 10:30 a.m.

SUBJECTS

• 1. Drafting of the Communiqué
• 2. Exchange of Notes on Buraimi

PARTICIPANTS

• Saudi Arabia
  • His Majesty King Saud
  • Prince Fahad
  • Prince Musaad
  • Shaikh Yusuf Yasin
  • Shaikh Mohammed Surur
  • Ambassador Al-Khayyal
  • Abdul Aziz Majid (interpreter)
  • Mamdouh Adib
  • Khalid Bey
  • Jamal Bey Hussaini
• United States
  • President Eisenhower
  • Secretary Dulles
  • Mr. Rountree
  • Ambassador Wadsworth
  • General Smith
  • Mr. Nowfel (interpreter)
  • Mr. Stoltzfus

The President opened the discussion on the joint communiqué to be issued by the United States and Saudi Arabia. He said that there were a few expressions which meant different things to different people and he wanted to make certain that the words that were used in the communiqué would not be misunderstood by people who did not have an understanding of these matters. He wished to insure, in other words, that nothing that was said would be misunderstood. He then asked His Majesty whether he would like to bring up any points where he felt difficulties would arise.

His Majesty said he would like to discuss these points now.

The President said that this was the last time that he and His Majesty would meet and therefore it would be well if they agreed now upon the final text, that this would constitute a final settlement of the matter.

His Majesty said that if the President agreed, it would be well to clear up the minor points of difficulty he had noticed in the draft joint communiqué and that as for the other notes to be exchanged between the two governments he proposed that he leave several of his counselors behind for two or three days to consult with United States officials and join him in Spain later.

The President agreed to this procedure.

His Majesty said that it was his feeling that precipitate action might cause confusion or error and this could be avoided if his counselors and members of the President’s staff would have a little more time together.

Shaikh Yusuf then explained to His Majesty that some changes had been incorporated into the United States draft of the joint communiqué which His Majesty had not yet seen. Shaikh Yusuf then explained these changes to His Majesty.

His Majesty said that while his staff was working on the communiqué he would like to assure the President that the friendship between the United States and Saudi Arabia was as strong as ever and that he was sure that as a result of these talks, his visit, and his coming to know the President better, the friendship would be stronger in the days to come.

The President said that he felt exactly the same way.

His Majesty said that he and his associates knew the meaning of honesty and friendship. Saudi Arabia had long been envied for the friendship it had with the United States. It was necessary now to guard against their enemies, whose object it had been and would be to break up this friendship.

His Majesty ….

The President expressed his thanks and appreciation for this explanation by His Majesty.

The Secretary said that he had raised this point in his meeting with Shaikh Yusuf in order to ascertain what the true situation was and so that it would be possible to dispel any false rumors on this subject.

. . . . . . .

His Majesty said …. Regarding the joint communiqué, however, His Majesty said that although he had only had an opportunity to glance hastily at the alterations the United States had made since last night, he felt that there were several points he would like to clarify. For example, he said, in Article II the communiqué mentioned opposing the use of force but did not refer to opposing aggression whatever the source might be. His Majesty said that he believed that the United States and Saudi Arabia should express opposition to aggression from any source.

The President said that the United States thought of aggression and force as being much the same thing and were in fact concepts that were wrapped up together.

His Majesty then suggested that it read “use of force from any source.” The President agreed to this.

His Majesty then referred to paragraph 5 of the communiqué and said that he wished to omit the clause which said “with respect to military matters.” The President said that he would like His Majesty to know that certain expressions had been included in order to make the agreement acceptable to the American people. The President said that as long as he put into the communiqué that the United States was willing to assist Saudi Arabia in its defense and mentioned also the defense of Dhahran, his problems would not be so difficult later. For example, he said that if general hostilities broke out in the Middle East the Dhahran Airfield would undoubtedly be the prime target of the enemy. Thus to the American people it was only logical to mention this defense.

His Majesty said that if the President insisted on that, would it be possible to include the defense of Saudi Arabia not only of Dhahran.

The President then proposed that the sentence begin with “with respect to the military defense of Saudi Arabia, including Dhahran Airfield.”

His Majesty said he was agreeable to this change… .

The President said he would like His Majesty to understand his concept of one of the ways to promote peace and understanding. As a general rule, the President said he believed it was better to confine their attention to subjects of common interest to Saudi Arabia and the United States. If the two countries were to publish to the world that they were considering problems that concerned other countries besides just Saudi Arabia and the United States, other countries would be likely to object. The United States was trying to be friends with all of these other countries and would not wish them to feel that it was discussing their problems without their consent or in their absence. The President said that in his meeting last week with His Majesty he had said that the United States would use its good offices to help solve the problems of the frontiers and the islands, but he did not feel that the specific mention of these matters in a public communiqué would help to solve them.

His Majesty then said regarding economic development he preferred that the communiqué include the country as a whole and not mention restricting economic development to the Dhahran area only.

The President said that this also had been put in for public relations reasons since he had to tie economic help to mutual defense. He suggested, however, that the communiqué read that the United States agreed to provide economic facilities that would serve to augment the mutual security of both countries. This he said would pull the economic and military aspects of United States assistance to Saudi Arabia together.

