137. Telegram From the Embassy in Lebanon to the Secretary of State1
2209. From Richards. Preliminary general discussion with President Chamoun and Foreign Minister Malik last evening went off in cordial atmosphere and both Lebanese expressed full understanding and approval of new United States Middle East policy. Chamoun pointed out Lebanon had given its indorsement publicly even sooner than the American Congress. They expressed full concurrence in principles underlying policy.
Conclusion of nearly two hour exchange Chamoun made closing statement to effect that he did not believe in formal written alliances, but believed firmly in friendship, understanding and cooperation as bonds between peoples. Said Lebanon had strong friendship for people of United States Lebanon would not give United States military bases in time of peace, ….
We outlined essential elements of new Middle East policy emphasizing especially sincerity of President Eisenhower as man of peace and fact policy supported not only by Executive branch, but also by Congress and great majority of American people. I also emphasized President’s complete respect for sovereignty Lebanon and all other free nations and fact we not seeking sphere of influence, bases, or special position for ourselves.
I introduced subject of possibility United States aid to Lebanon by saying we wanted to assist where we could but that our funds are limited and we probably could not do everything Lebanon would like us to do. Chamoun mentioned no figures, saying he would leave details to experts, spoke of list of “vital economic projects” Lebanon wished to undertake in order produce greater employment and higher living standards especially in certain relatively backward areas of country. Rather than ask for large lump sum in one year, he would prefer receive assurances of continued help over period of five or six years which would be needed to complete proposed projects. I pointed out limitations on our authority and fact Congress up to now had never appropriated money for more than one year at a time. Nevertheless, I did not think United States was going to abandon foreign aid programs and felt there was reasonable assurance [Page 209] if something were started it would be carried forward. Chamoun observed he was not asking firm guarantees but wanted to emphasize importance of continuity.
Re military aspect of policy, Chamoun voiced thanks to President Eisenhower for offer of United States armed protection against Communist aggression. He said, however, Lebanon did not fear Soviet attack but rather Communist penetration. Danger had increased since Syria and Egypt had begun to large extent to follow Russian policy. Communist activities had never been so great as now.
While Lebanon knew she could call on United States if attacked by major power Chamoun said she also felt she must have small army of her own equipped with modern weapons which could at least delay invasion until help came. She wanted develop one infantry division, one tank brigade and one artillery brigade along with two air squadrons. She greatly appreciated our recent offer of $2 million worth equipment. He had been told, however, Lebanon would not be given shooting weapons. He was not convinced this was good decision. I observed we were anxious to avoid stimulating arms race in Middle East, to which he replied Lebanon would not and could not attack any country with armed forces of size he had mentioned. Since Russia, our common enemy, was helping Syria, which was unfriendly to Lebanon, Chamoun said it would be logical for United States to help Lebanon protect herself against Syrian attack.
I said I had understood that Lebanon was interested in building up forces for internal security. Chamoun agreed he feared Communist infiltration but reiterated need to guard against overt attack as well.
Malik’s only contribution to general discussion was to say that it was important to nip Communist designs in the bud and that this was primarily a political problem rather than economic or military. He spoke of Egyptian-Syrian- … conspiracy against Lebanon and argued United States should take interest in all aspects Lebanese politics, devoting attention to countering Communist elements.
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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 120.1580/3–1557. Secret. Repeated to Cairo, Damascus, Jidda, and Tripoli.
After Congress approved the President’s Mideast Resolution #1 on March 7, Eisenhower sent former Congressman James P. Richards to the Middle East to gather information and explain American policy to Middle Eastern governments. Richards’ first stop was Beirut. See also infra.
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