120. Telegram From the Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State 1

490. Re Secto 56.2 Embassy agrees with principle aiding Lebanon proposed British memorandum; however believe small amounts economic aid would not achieve psychological effect so imperative now. On other hand relative small amount arms aid would produce immediate strong effect and would prove to Lebanese value of policy close alignment and support US. Commitments effected by air agreement and arms aid (Deptel 5333 and Embtel 4144) would serve as guarantee to an independent Lebanon which would give GOL necessary confidence and strength take more leadership in area. Consequently we reiterate recommendations made Embtels 414, 4405 and 442.6

With respect … Karame Government (Deptel 6497) although we still of same opinion believe situation has worsened since October 11 (Embtel 414) to extent we might wish speed action. Believe we could safely make preliminary confidential approach to President … informing him US has intention make offer and seeking his cooperation in method and timing.

Would like add suggestion that Lebanese might at same time be helpful in continuing steps toward solution Arab-Israeli problem on basis Secretary’s August 29 [26] proposals. In lengthy interview between Foreign Minister and Congressman Multer this morning Foreign Minister made personal suggestion that President Eisenhower or Secretary invite representatives Arab States and Israel separately to discuss further steps. Foreign Minister expressed several times his willingness meet any time to discuss question.

Believe possible that if given encouragement and tangible support Lebanese might play constructive role in working toward relaxation of tensions. To achieve best effect in Arab States and Israel [Page 180] offer arms to Lebanon should be coupled with simultaneous proposal of meeting discuss Arab-Israeli question (paragraph 2, Embtel 440).

We believe situation demands concerted action on several fronts and that piecemeal offers would not serve our objectives. We need to show that we have confidence in our friends and that we are prepared take initiative in reaching fair modus vivendi.

Emmerson
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00/10–2955. Top Secret; Priority. Also sent to Geneva for the Secretary.
  2. Supra.
  3. In telegram 533 to Beirut, October 5, the Department noted, inter alia, that the purpose of the Department of Defense in seeking U.S. rights to Beirut International Airport was to develop installations and units there to support possible wartime operations in Lebanon. (Department of State, Central Files, 711.56383A/10–555)
  4. See footnote 4, Document 118.
  5. In telegram 440, Emmerson commented, among other things, that some encouragement to Lebanon in the form of limited defensive arms aid would help the U.S. cause with the Arabs and pose the least threat of unfavorable repercussions on the part of Israel. (Department of State, Central Files, 101.21–NIS/10–1755)
  6. See footnote 2, Document 118.
  7. Document 118.