His Majesty went on to say that he suggested “promotion of common aims” rather than “combined defense.” He said that in his view the word “aims” included the concept of defense and strength.

The President said that he would have a problem here with Congress. Many people had no objection to United States assistance for the military strengthening of Saudi Arabia but were against economic assistance, because they believed Saudi Arabia to be a rich country. If the military and economic aspects of United States assistance to Saudi Arabia could be tied together, it would be possible to achieve the results they wanted. The President suggested the wording “combined interests of the two countries.” His Majesty then suggested “combined aims and interests of the two countries.” The President agreed to this suggestion.

. . . . . . .

… His Majesty said he had one final point on the communiqué. He questioned whether it was necessary in paragraph 5 to say “in accordance with United States legislative authority.”

The President said it would be impossible for him under the Constitutional form of government not to include that clause and that he would not be honest with His Majesty if he did not state that this agreement was subject to legislative approval. Once this agreement had been concluded, the President said he would be going before Congress where he and his staff would be fighting as hard as they knew how to get its approval. However, Congressional authority would be essential before the agreement could be carried out. The President suggested that the wording could be changed to read “within the Constitutional processes of the United States.” His Majesty agreed to this wording.

His Majesty said that he also regretted the omission of the last paragraph of the communiqué as drafted last night. This was of interest to the United States, and he wondered if it could be put back into the communiqué. The President agreed to do this.

. . . . . . .

His Majesty said he would appreciate it if the President would allow him to explain certain other matters of interest to him regarding the Saudi Arabian financial situation. He said that it was true that it was the opinion of some that Saudi Arabia was rich. In fact, however, Saudi Arabia had many problems and burdens, all of which had been fully explained to Ambassador Wadsworth some time previously in Riyadh by the Saudi Arabian Minister of Finance. The Finance Minister had even presented Ambassador Wadsworth with detailed information on the Saudi Arabian budget and the new budget estimates. This had been done to prove to the United States that the country was shouldering a heavy financial burden and that, unless Saudi Arabia was able to obtain the friendly help of the United States, it might well find itself in real financial difficulties and even bankruptcy. His Majesty said he would appreciate it very much if the President would look into the matter to see if he could not find ways to help Saudi Arabia in the development of its economic and military projects, which were after all in the United States interests as well as Saudi Arabia’s. His Majesty added that Saudi Arabia’s defense obligations would now add $100 million to its expenditures for armaments, equipment and installation. This was something he wished to explain to the President so that, as friends, the two parties could work out some way to lighten Saudi Arabia’s load.

The President replied that the United States would always look with sympathy upon Saudi Arabia’s problems and give them the greatest possible consideration. His Majesty could understand, however, that the United States had acquired obligations throughout the world. In Korea and in Vietnam, and in many other countries, the United States was providing a great deal of assistance. Its obligations were heavy and thus it was necessary to study each situation thoroughly before adding to its already heavy commitments.

The President said he could assure His Majesty, however, that the United States would always study the problems of Saudi Arabia with the greatest interest and sympathy.

His Majesty said he wished to offer his sincere thanks and to assure the President that he appreciated the problems and obligations of the United States throughout the world. At the same time he hoped that the United States would carefully consider Saudi Arabia’s problems, which were also its problems.

The President said that he wanted to express again to His Majesty his great appreciation for the long trip that His Majesty had undertaken and His Majesty’s sincere efforts to help to promote peace and his friendship with the United States. The President said he was sure that permanent good would come out of his visit.

The President then asked whether His Majesty agreed to making the joint communiqué as corrected public at 2:00 p.m. today.

His Majesty said he was agreeable but that it was important to contact Saudi Arabia by telephone so that the communiqué could be issued simultaneously in both countries.

The President agreed to assist His Majesty in contacting Saudi Arabia by telephone. The President said he had one final point: would His Majesty use his influence to the greatest extent possible in Syria and Egypt to help prevent them from going Communist. The President said he felt these two countries were now in great danger.

His Majesty said that he was now giving his promise to use all his influence towards this end and he believed that, God willing, Egypt and Syria would not do anything against their Arab interests. His Majesty said the President could help in this matter also.

1. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 62 D 181, CF 833. Secret. Drafted by Stoltzfus. According to the President’s record of daily appointments, Eisenhower met with the King privately from 10:30 to 10:50 a.m. with only the King’s interpreter present. (Eisenhower Library, Record of President’s Daily Appointments) In a memorandum of his conversation with the President on February 8, Dulles noted that the President informed him that Saud had raised two points during their private talk. The first concerned the King’s fear that if the Israelis were ever granted rights in the Gulf of Aqaba, the United States should assure that they could not interfere with the flow of Muslim pilgrims. According to Dulles, the President informed the King that he could not conceive of the Israelis disrupting the movement of pilgrims. The second point focused on Saud’s desire to find someone in Saudi Arabia through whom he could communicate with Eisenhower on a “highly confidential basis.” (Ibid., Dulles Papers, Meetings with the President) According to a note, February 11, from Howe to Herter, copies of the memorandum of the President’s private talk with Saud had been sent to Rountree and Allen Dulles. (Department of State, Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversations, Lot 64 D 199) For text of the Joint Communiqué issued by the White House on February 8, see Department of State Bulletin, February 25, 1957, pp. 308–309.