Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Near East: Jordan-Yemen, Volume XIII

138. Telegram From the Embassy in Lebanon to the Secretary of State¹

Beirut, March 16, 1957—8 p.m.

2223. From Richards. After intensive discussions with Lebanese officials including President, Prime Minister, Foreign Minister, Commanding General, Minister of National Economy and President of Chamber of Deputies and taking into account views and recommendations of Ambassador Heath and his staff I concluded program of economic and military assistance to Lebanon necessary to further purposes of President’s proposals. Accordingly I have informed GOL United States prepared in principle initiate necessary procedural and legal steps to provide on grant basis economic development assistance up to $10 million. Military defense assistance up to something over $2 million (exact MDAP figure not given Lebanon but we estimate will amount to about $2.7 million).²

Following are among factors influencing my decision:

1. Lebanon prior to my visit endorsed President’s proposals and has strongly reaffirmed this stand in public statements since my arrival. These acts required considerable political courage which we should recognize.

2. Public impact achieved in Lebanon as first country visited by mission important to success of mission’s trip as a whole.

3. Real fear evident among Lebanese officials (confirmed by Embassy) over growing intensity subversive activities in country by Communists supported by Syria and Egypt.³ This fear extends to apprehension that Syria might go so far as to launch armed attack. Lebanese argued with logic that US should respond to call for help from pro-Western Lebanon against Soviet armed Syria.

4. During forthcoming elections pro-Western policies of present government will be very much on the block. Government must be in position to show tangible results from cooperation with West. Defeat of political grouping now in power would severely damage US interests and could swing Lebanon into Syrian-Egyptian fold.

5. Lebanon obviously has neither intention nor capability of launching attack on any other country. I heard remarkably few references to Israel. I did hear repeated expressions of admiration for President Eisenhower’s stand after UK-French attack on Egypt and for his February 2 statement regarding Israel withdrawal.⁴

6. In view of present status of Lebanon’s economy and absence of debt I would find it somewhat hard to justify grant economic or military aid on purely economic grounds. However I consider political reasons mentioned above overriding. Projects selected for economic aid⁵ will involve considerable financial contributions by Lebanon Government. These projects appear sound capable of quick implementation and will have direct impact upon population. They should both create good will for the US and help rectify conditions which Communists and their supporters can exploit.

7. My decision regarding additional grant military aid was difficult. Items to be provided will be for defensive purposes.⁶ They have been screened from a very much larger list of deficiencies presented to me on my arrival. Mission tried repeatedly but unsuccessfully to get Lebanon to accept equipment on credit or loan basis. After weighing carefully all factors I concluded that this small amount of additional equipment as a grant was justified. It will in no sense affect arms balance in area but will impart to Lebanese important additional feeling of self-confidence and thus willingness to resist either direct attacks or subversion from Syria. Regarding reactions elsewhere in area I believe Iraqis likely to approve; Israel is unlikely to object; and in case of complaints from Saudi Arabia, we can point to small amount of arms compared to amount flowing to Saudis and to favorable consideration given to Saudi requests during Saud’s visit to Washington.

[Here follows section two of the telegram, dealing in part with the procedures necessary to implement aid commitments made by the Richards mission.]

Heath

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 120.1580/3–1657. Secret; Priority. Repeated to London, Paris, Tripoli, Ankara, Tehran, Damascus, Tel Aviv, Amman, Baghdad, Karachi, Kabul, Jidda, Cairo, Addis Ababa, Khartoum, Athens, Tunis, Rabat, Rome, and New Delhi.
2. Since Lebanon did not have a standard Mutual Defense Assistance Program agreement with the United States, this aid was furnished through Section 401(a) of the Mutual Security Act. Lebanon gave assurances that it would use this military aid only for self-defense, that it would not transfer the equipment without U.S. consent, and that it would protect the security of all assistance furnished. (Memorandum from Metzger to Raymond, April 10; Ibid., 783A.5–MSP/4–1057) The aid agreement was effected by an exchange of notes at Beirut, and entered into force on June 6, 1957. (TIAS 3855; 8 UST 943)
3. In conversation with General Chehab, now Commanding General of the Lebanese Army, Richards was told that “in the past few months the Syrians have sent money and arms to Lebanese tribesmen along the Syrian border, have sought to persuade these tribesmen to address petitions to the Syrian government to incorporate their areas within the borders of Syria, have bribed Lebanese newspapers and politicians, and have incited and bribed persons to create civil disturbances in Lebanon. Syrian army officers who are on intimate terms with their counterparts in Lebanon have kept the latter well informed about Syrian aggressive intentions toward Lebanon.” (Record of meeting at the Lebanese Ministry of Defense, March 15; Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 57 D 616, Lebanese Document)
4. Reference is presumably to Eisenhower’s February 20 statement, urging U.N. pressure upon Israel to withdraw from Egyptian territory. For text of the statement, see Department of State Bulletin, March 11, 1957, pp. 387–391.
5. These projects included low-cost housing, highway construction, irrigation, flood control, rural electrification, village water supply, and airport expansion. (Telegram 2224 from Beirut, March 16; Department of State, Central Files, 120.1580/ 3–1657)
6. These items consisted of anti-tank weapons, light artillery, motor transport, engineering equipment, demolition equipment, fortification material, and electronic equipment. (Ibid.,) A detailed list is in Army message CX 16 from Beirut, March 16; Ibid., According to Heath, the only shooting weapons included were 12,106 recoilless rifles and 18 105mm howitzers. (Telegram 2223, section 2)